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ABSTRACT
The surge of the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs' or capitalists'
foreign direct investment (FDI) from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and
Malaysia in Vietnam was only noticeable in the early 1990s, especially
from 1991 to 1995. Their investment in Vietnam had grown by leaps
and bounds, from U.S.$ 1.06 billion to U.S$ 7.81 billion in 1995.

By

pouring this massive investment into Vietnam, these overseas Chinese
entrepreneurs had out-invested other investors from the countries, such
as Japan,

South

Switzerland.

Korea, United

States of America,

France, and

In view of this, it does seem clear that this overseas

Chinese investment is heading the way to become one of the most
dynamic and influential forces in transforming Vietnam's economy.
Arguably, an unfavourable sudden change of political and economic
circumstances in Vietnam or in the Asia-Pacific region could dash this
promising outlook of these overseas Chinese entrepreneurs' increasing
substantial
influence.

investment,

and

growing

economic

significance

and

Nonetheless, by examining the pull and push factors, the

extensiveness and penetrability of these overseas Chinese investments
into various aspects of Vietnam's economy, and Vietnam's expanding
trade ties with East Asian nations and recent accession to ASEAN, the
afromentioned argument cannot be established. The pull factors which
relate to the strategic geographical location, abundant unexploited
natural resources, potentially large domestic market, cheap and highly
literate labour force, relative political and social stability, inauguration of
doi moi programme, and the availability of business-oriented and
Confucian-value-adherence ethnic Chinese have conditioned Vietnam as
a very attractive investment destination. The push factors which concern
the positive and negative political, economic, social considerations

arising from or existing in those overseas Chinese entrepreneurs' home
countries have prompted them to invest in Vietnam.

These overseas

Chinese entrepreneurs have not only invested heavily in Vietnam but
also diversed their investment to various economic sectors of Vietnam.
In doing so, these overseas Chinese entrepreneurs display some major
commercial commitments and can probably establish some structural
importance in Vietnam's economy.

Moreover, the blossoming trade

relations between Vietnam and East Asian countries as well as Vietnam's
admission to ASEAN in July 1995 have not only reflected the economic
importance of Vietnam to East Asia and the gradual integration of
Vietnam into regional and international community, but also the growing
tendency for more economic interaction between those overseas Chinese
entrepreneurs and Vietnam that can most likely facilitate the process of
regional and international integration. Taking all this into consideration,
it is clear that these four East Asian nations' overseas Chinese enormous
investment in Vietnam appears to increase persistently and their
economic influence and significance in Vietnam will become increasingly
fundamental.
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INTRODUCTION
It is an accepted fact that foreign direct investment (FDI) has
been an engine for growth among all emerging economies in the world.
In Asia, for example, the high economic growth rates of the Newly
Industrialized Countries (NICs) have been attributed to the large
amount of FDI from Japan, United States and Europe. The second
lower case generation

NICs - namely Malaysia, Thailand and

Indonesia - have also benefited from the inflow of foreign capital from
not only Japan, Europe and the US, but also the first generation NICs.
More recently, Vietnam has become the promising destination for FDI.
FDI in Vietnam has come from a wider scope of countries such as the
U.S, Japan, Europe, the first generation NICs and the second
generation NICs. However, the Asia-Pacific countries are the dominant
investors in Vietnam and they account 70% of the total foreign direct
investment in the countiy.
A notable feature of the rapid rise in foreign direct investment
has been the rising inflows of overseas Chinese or "Hua-qiao"
investment to Vietnam. The sources of the increasing overseas
Chinese investment in Vietnam are mainly from Taiwan, Hong Kong,
Singapore, and Malaysia. These four countries emerge as the four of
the largest top ten foreign investors in Vietnam by the end of 1995
(See Chart I). Taiwan leads all the others with a total capital of
U.S.$3.3 billion. Hong Kong is the second largest investor with

U.S.$2.1 billion and Malaysia became the seventh largest with
U.S.$846 million.

Chart 1 : Leading Investors in Vietnam (as at December 1995)
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Source : Leung, Suiwah, 'Asia-Pacific Profiles : Decision Time for Vietnam', The Asia-Pacific
Magazine, No.3, June 1996, p. 14

Among the total capital invested (U.S.$14.33 billion), Taiwan, Hong
Kong, Singapore and Malaysia accounted for 54% (See Chart 2).
Taiwan held the biggest share of 22%; Hong Kong and Singapore
accounted for 15% and 11% respectively; Malaysia constituted 6% of
the

total

investment

(Malaysia's

ethnic

Chinese

investors

or

entrepreneurs most likely accounted for about 3-4%)*.

* Note: This is only a speculation because the exact share of Malaysian Overseas Chinese is difficult to
be computed because some investment of the Overseas Chinese from Malaysia is untraceable or
unrecorded.

Chart 2 : Percentage of Total Investment
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Source : Compiled from Chart 1

The overseas Chinese enterprise groups throughout East Asia
have grown into a significant economic force in the 1990s. Since the
1980s, they have been spearheading virtually every major business
trend in the region. Countries with a major ethnic Chinese population,
such as the NICs-3 (Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) and minor
Chinese population, such as the ASEAN-3 (Malaysia, Indonesia and
Thailand) have created investment flows within East Asia that outrank
Japanese, European and American investors. The overseas Chinese
entrepreneurs' increasingly prominent role as .sources of foreign direct
investment in China has been dominated by the overseas Chinese
from Taiwan,

Hong

Kong,

Singapore,

Malaysia,

Thailand

and

Indonesia. Considering the amount of foreign direct investment, 80%
of the total investment channeled by the overseas Chinese to China,
the galloping economic growth and the long presence of the overseas

Chinese investment in China since 1979, the crucial, constructive and
long-term economic role played by the overseas Chinese in China is
indisputable. The manifestation of the surge of these overseas Chinese
investment in Vietnam was only in the early 1990s, particularly from
1991 to 1995. The overseas Chinese entrepreneurs from Taiwan, Hong
Kong, Singapore and Malaysia have poured voluminous investment
into Vietnam during this five year period. The investment made by
these four countries has shown a tremendous increase year by year.
Taiwanese investment which recorded U.S.$499 million in 1991 had
shown an increase to U.S.$793 million in 1992; U.S.$1.53 billion in
1993; U.S.$1.96 billion; and U.S.$3.3 billion in 1995 (See Table 1 and
Chart 3). The investment made by Hong Kong scoring U.S.$393
million in 1991 had risen to U.S.$512 million in 1992; U.S.$1.3 billion
in 1993; U.S.$1.8 billion in 1994; and U.S.$1.8 billion in 1994; and
U.S.$2.1 billion in 1995 (See Table 1 and Chart 3). Singaporean
investment which registered below U.S.$100 million in 1991 had
grown to U.S.$109 million in 1992; U.S.$389 million in 1993;
U.S.$1.07 billion in 1994; and U.S.$1.5 billion in 1995 (See Table 1
and Chart 3). Malaysia which invested about U.S.$65 million in 1991
had boosted its investment to U.S.$90 million in 1992; U.S.$457
million in 1993; U.S.$580 million in 1994; and U.S.$846 million in
1995 (See Table 1 and Chart3).

Table 1 iCumulative Investment Made by the four East Asian Nations in Vietnam, 1991-1995
Country
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Taiwan

499 million

793 million

1.53 billion

1.96 billion

3.36 billion

Hong Kong

393 million

512 million

1.30 billion

1.80 billion

2.10 billion

Singapore

100 million

109 million

389 million

1.07 billion

1.50 billion

Malaysia

65 million

90 million

457 million

580 million

846 million

Total

1.06 billion

1.50 billion

3.68 billion

5.41 billion

7.81 billion

Source : Compiled from various sources which include Asiaweek, vol.18. No. 15, April 12 1992;
Nguyen Xuan Oanh & Grub, Phillip D, Vietnam : The New Investment Frontier in Southeast Asia,
Times Academic Press, Singapore, 1992, p.55; 'Vietnam-The Road To Reform', Reading of the Week,
University of Wollongong, Australia, 1995; Leung, Suiwah, 'Asia-Pacific Profiles : Decision Time for
Vietnam', Asia-Pacific Magazine, No.3, June 1996, p. 14 ; American Technology : Foreign Investment
in Vietnam [On line]. Available Internet: American Technology Home Page

Chart 3 : Investment in Vietnam by the four countries (Taiwan,Hong
Kong,Singapore,Malaysia) from 1991 to 1995
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n view of the rising and colossal amount of these four countries
investment in Vietnam from the period of 1991-1995, it does seem
clear that overseas Chinese investment is heading the way to become

the most dynamic and dominant force in the country's economy. The
growing significance and influence of overseas Chinese investment in
Vietnam arguably does not materialize or come into being because the
overseas Chinese investors or entrepreneurs might be set back by the
unfavourable sudden change of politicad and economic circumstances
in the Asia-Pacific region or in Vietnam. However, this undesirable
phenomenon is most unlikely to happen. By weighing the pull factors
and push factors, the extensiveness and penetrability of the overseas
Chinese entrepreneurial role into the various aspects of Vietnamese
economy, the improving trade ties of Vietnam with East Asia, and
Vietnam's integration into ASEAN, the aforementioned argument holds
no validity.
The pull factors which refer to the favourable and stable
political, economic, and social conditions produced by the openminded and pragmatic political and economic reforms unleashed and
committed by the Vietnamese government since 1986 as well as the
abundant unexploited natural resources and mineral reserves, a
relatively untapped highly literate, and cheap workforce, a 74-million
Vietnamese potentially lucrative domestic market, and the businessoriented ethnic Chinese community, have convinced and attracted the
overseas Chinese investors and capitalists to pour voluminous
investment into Vietnam. The push factors which concern the positive
and negative political, economic, and social considerations arising
from or existing in the overseas Chinese host country or state have

driven them to invest in Vietnam. The combination of these pull and
push factors coupled with extensive and penetrating involvement of
these overseas Chinese investment in various economic sectors of
Vietnam, Vietnam's thriving trade links with East Asian countries as
well as Vietnam's attainment of ASEAN membership have all signified
that the inflow of those overseas Chinese massive investment will
persist and the economic influence and significance of these overseas
Chinese entrepreneurs in Vietnam will be increasingly crucial.

Ob jective and Methodology of the Study

The main objective of this research essay is to study the foreign
direct investment of the overseas Chinese, especially from Taiwan,
Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia in Vietnam - its reasons and
implications - in light of Vietnam's and East Asia's economic boom.
Furthermore, hopefully, this study of these four East Asian nations'
overseas Chinese investment in the context of Vietnam could also
shed light on the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs' nature, behaviour
and pattern in conducting their business. In preparing this study, I
have been very conscious of the serious limitations of the data,
particularly on the Malaysian Chinese investment in Vietnam. Official
figures on the Malaysian Chinese are veiy difficult to obtain because
the Malaysian Chinese entrepreneurs or capitalists have deliberately
chosen to keep a low profile on their investment in order to avoid

publicity. In order to identify their investment, I tried to collect all the
obtainable recorded data or information on the Malaysian investing
companies

in

Vietnam

from

various

sources

(magazines

and

newspapers), and then I attempted to use the publication of Who's
Who In Malaysian Business & Directory 1985-1986, Who Owns Whom
: Australasia 65 Far East 1993 &1994, Major Companies of the Far
East and Australasia 1992/1993, and David C.L.Ch'ng's publication
of 806 Companies Owned or associated with Selected

Overseas

Chinese Entrepreneurs 1992 to track down those Malaysian investing
companies' parent companies or owners. The investing companies of
the four East Asian countries (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and
Malaysia) in Vietnam listed in this research, paper are classified as
overseas-Chinese-owned because the controlling interest of those
companies is largely or wholly possessed by the overseas Chinese of
the respective nations. Although Singapore and Malaysia claim to be
multi-ethnic, the overseas Chinese community of the two nations
dominate the national economy and hold the controlling interest of
most of the public or private enterprises.

Singapore's Temasek

Holdings and United Oveseas Bank Ltd (UOB), for instance, are wholly
owned and managed by the overseas Chinese.

The former is a

venture-capital company that the Singaporean government h a s direct
and major stakes and the latter is a limited company controlled by
Wee Cho Yaw who personally owns at least 40 percent of the UOB
shares. In Malaysia, the private limited enterprises, such as the MBF

Holdings Bhd, Kuok Bros. Sdn. Bhd, and Public Bank Berhad, are all
largely or wholly owned and controlled by overseas Chinese.

Public

Bank Berhad, for example, was founded and controlled by The Hong
Piow who has a personal stake of 40 percent.

MBF Holdings Bhd

which has more than 100 subsidiary companies was founded and
wholly owned by Loy Hean Heong.

However, this research paper is

conducted through a methodology of compiling, analysing and
interpreting some existing statistical data, economic and political
literature of Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore,. Malaysia and Vietnam,
and the perspectives of economists, political scientists and business
scholars who have studied foreign investment in developing countries
from different viewpoints. Statistical data for the four countries'
(Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore) investment in Vietnam
and trade with Vietnam is derived and compiled from various sources,
ranging from the respective country's official sources, such as
Taiwan's Council for Economic Planning and Development, Taipei
overseas Chinese affairs Council (Tai-pei Shih: Ch'iao Wu Wei Yuan
Hui), Hong Kong's Census and Statistics Department, Singapore Trade
Statistics

Department,

Singapore

International

Chamber

of

Commerce, Department of Statistics Malaysia, Chamber of Commerce
and Industry of Vietnam, and the State Committee for Cooperation
and Investment, to that of international organisations such as the
Asian Development Bank (ADB)and

the United Nations, and

complemented by data from various authors in their studies on the

four countries' (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia) and
Vietnam's economy.

The surge of overseas Chinese investment in

Vietnam is a recent phenomenon and, hence, further research should
be carried out in the future in order to verify the significance of
overseas Chinese, especially from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and
Malaysia, and their investment in the Vietnamese economy. It must be
pointed out again that this research essay does not intend to present
a definite and conclusive discussion or argument on the emergence of
the overseas Chinese (from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and
Malaysia) investment in Vietnam and their role in the Vietnamese
economy. It is hoped that this initial study and effort will attract some
attention and spark further interest and research in this field.

Structure of the Study
Chapter 1 of this research paper provides an overview of the
overseas Chinese or 'Hua-ren' which includes the general historical,
cultural, and economic background of the overseas Chinese in
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam.
Chapter 2 of this research paper examines the Vietnamese
economy in the period 1975-85, in which Vietnam adopted a centrally
planned economic model to construct a supposedly prosperous and
growth-oriented economy. But, the centrally planned economic model
based on socialist Marxist-Leninist principles plunged Vietnam's

economy into the doldrums. By introducing and imposing socialistoriented economic policies, such as collectivization or nationalization,
the enterprising economic activities in Vietnam had been severely
crippled rather than boosted. Furthermore, the Vietnamese overseas
Chinese or Hoa residing mostly in South Vietnam was particularly
hard hit under the socialist-oriented economic system. Most of their
business

or enterprises were confiscated and nationalized.

By

antagonizing the ethnic Chinese, the Communist government had not
only damaged the economic backbone of Vietnam but also the
potential and powerful economic driving force in the country.
Chapter 3 & 4 of this research deals with the pull and the push
factors in an attempt to shed light on the rush of the overseas Chinese
investment to Vietnam and the post 1986 political and economic
development in Vietnam as well as the post-cold war economic and
political situation in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia.
In Chapter 3, the pull factors are discussed. The pull factors
refer to the favourable and stable political, economic and social
conditions offered by Vietnam. With the Vietnamese Communist Party
(VCP) coming into power in 1975, the state of Vietnam has not
experienced any major political chaos or crisis. The tough line attitude
adopted by the Vietnamese government towards internal dissenters
has warded off any political rival or opposition. Furthermore, the
political "renovation" launched by the VCP, especially under Nguyen
Van Linh's leadership, pursues a process of reform that can counter
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bureaucratic

ineptitude

and

corruption

and

produce

wider

participation and greater administrative efficacy without bringing the
Party's own legitimacy and position under

major challenge. In the

light of this, the VCP can ensure a firmer and durable position in the
political arena of Vietnam and faster long-term political stability. The
introduction of "doi mof or economic "renovation" in 1986 and the
enactment of a series of lenient laws on foreign investment have
created a favorable operating environment for FDL Vietnam is a
country well endowed with natural resources and mineral reserves
such as timber, oil and gas, coal, bauxite, rare earth metals and a
number of non-metals which are ready to be exploited. Its cheap, and
highly-literate labour force is ideal for developing the production of
consumer and export goods. Besides, a population of 74 million has
positioned Vietnam as a potentially lucrative consumer market to be
tapped.

One

unperceivable

factor

of

the

pull

factors

is

the

approximately 0.7 million ethnic Chinese population living in Vietnam.
This handful of Vietnam's Chinese community which is traditionally
heavily business-oriented and has 'cultural similarity and familiarity'
with the overseas Chinese from the four countries has served as a
seamless and informal business network for the overseas Chinese to
tap into the local market.
Chapter 4 deals with the push factors which concern the
positive and negative political, economic, and social considerations
arising from or existing in the overseas Chinese home country. The

positive political consideration is the rapprochement between East
Asian countries and Vietnam. In the wake of its withdrawal of forces
from Cambodia and Laos in 1989 and the Cambodia settlement
agreement, Vietnam's relationships with Malaysia, Singapore, Hong
Kong and Taiwan have improved greatly.

Increasing government

official visits from these four countries to Vietnam and the mounting
business and friendship agreements reached by both sides have
fostered the confidence and willingness of the overseas Chinese to
invest in Vietnam. The negative political consideration faced by
Malaysia's, Hong Kong's and Taiwan's but not by Singapore's overseas
Chinese entrepreneurs has been another push factor. Since the end of
the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1990, the investment environment
of Malaysia for domestic Chinese entrepreneurs is still somewhat
unfavourable. This is because the economic policy after 1990, the
National Development Policy (NDP), which includes the Sixth Malaysia
Plan (6MP) for 1991-1995 and a ten-year Second Outline Perspective
Plan (OPP2) for 1991-2000, still reiterates the NEP's commitments
which have disadvantaged the ethnic Chinese. With Hong Kong's
reversion to PRC sovereignty in 1997, the future well-being of the
territory in terms of political rights, independent legislation and pool
of skilled workers and professionals became uncertain. Hence, Hong
Kong Chinese business is greatly unnerved by all this uncertainty.
The unsettled and prolonged political tension between the PRC and
Taiwan has diverted some Taiwanese investment to Vietnam. The

Taiwanese government and business community are concerned that
investments could be lost due to sudden policy shifts in Peking, or be
used as a political tool to influence cross-Taiwan straits relations.
Therefore, the "Southward Policy^ or "Go South Policy^ was initiated
by the Taiwanese government to encourage investors or entrepreneurs
to target Southeast Asian countries and at the same time strengthen
Taiwan's economic relations with the nations of ASEAN. The emerging
or existing negative economic consideration which comprises the
rising land and labour costs, stricter environmental-protection laws,
scarcity of renewable and non-renewable resources, and the small
domestic market confronted by the overseas Chinese in the four East
Asian nations, has compelled them to seek alternative destination for
investment.
Chapter 5 deals with the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs' ways
of investing in Vietnam, spatial location of investment in Vietnam, and
extensive and penetrating entrepreneurial role into the various sectors
of Vietnam's economy. Most of the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs
invest in Vietnam through their subsidiary companies that engage two
common and main methods of investment: joint venture and 100 per
cent foreign capital ownership.

The heaviest concentration of these

four East Asian nations' overseas Chinese investment is in the
southern part of Vietnam.

Overseas Chinese investment which is

traditionally and typically confined to property, trading, shipping,
hotels, and light industry, such as textiles, toys and food, has made a

breakthrough in Vietnam. The overseas Chinese investors have not
only poured their investment into the so-called traditional and typical
economic

sectors

but

also

into

the

sectors

of

transport

and

communication, agriculture and fishery, services and infrastructure.
There are also some indicators showing the increasing overseas
Chinese investment in heavy industries such as steel production,
cement and vehicles. Taking this into account, the overseas Chinese
have displayed a very different investment pattern from the Japanese,
the American, and the European investment pattern in the developing
countries, such as Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines.
The investment made by the United States, Japan and the European
countries in the developing countries is concentrated mainly on
manufacturing industries ( food, textiles, wood, paper, and chemicals)
and

mineral

exploration.

With

this

diversified

and

borderless

investment pattern, it does seem clear that the overseas Chinese
investment is one of the key forces that could transform Vietnam's
economy.
Chapter 6 deals with the prospects of Vietnam's integration into
the regional and the world economy. Since the overseas Chinese
entrepreneurs are the largest source of foreign direct investment in
Vietnam, their role has been critical to the transformation of Vietnam
into

a

probable

export-oriented

dynamo.

Moreover,

the

trade

relationships of Vietnam with other countries can also be brought
closer and improved directly or indirectly by the overseas Chinese

entrepreneurs. With the sustained GDP growth in the range of 6 to 9.5
percent per annum and the growing and expanding trade ties,
Vietnam gained the membership of ASEAN in July 1995. By obtaining
ASEAN membership, Vietnam has built a concrete cornerstone to pave
the way for participating in the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) or even
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the World Trade
Organization

(WTO).

In order to deepen Vietnam's

economic

integration with the region or the world, the East Asian overseas
Chinese entrepreneurs' continuing and increasing investment into
Vietnam

is

exceedingly

important

and

necessary.

CHAPTER 1
An Overview of the Overseas Chinese
1.1 Definition of Overseas Chinese

The "overseas Chinese" can be defined as ethnic Chinese living
outside the present geographical boundaries of the People's Republic
of China (PRC).i This includes the ethnic Chinese population of
Taiwan and Hong Kong because they are currently living outside the
administration of the People's Republic of China. Furthermore, the
political and economic structures of Taiwan and Hong Kong are so
different from those prevailing in Mainland China that the population
of these two countries are more appropriately regarded as being
"overseas''.2 "Overseas Chinese" is a translation of the term Hua-qiao
(sojourner) and suggests that those so described are temporarily
resident outside China and intend to return to China. This carries the
implication that the sovereign and political loyalties of "overseas
Chinese" lie not with their country of residence but with China.^
However, today, the vast majority of the so-called "overseas Chinese"
who were not born in China and are citizens of the countries in which
they reside have no intention to return to China to reside."^ The term
"overseas Chinese", over time, has been widely used by many scholars

^ Ch'ng, David C.L., The Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs in East Asia : Background. Business
Pratices And International Networks. CEDA Monograph M 100, Australia, 1993, p.26
^ Md
^ East Asia Analytical Unit. Overseas Chinese Business Networks in Asia. Department of Foreign
Affairs And Trade, Canberra AGPS, 1995, p.l 1
^ ibid

and academics to embrace all Chinese living outside China, whether
or not they intend to "return'' to live there.

1.2 Percentage of the Total Population of Overseas Chinese
Table 2 presents the percentage of ethnic Chinese in the total
population for the five East Asian nations, namely Taiwan, Hong
Kong, Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam.
TABLE 2 : Overseas Chinese as Number and Percentage of Local Population,
1991
COUNTRY
TAIWAN

TOTAL POPULATION
(million)
20.6

ETHNIC CHINESE
(miHions)
20.3

HONGKONG

5.8

5.7

SINGAPORE

2.7

2.1

MALAYSIA

18.0

5.8

VIETNAM

64.4

0.7

ETHNIC CHINESE AS
% POPULATION
97
^ W^
77

.

29
1.3

Source : Compiled from Ch'ng, David C L., The Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs in East Asia :
Background, Business Practices and International Networks. CEDA Monagraph Ml GO, 1993,
p.27 and East Asia Analytical Unit of Department of Foreign Affairs And Trade, Overseas
Chinese Business Networks In Asia, Canberra AGPS, 1995, pp.49,69,90, and 100.

The population of Taiwan and Hong Kong are predominantly Chinese.
In Taiwan 97 per cent of the total

population is ethnically Chinese

and the Chinese comprise 98 percent of the population in Hong Kong.
77 percent of Singapore's population is Chinese in origin, while 29
percent of Malaysia's population is Chinese. Vietnam has the smallest
population of Chinese which only constitute 1.2 percent of the total
population.

1.3 Dialect Distribution of Overseas Chinese
The majority of the overseas Chinese in the East Asian countries
(Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam) originate from
two coastal

provinces

in Southern

China, namely

Fujian and

Guangdong (See Table 3).

.

COUN'mY

TABLE 3 : Provincial Origins of Ethnic Chinese, 1991
FUJIAN ( % )

HAINAN (%)

GUANGDONG (%)

TAIWAN

11

HONGKONG

2

93.2

-

SINGAPORE

40

42

-

MALAYSIA

30

59

9

VIETNAM

8

89

2

13

:

- refers to not available
Source : Compiled from East Asia Analytical Unit of Department of Foreign Affairs And Trade,
Overseas Business Network In Asia, Canberra AGPS, 1995, p.23

A small proportion comes from Hainan Island at the Southern tip of
China. Therefore, the dialect groups of the overseas Chinese in these
five countries are quite diversely formed. Singapore's, Malaysia's, and
Vietnam's dialect group of overseas Chinese comprise Hokkien,
Hakka, Cantonese, Teochiu and Hainanese while Taiwan's and Hong
Kong's dialect groups are predominantly Hokkien and Cantonese
respectively (See Table 4).
T A B L E 4 : Distribution of Ethnic Chinese in the Five East Asian Countries by Country
and Ancestral Dialect G r o u p ( B y Percent)
Taiwan

85.0

Hong Kong
Singapore

2.0

90.0

40.0

18.0

10.0

-

-

1.4

1.6

-

-

23.0

9.0

7.0

3.0
7.4
-

Malaysia

31.7

21.7

12.1

21.8

5.3

Vietnam

6.0

56.5

34.0

•1.5

2.0

- refers to not available
Source : Compiled from East Asia Analytical Unit of Department of Foreign Affairs And Trade,
Overseas Chinese Business Networks In Asia, Canberra AGPS, pp.25, 90, and 100

.

The other dialect groups are relatively small in Taiwan and Hong
Kong. These distinct dialects, to some degree, divide the overseas
Chinese community because of the mutual unintelligibility of some
dialects and sub-dialects. However, the shared use of common
Chinese characters and the practice of some common Chinese
traditions have served as an informal social bonding that unites the
overseas Chinese.

1.4 The Core Values and Beliefs of the Overseas Chinese Community

Although the overseas Chinese are dialectally different, they
share

some core qualities of Chinese traditions and Confucianism.

These qualities encompass the Confucian values of thrift, discipline,
family cohesion, reverence for education, strong sense of responsibility
and obligation, and the work ethic of diligence and unremitting
industry. These qualities are commonly and greatly emphasized by
most of the overseas Chinese. A lot of the overseas Chinese do not
think of themselves as Confucianists, but the natural Chinese way of
doing things is largely

Confucian.®

In these five East Asian countries

(Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam), the overseas
Chinese exhibit

a strong adherence to these qualities as well as to

Confucian cultural values and beliefs. As some scholars, such as Lynn
Pan, David C. L. Ch'ng, Michael Backman, Yuan-Li Wu, S.Gordon
Redding, Yeu-Farn Wang and Andrew Tanzer have pointed out that
Ch'ng, David C.L.. op cit p.40

the life of the overseas Chinese is still very much oriented within the
cultural context of Confucianism. In one of his works, Andrew Tanzer
notes:
In all of these different environments (in host
countries) overseas Chinese display strong selfreliance and the Confucian virtues of thrift,
discipline, industriousness, family cohesion and
reverence for education.®

According

to David

C L Ch'ng, a number

of key

Confucian

characteristics can be found in a person brought up as an ethnic
Chinese and the Confucian cultural values also influence the business
practices of the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs.*^
Taking this into consideration, it does seem clear that the
sharing of Confucian cultural values and beliefs held by the overseas
Chinese have formed cultural and linguistic affinities which can most
likely promote amiability and togetherness among the overseas
Chinese.
Besides, these inherited and ingrained Confucian cultural
values and beliefs have also been partially responsible for the overseas
Chinese economic success. As Michael Backman put it:
Confucianism is not without influence. It is,
however, only one of many factors that propel the
ethnic Chinese to the forefront of Asian business.«

^ Tanzer, Andrew,' The Bamboo Network'. Forbes, July 18, 1994, p. 140
^ Ch'ng, David C.L., op cit, p.42
^ East Asia Analytical Unit, op cit, p. 122

In common with Michael Backman, J.A.C Mackie agrees that the
Confucian cultural values and beliefs only partially explain the
commercial success of the overseas Chinese. As he comments:
What can be said, in conclusion, by.way of answer
to the question raised at the beginning of this
paper about the relevance of Chinese values to
Chinese business success? Their values and
behaviour patterns were clearly one important
factor contributing to it, but only one among
many.®
1.5 Economic Backdrop and Power of the Overseas Chinese
Ever since the important and large-scale Chinese migration to
these five East Asian nations during the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, many of them have risen from the subordinate
economic roles their forebears took on as mere 'coolies' or small
shopkeepers,

or as

'compradors' (middlemen)

between

the

big

European trading houses and the indigenous population, to the
dominant positions they occupy today as wealthy and independent
merchants, financiers and industrialists. For example, most of
Malaysia's

small

and

medium-sized

businesses

are

owned

by

Malaysian Chinese; 99 percent of the Taiwanese manufacturing firms
are small and medium-sized enterprises, accounting for approximately
65 percent of Taiwan's export earnings and 55 percent of its GDP; 98
percent of manufacturing establishments in Hong Kong employ fewer
than 200 people; and the majority of Chinese-owned enterprises in

^ Mackie, J.A.C, 'Overseas Chinese FntrpprenenrshipV Asian Pacific Economic Literature, vol.6, No.l,
May 199i p.58

Vietnam are medium and small c o m p a n i e s , Apart from these small
and medium sized enterprises, the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs
also control considerable numbers of conglomerates which are often
groupings of sometimes hundreds of much smaller companies. Table
5 shows the major conglomerates owned by the overseas Chinese
entrepreneurs in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia.
Table 5 : Overseas Chinese Conglomerates in the four East Asian nations, 1994
Country

Principai(s)

Taiwan

Tsai family
Yue-Chee Wang
Wu family
Koo family
Chang Yung-Fa

Estimated Net Worth Conglomerate or Main
jOU,S.$piron)

Cathay Life Insurance
JRoraosa Plastics
Shin Kong Life Insurance
China-Trust Commercial Bank
2.0
Evergreen Group/ Eva
1.1
Airways
Huang Shi Hue
1.1
Ching Fong Group
Hong Kong Lee Shau Kee
6.5
Henderson Land Co.
. Kwok Brothers
6.4
Sun Hung Kai Properties
^LiJKa^Shj^^^
5.8
Hu^tchison Whmpoa
i Pao family
Ts
meelock Co.
N m World Development
3.3
Sinoland and f ^ Eastern
3.0
Hong Leong Group
Sit^apore ; Kwek family
2.Ò
Malayan Banking Corporation
Khoo Teck Huat
1.6
Overseas-Banking Chinese Co.
i Lee f ^ l y
1.3
Hong Leong
Malaysia
Quek family
Genting Berhad
LimGohTong
2.1
Kerry Group
r Robert Kuok
2.1
Tan Chong Motor
TanEng Soon
l.l
Source : Compiled from East Asia Analytical Unit of Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
Overseas Chinese Business Networks in Asia, Canberra AGPS, 1995, p. 120 and 'Dragon
Power', Asiaweek, August 24, 1994, pp.38 & 39
2.1

With all this in view, the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs did
exert significant influence on the economies of the five East Asian
nations. Table 6 shows the contribution of the overseas Chinese to
their respective countries' economy. Although Vietnam's overseas
Chinese contribute a small proportion (20% of the total local economy
10

Ch'ng, David C.L., op cit p. 14

(GNP) or $4 billion to the GDP) to the Vietnamese economy, compared
to the other four nations' overseas Chinese, their economic influence
is growing progressively.
Table 6 : Overseas Chinese Contribution to the Five East Asian Nations' Economies
Country

Chinese Population
In million

Chinese Population
as % of total locai
population

Chinese Business
Output as % of
total loeal
Economy
(GNP)

Chinese Business
Output as GDP
Contribution in
U.S$blUion

Taiwan

20

97

95

255

Hong Kong

6

98

80

120

Singapore

2

77

76

62

Malaysia

6

29

60

48

20
1.3
0.7
Vietnam
Source : Compiled from 'The Limits of family value', The Economist March 9th, 1996, p.l2.
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The overseas Chinese entrepreneurs have' not only flexed their
economic muscle in their own countries but also in other countries of
the East Asian region. Taiwan's and Hong Kong's overseas Chinese
entrepreneurs

have

far out-invested

Japan

and the

European

countries in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and
China.

The overseas Chinese entrepreneurs of Singapore and

Malaysia have also emerged as prominent investors in Myanmar,
Cambodia,

China,

Thailand,

the

Philippines

and

Indonesia,

However, in recent years, the overseas Chinese capitalists of these
four nations have targeted Vietnam with millions and billions capital
worth of capital investments. Why has Vietnam become the favourable
''
Wang, Yeu Fam. Chinese Entrepreneurs in Southeast Asia : Historical Roots and Modem
Significance, Center for Pacific Asia Studies at Stockholm University, Working Paper 24, May 1994,
p.21
ibid

destination for these overseas Chinese to invest? Before probing the
factors for the r u s h of overseas Chinese capital to Vietnam, the prereform economic situation in Vietnam needs to be examined because
it reveals Vietnam's past economic chaos and crisis which had
discouraged foreign investment and handicapped
development

and

growth

in

the

the economic
country.

CHAPTER 2
The Economic Situation Of Vietnam, 1975—1985
2.1 The Socialist Central-Planned Economic Model and Its Impact.
When the Vietnam war came to an end in 1975, along with the
unification of the country's political institutions, the integration of the
economies of North and South Vietnam was set in motion. South
Vietnam was imposed with North Vietnam's economic system which
was based on the socialist centrally planned economic model. With
this centrally planned-economic model, the Vietnamese Communist
Party (VNCP), tried to transform the market-oriented economy of the
South Vietnam to the socialist-oriented one. The central planning
model, somewhat simplified, was basically intended to operate as
follows:

-The state determined all important economic activities of the entire
country through a system of production plans and goods
distribution; there were also strict regulations on pricing and
interest rates.
-The state monopolized foreign trade and the trade relationship had
been mainly with the former Soviet Union and East European
countries through bilateral treaties. Foreign trade companies under
the control of the state would implement these trade treaties, and
the profit-and-loss account of foreign trade was entirely taken care
of by the state.
-Large-scale private enterprises were not encouraged to expand
further, but were instead singled out to be finally incorporated into
either state or collective units.
-The finance of the state was not separate from that of state-owned
enterprises. The state undertook to compensate for losses incurred
by state-owned enterprises by means of subsidies, and when these

enterprises chalked up a profit, the profit was channeled back to
the state budget. All productive activities were subsidized by the
state through its provision of raw materials and other inputs of
production, machineiy, and equipment imported with old fund and
credit loans, and sold at low prices to state-owned enterprises.
-The market mechanism operated only in small businesses and the
household economy, that is to say in only a part of the agricultural,
handicraft, and consumer goods retailing sectors. Many capital
goods used for production were not allowed to be bought or sold on
the market but were allocated by the state's planned distribution
system.
The adoption and imposition of this socialist centrally-planned
model by the Vietnamese Communist Party (VNCP) brought about a
devastating multiplier-effect which eventually dragged along the whole
country towards an unprecedented economic crisis. The Second FiveYear Plan (1976-80) and the Third Five-Year Plan (1981-85), which
were launched in accordance with the socialist centrally-planned
model, plagued the Vietnamese economy with a galloping inflation
rate, lowered living

standards and productivity,

caused

acute

shortages of food, essential consumer goods and capital investment of
all kinds, and lopsided trade relations,
The economic crisis or predicament suffered by Vietnam is quite
clearly revealed in Secretary-General Truong Chinh's Political Report
to the Sixth Party Congress at the end of 1985:

Our country is facing many socio-economic
difficulties
Failure to fulfil a number of
major targets, such as food staples, coal, cement,
Vu, Tuan Anh, Development in Vietnam : Policy Reforms and Economic Growth, Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1991, p.4
Tran, Dong Phnong. Viemam and its Transition To A Market Economy, Department of Economics,
University of Wollongong, Australia, 1995, pp.29-30

wood, textiles, and items for export has affected all
aspect of economic activity and the working
people's life
Production and investment
efficiency has been low. i®

In view of all this, the socialist centrally-planned model pursued
by the Vietnamese Communist Party did not embark Vietnam's
economy on an outward-looking and growth-oriented path. Instead,
the model plunged the country into undesirable economic crisis. It is
clear that, the Vietnamese government's adherence to an inflexible
and problem-ridden socialist model was not conducive to motivating
individuals and companies to boost enterprising economic activities.
The economic policies implemented had no room for private and
market-oriented business dynamism. Hence, the socialist model
discouraged the overseas Chinese or Hoa Kieu's role and involvement
in the economy of Vietnam. By introducing the anti-compradore
bourgeoisie movements, the overseas Chinese or Hoa capitalist or
entrepreneurs were dispossessed and pushed out from the country's
economic mainstream.

2.2

The Vietnamese Communist Regime's Harsh Economic Policies
Towards the Economically-Influential Overseas Chinese

In 1974, the Hanoi Government estimated that the overseas
Chinese in South Vietnam controlled more than 80 per cent of the
Vo, Nhan Tri and Booth, Anna, 'Recent Economic Development in Vietnam', Asia-Pacific
Economic Literature, vol.6, N o . l , May 1992, p. 17

food, textile, chemical, metallurgical, engineering and electric
industries; held virtual monopolies in the wholesale and import-export
trades and controlled over 50 per cent of the retail t r a d e . T h e y
monopolised the purchase of rice, obtained up to 80 per cent of all
loans from South Vietnamese banks, owned 42 of the 60 major
companies, and accounted for two thirds of the total annual
investments in South Vietnam, Besides, the overseas Chinese also
formed a large segment of the technical and managerial personnel and
skilled workers. A substantial number of overseas Chinese were
employed in diverse industries as well as the civil service :
The overseas Chinese represented a large
percentage of workers in the mining ,
manufacturing, and processing industries during
the French colonial period. They comprised 9
percent of the 21,000 workers employed by French
colonial administration in 1929. Under the Saigon
regime (1955-1975), they accounted for 25,000 to
30,000 industrial workers in the mid-1960s,
accounting for one-third of the total southern
industrial workers, i®
In view of all this, the overseas Chinese capitalists or entrepreneurs
and workers did not only play a pre-eminent economic role but also
form an indispensable and constructive force in the economic
development of Vietnam.
Nevertheless, the Vietnamese Communist Party, which came
into power in the South in 1975, disregarded the economic
East Asia Analytical Unit, op cit, p.84
xran, Khanh, The Ethnic Chinese And Economic Development in Vietnam, Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, Singapore, 1993, p.72

significance of t±ie overseas Chinese and dogmatically

initiated

'socialist transformation' movements to confiscate and nationalize the
business and properties of the compradore

bourgeoisie, which

comprised mainly overseas Chinese and foreign capitalists. By
launching the X I campaign in 1975 and X2 campaign in 1978 as well
as enacting Act 14 in 1983, most of the businesses and social
activities of the overseas Chinese community were
restricted or terminated, i®

relentlessly

About 76% of the private industrial

enterprises in Ho Chi Minh City were transferred to state or stateprivate manufactures. In the commercial sector, more than 60,000
large and medium-sized private trade enterprises in the South were
banned from trading and ordered to move into the state-controlled
industrial or agricultural production sector.20 This discriminatory and
unfavourable economic approach had led to a'large exodus of refugees
from Vietnam by land and by sea. During 1978-79 an estimated
150,398 to 270,882 persons left the country, a disproportionately high
number being from the Chinese community.
The restrictive and inward-looking socialist centrally-planned
model adopted by the Vietnamese Communist Party failed to set
Vietnam on a market-oriented and outward-looking economic course.
The imposition of the socialist economic model had not only created
an inauspicious and hostile business environment in Vietnam but
also

disrupted

ibid, pp.81, 85, and 90
ibid
ibid, P.25

and

dismantled

the

overseas

Chinese

or

Hoa

commercial structure which was the integral part of south Vietnam's
economic system.

CHAPTERS
The Pull FcLctors and the Influx of Overseas Chinese Investment
into Vietnam
3.1 The Pull Factors
The year

1986 witnessed

a watershed

in the economic

development policy-making of Vietnam. At the- sixth National Congress
of the Communist Party of Vietnam in December 1986, Vietnam's
reform milestone, the party decided to initiate economic 'renovation' or
doi moi, which has consisted of policies creating a market-oriented
economy,

establishing

a

system

of

new

institutions

that are

appropriate to the changing condition of Vietnam's socio-economy,
and promoting the integration of Vietnam into the world economy. The
launch of doi moi has brought about significant increased inflow of
foreign direct investment (FDI) into Vietnam.
The largest share of the FDI flowing into Vietnam originates
from the major Asian-Pacific countries' entrepreneurs or capitalists,
such as Taiwanese, Hong Kongers, Singaporean, South Korean,
American, Japanese, Thai, Malaysian and Australian. But among
these Asia-Pacific nations' entrepreneurs, the overseas Chinese
entrepreneurs, especially from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and
Malaysia appear to become one of the most dynamic and dominant
source of FDI in Vietnam (As mentioned in the Introduction). However,
the tremendous influx of Overseas Chinese investment into Vietnam
cannot be attributed only to one pull factor, the launch of doi moi In

fact, a combination or conjunction of some pull factors including the
strategic

geographical

location,

abundant

natural

resources,

potentially large internal consumers' market, cheap and highly-literate
labour, relative political stability, initiation of unprecedented economic
reform, and the availability of a business-oriented ethnic Chinese
community has attracted the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs or
capitalists to pour their investment into Vietnam.

3.1.1 The Strategic Geographical location of Vietnam

Vietnam lies along the eastern edge of the peninsula of
mainland Southeast Asia, bordered by China to the north (3,818 km;
2,372 mi), Laos to the west (1,555km; 966 mi), and Cambodia to the
South-west

(982km; 610mi).22

Thailand,

Malaysia,

Singapore,

Indonesia, Brunei, the Philippines, Taiwan and Hong Kong, however,
are lying beyond the Gulf of Thailand and the South China Sea and
forming an almost-circle like shape surrounding Vietnam (see Map 1).
Having the shape of an elongated letter "S", Vietnam has a total area
of 331, 114 square kilometers extending 1650 km from north to
south.23

The widest area from east to west is 600km and the

narrowest only 50km.24 it also has a long coastline looking out on the
South China Sea and stretching 3260km from the Gulf of Tonkin to
^^ Kurian, George Thomas (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Third World," (4th.ed), vol.3. Facts On File, New
York, p.2081
^

Tran, Hoang Kim, Economy of Vietnam : Reviews And Statistics, Statistical Publishing House,

Hanoi, 1992, p.5
^^ ibid

the Gulf of Thailand (see Map 1). Fronting the South China Sea and
neighbouring Northeast and Southeast Asian nations, Vietnam is
strategically positioned in the fastest growing part of the world and
along major shipping routes. Map 2 suggests the underlying
structure of shipping (Hub/mainline/feeder) networks in Northeast
and Southeast Asia and Vietnam, with its geographical location, it can
be said to be in proximity to these shipping networks.
With all this in view, the strategic geographical location of
Vietnam can be capitalized by many, including the overseas Chinese
entrepreneurs or capitalists, especially from Taiwan, Hong Kong,
Singapore and Malaysia. These four countries' overseas Chinese have
not only channeled their investments into Vietnam because of its
proximity to their home country but also because of Vietnam's vicinity
to other Southeast and Northeast Asian natipns, such as Cambodia,
Laos and China (its Southern parts) which are the potential and
untapped markets. Hence, Vietnam's strategic geographical position,
in these overseas Chinese entrepreneurs' minds, can serve as an ideal
gateway to plug into other Indochinese and Southern Chinese
markets.

Map 1 : The Southeast Asian Region
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MAP 2 : Hub/ Mainline/Feeder Networks in East and Southeast Asia
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Source : Robinson, Ross, 'Shipping and port development in East and Southeast Asia', in
Bateman and Sherwood, Australia's Maritime Bridge Into Asia, p.66

3.1.2 Vast and Unexploited Natural Resources
Vietnam abounds in natural resources from forests, land,
minerals and water resources. Most of these natural resources have
not yet been fully exploited for economic gain.
*Forest resources
Recent forest inventories show that Vietnam has 19 million
hectares of forest land which occupies two-thirds of the total area.
But due to war destruction, forest clearing for cultivating land and
fuel, the actual forested land is only 9.3 million hectares.25 Forests
cover many regions of the country from the far northern border areas
to the eastern edge in the south.

Table 7 shows the percentage of

forest coverage for Vietnam.

Table 7 : Forest Coverage by Region in Vietnam
Ndrthem highland
8.6
Central midland
26.0
North eastern highland
23.9
Mid-northern provinces
33.6
Central coastal area
19.3
Central highland
58.7
Eastern southern provinces
20.9
Source : Nguven, Xuan Oanh & Grub, Phillip D., Vietnam : The New Investment Frontier in Southeast
Asia, Times Academic Press, Singapore, 1992, p.47

However, Vietnam's forests contain ample precious timber, special
forest products, medicinal plants and various species of wild animals.
By the end of 1989, timber stock was estimated at 586-million m^ . 26
With such a vast timber stock, the exploited timber output could be
^^ Nguyen, Cong Nghiep and et al, Vietnam : The Blazing Flame of Reforms. Statistical Publishing
House, Hanoi, 1993, p. 18
26
Iran, Hoang Kim, op cit, p.9

76 million m^ , including 73 million m^ of high quality timber 25.1
million m^ of fuel wood.^^ Bamboo stock is estimated at 5.9 billion
trees, including 5.2 billion trees of natural b a m b o o . A p a r t from
timber and bamboo, Vietnam's forests also have other special
products, such as cinnamon, star anise, castor-oil plants, pine star,
fragrant tree and others.

*Land resources
There is approximately 6.9 million hectares (20.9%) out of 33
milion hectares of natural land used for agricultural production; 9.8
million hectares (29.7%) is allocated for forestry; 1.7 million hectares
(5.2%) is for specialized purpose and the remaining part consisting of
all types of lands totals 14.6 million hectares (44.2%).^^

This portion

of land includes nearly 1 million hectares of inferior land in the plains
and 11 million hectares of waste land in the mountainous regions
where there are possibilities of use for the benefit of agriculture and
forestry.30

The regions most propitious for an expansion of the

farming area are located in the Central Highlands and the Mekong
delta.

*Mineral resources

'' ibid
^^ 'Vietnam : A Potential Recipient of Foreign Investment', Viemam Courier, No.34. August 1992, p.7
ibid

Vietnam's mineral potential has been identified in various
geologic surveys. To date this information largely provides estimates
of reserves. However, some minerals have proven reserves and the
Vietnamese government has set priority for the exploration of the
reserves, but owing to substantial investments required, possibilities
for

comprehensive

investments.
development of

development

These

resources

depend
are

the

much

upon

background

foreign
for

various domestic industries and for exports.

the
The

principal mineral resources are as follows:

Oil and Gas — Vietnam boasts a relatively large reserve of oil and
natural gas and is quite capable of meeting the domestic needs and
the requirement of export. The surveys conducted so far have shown
that oil and natural gas are chiefly concentrated in the southern
mainland and the southern continental shelf.^i in these regions, they
are distributed on an extensive area covering 200,00 sq. km consisting
of the low-lying area of the Mekong delta, and in the sea south of Con
Son, Vung Tau and the Gulf of Thailand.

The exploitable oil and

natural gas reserve is estimated to be about 2.8 billion tonnes of oil
and 500 billion cubic meters of natural gas.^^

Coal — Total reserves are staggering; it is estimated that well over two
hundred billion tonnes of coal are to be found in Vietnam and its

m

^^ Tran, Hoang Kim, op cit. p. 12

surrounding coastline areas. Coal is mostly concentrated in Quang
Ninh province in northern Vietnam with a reserve of 3.6 billion
tonnes.Besides, the Thai Nguyen region has a prospected reserve of
80 million tonnes, the Na Duong mine (in Lang Son province) has a
reserve of 100 million tonnes.

Bauxite — Located in the Lang Son-Cao Bang area, it is estimated to
have a reserve of 40 million tonnes.

It can also be found in the

Central Highlands with an estimated reserve of 6 billion tonnes.

Tin— With a reserve of around 80,000 tonnes, tin is found in different
areas, such as Tinh Tuc (Cao Bang province). Son Duong (Ha Tuyen
province, Quy Hop (Nghe An province and Da Choy (Lam Dong
province).
Iron ore — Iron ore reserves are estimated at 700 million tons, with
over half being located in the Thach Khe area. 37

Chromite — Valuable deposits of Chromite have been found in Nui
Nua (Thanh Hoa province) with an estimated reserve of 20 million
tonnes. 38

' ' ibid
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Asia, Times Academic Press, Singapore, 1992, p.63
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38
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Phosphates — Vietnam has one of the world's largest known
phosphates resources, located mainly in Hoang Lien Son

province.

*Water resources
Vietnam boasts an abundant source of fresh water.

Surface

water is equally distributed in all the regions and could meet the
requirement of development of different branches in the national
economy and the daily needs of the population of different regions.
Throughout the territory, there are 2860 rivers. Surfaces of lakes and
ponds cover respectively 394,000 and 56,000 hectares to say nothing
of 85,000 hectares of marshy land and over 1 million hectares of
mangrove forests."^ These water resources can be exploited for the
development of hydraulic, for irrigation purpose, for rearing aquatic
products and for the expansion of water communication.
In addition to fresh water surface,the surrounding sea water
surface of Vietnam is relatively large because it has a 3,260 km long
coastline.'•I Vietnam's saltish water surface is one million km^
belongs to 27

provinces.42

and

To date Vietnam's sea potential has not

been adequately surveyed and assessed. Marine resources have been
explored to a very small extent compared with its potential.

The area

of 31-200 m depth of the sea bed is presenting a great potential for
marine products.

There are a lot of species of fish in the Vietnam

^^ Nguyen, Xuan Oanh and Grub, Phillip D., op cit p.64
'Vietnam : A Potential Recipient of Foreign Investment', op cit p.7
^^ Tran, Hoang Kim, op cit p. 14
Nguyen, Cong Nghiep and et al, op cit p. 19
^^ ibid

sea in which 100 species have great economic value. Fish reserves are
estimated at about 3 million tons.^

Besides, there are many other

marine products, including pearl oyster, abalone, jelly fish, crabs,
shrimps and others.

3.1.3 Large Consumer Market of Vietnam
The population of Vietnam with an annual growth rate of 2.2
percent, stood at 74 million in 1995 and is expected to grow to about
81 million in 2000, 92 million in 2010 and about 122 million in
2 0 5 0 . B y and large, Vietnam has or will have a young population.
This is because the proportion of population aged 65 and above
remains or will still remain small while the proportion of the
population aged between 15-64 keeps increasing from 1992 to 2000
(See Chart 4).

Tran, Hoang Kim, op cit p. 14
^^ Banister, Judith, Vietnam Population Dynamics and Prospects, Institute of East Asian Studies.
University of California, Berkeley, 1993, p.61

Chart 4 : Vietnamés Projected Age Structure, 1992-2050
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Source : Banister, Judith, V i e t n a m Population D y n a m i c s a n d Prospects, Institute of
E a s t A s i a n Studies, University California, Berkeley, 1993, p.6

Besides the GDP per capita at PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) and the
Consumption per capita are also on the rise in Vietnam. The GDP per
capita at PPP (Purchasig Power Parity) has increased from U.S$1000
in 1989 to U.S$1263 in 1995 and the Consumption per capita has
jumped from U.S$ 142.3 in 1992 to U.S$242.1 in 1994 (See Table 8 ).
The tremendous size and growth of the population coupled with the
increasing GDP per capita at PPP and consumption per capita make
Vietnam indeed a great and promising consumer market.

Table 8 : Vietnam's Purchasing Power & Consumption Power, 1989 to 1996
The Consumption Per capita (U,S.$)
n/a refers to not available

i

1989

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

n/a

142.3

183.7

242.1

n/a

n/a

n/a

1250

1263

1263

1310

* PPP refers to Purchasing Power Parity index which attempts to measure the real purchasing power of
nominal incomes across Vietnam.
Source : Compiled from "The Bottom Line' in Asiaweek of various issues and the World Economic
Factbook 1996

3.1.4 Abundant Literate and Cheap Labour

In view of its dense and young population, Vietnam has great
potentialities in manpower. Vietnam's work-force was estimated to be
around 34 million in 1994 and is growing by more than 3 percent
annually as an estimated 1.1 million additional workers seek jobs
each year.^

It is expected to increase to 49 million in the year

2000.4'^ In other words, about 40-45 percent of the total population in
Vietnam is eligible and ready to participate in the work force. The
educational level of Vietnamese laborers is fairly high. The literacy
rate in 1995 according to the Asiaweek survey, was 88.6%.'^®

The

population aged ten or over who have had some schooling is quite
high, 84 percent overall, or 87 per cent for males and 80 per cent for
females.^®

This is a fairly high rate compared with many other

developing countries. This educational level would very likely create
favourable conditions for job-training and skill-improvement and
make it possible for the trainees rapidly to adapt themselves to new
working environments. Furthermore, the cost of labour in Vietnam is
relatively cheap in comparison to most other countries of East and
Southeast Asia. A skilled worker's monthly wage is about U.S.$250
and an unskilled worker's monthly wage is about U.S.$40.®® But, in
46
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some cases, a worker still can receive an appalling-low-monthly wage
which is only U.S.$20 to U.S.$25 in 1993.51 However, such a large,
literate, and inexpensive pool of labour has partially made Vietnam a
target of great attraction for the Overseas Chinese investors.

3.1.5 The Economic Reform under 'Doi MoV or Renovation
At

the

Sixth

National

Congress

in

December

1986 the

Vietnamese communist government introduced a comprehensive
reform program, doi moi with the objective of liberalising and
deregulating the economy. The reform measures explicitly recognized
the failure of central planning and marked a major turning point in
the economic development of Vietnam. The objectives of the reform
were mapped out as follows :

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

to develop the private sector
to increase and stabilize agricultural output
to shift the focus of investment from heavy to light industry
to reform the role of the state enterprises
to focus upon export led growth, based upon the experience of
Vietnam's dynamic regional neighbours
6. to attract foreign direct investment, seen as essential for economic
development^^

In order to achieve these objectives, a series of new reformed economic
policies and programmes have been initiated or launched. The new

Hainsworth, Geoffrey B., op_cit, p. 196
^^ Harvie, Charles, Economic Reform And Future Prospects of the Vietnamese Economy, University of
Wollongong, Australia, p. 4

reformed economic policies and programmes can be boiled down as
follows:

Price reforms : Price controls on most goods and services in Vietnam
were abolished in March 1989, except in the case of items such as
electricity, coal and cement used in major state construction projects.
But from 1991 onward, most of these items' prices have been liberated
and only the price of electricity is still controlled by the s t a t e . i t is
clear that the decentralization of the price decision process and the
establishment of market price system are emphasized.
Exchange rate devaluation : The exchange rate was unified and sharply
devalued in December 1989.®^ Foreign exchange trading floors were
created which enabled the exchange rate to be largely determined by
the market.
Interest rate reforms : Interest rates were raised to very high levels,
with the aim of making real rates positive, as part of the fight against
inflation.Although the real rates of interest were allowed to become
negative again, they did not have much damaging effect on the
economy.

Since 1992 real interest rates have primarily remained

positive, contributing to the sizable decline in inflation thereafter.®®
Fiscal reforms : In conjunction with interest rate increases, and to
consolidate the stabilization program, the government undertook

"

Vu, Tuan Anh,_OEM^, pp.26-27
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^^ Tran, Dong Phuong, op cit, p.48
^^ ibid

ambitious reforms in fiscal management.

The government made a

great effort to improve financing of the budget. Budgetary expenditure
has been reduced significantly during 1990-1991 by the elimination of
budgetary

subsidies

to

state

enterprises

and

large

military

d e m o b i l i z a t i o n . T h e tax system has been undergoing a reform
program with favourable new taxes like housing and land tax,
personal income tax, profit tax, and others being introduced in late
1990.5®

A comprehensive tax system reform together with tax

administration reform are being planned in cooperation with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Financial sector reform : This involved the restructuring of the banks,
which dominate the financial system, into a two tier system with the
State Bank of Vietnam performing the function of a modern central
bank, and the four major state owned commercial banks providing
banking facilities.^^ The financial system is being further expanded to
include shareholding banks, credit cooperatives and joint venture
banks. Foreign banks have been allowed to operate since 1991 and
the government is developing a securities market which is planned to
start operating by 1996-1997.60
Promotion of the private sector : The Laws on Companies and Private
Enterprises, released in 1991, give the private sector, which was
discriminated against for years, official sanction.®^
^^ Harvie, Charles, op cit p.5

'' m

^^ ibid, p.6
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Another New

Constitution adopted in 1992 provides explicit protection of private
property rights and recognizes the importance of the private sector in
the economy.®^
Legal system reform : Legislation has continually been reviewed and
renewed to keep abreast of the market economy.

A series of legal

documents such as the Law on Foreign Investment (which was called
by the London Economist 'one of the most liberal in all Southeast
Asia'), the Law on Companies, the Law on Private Business, Law on
Land,

the Oil and Gas Law, and the Bankruptcy Law, have been

promulgated to create a legal basis for all economic activities to
function in the market mechanism.
Foreign trade policy reform : The foreign trade of Vietnam, which had
been the monopoly of the state, began to be rationalized and
liberalized in 1989.^^ All sectors, including the private sector, have
been encouraged to participate in foreign trade. Import quotas have
been largely eliminated, and import duties on industrial inputs were
removed.

Furthermore, the Vietnamese direction of trade has also

been reoriented from the former socialist countries or the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) countries to other countries,
especially those from Southeast Asia and East Asia.
The launch and implementation of a series of these policies and
measures for economic renovation have really restructured a more

^^ Vu, Tuan Anh, op cit, pp.36-37
^ Gates, Carolyn L. and Truong, David H.D., Reform of A Centrally-Managed Developing Economy :
The Vietnamese Perpective, N I A S Report, No.9, Denmark, 1992, p. 19

reliable, workable, and liberal Vietnamese economic system which can
produce good and favourable prospects and environment for attracting
the foreign investors, especially the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs or
capitalists.
3.1.6 The Political and Social Stability of Vietnam
Political stability of Vietnam achieved and maintained by the
Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) since 1975 has also been a major
pull factor for attracting the foreign investors or capitalists,
particularly the overseas Chinese. The political and security
dimensions of Vietnam indicate that political stability is an obvious
feature in spite of its internal and external stresses. Under the
Vietnamese Communist Party's rule, Vietnam has not experienced any
major political chaos. The effectiveness of VCP's in maintaining
political stability and reducing political risk and uncertainty has not
only relied on force and coercion, but also on reform of the party
leadership.
In order to ward off any political opposition or rival which can
pose threat to the rule of the VCP and the well-being of Vietnamese
society, the VCP-led government which came into power in 1975 has
undertaken a series of violent and coercive measures. After its seizure
of power in South Vietnam, the communist regime carried out

extensive summary executions of political e n e m i e s . T h e

extreme

cruelty and barbarity in carrying out the mass killings were part of the
authorities' plan to terrorize the population- and thereby to secure
their submission. In addition, the communist regime had also used
re-education and concentration camps as a means to eliminate or
neutralize by terrorism, potential opposition to the communist
political system.®® In December 1985, for instance, the police security
forces in the province of Long An searched and interrogated 180,000
families, arresting a total of 6,100 people who were then sent to
concentration camps for re-education.
Although the exercise of execution of political enemies and the
use of re-education and concentration camps as a means of political
repression appears to have decreased in Vietnam nowadays, non-lifethreatening

forms of oppression

such as arbitrary arrest and

imprisonment, authorities' harassment, interrogation and torture are
still very prevalent in Vietnam.

For example, two of the most

prominent leaders of the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBC),
Thich Quang Do and Thich Huyen Quang, who had shown political
opposition to the VCP in 1982, were arrested and sent to their native
village where they remained under house arrest till the end of 1989.®®
In 1984 twelve more Buddhist monks and nuns, including two well-

^^ Nguyen, Van Canh, 'Developing and Human Rights In The Socialist Republic of Vietnam^
Indochina Journal, vol.4, No.2, Christmas 1990, p. 12
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1993,p.l81

known scholars, Thich Tue Sy and Thich Tri Sieu, were arrested and
held under administrative detention for more than four years.^® Many
Buddhist monks and lay activists connected with the UBC have
always been subjected to the government's arrest, imprisonment and
torturerò Furthermore, there is a broad multilevel campaign by the
party to strengthen and tighten the inspection and control system,
including a range of control personnel from the police to the courts,
prosecutors' offices, control organization of mass organizations and
parties, and state and peoples' inspectorates7^
While the VCP's ubiquitous and heavy-handed security systems
are a major deterrent to most forms of dissenting behavior, the
stability of the communist regime has managed to maintain and
create a favourable environment for foreign investment.
With the arrival of Nguyen Van Linh as the secretary of the
party, the reforms were whipped up. During the course of his tenure
in office, Linh fashioned an ambitious and comprehensive package of
party reforms.
organizations

That package included efforts to empower local
to

take

more

responsibilities,

increasing economic autonomy afforded

parallel

with

e n t e r p r i s e s . L i n h

the
also

introduced a more flexible style of management, and a concomitant
active support for the training of a skilled class of party managers. He
^^ ibid, pp.181-182
Duiker, William J., Vietnam : Revolution in Transition, Westview Press, Boulder, 1995, p. 122
Joiner, Charles A., 'The Vietnam Communist Party Srives T o Remain The Party's Central
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p. 189
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sought to confine the party to a more limited role as the conscience of
the revolution responsible for fashioning social and political direction
and maintaining the integrity of the revolutionary inheritance, while
allowing responsibilities for daily governance to pass to a body of
qualified technicians and elected and appointed o f f i c i a l s . L i n h ' s aim
was to guide the party towards quality control in operational matters
and membership policy, emphasizing responsiveness to direct, critical
complaints against party personnel and organizations.'^'^ Hence, it is
clear that Linh attempted to combat

bureaucratic ineptitude and

corruption and produce wider participation and greater administrative
efficiency.
However, all this well-intentioned and radical reform effort of
Linh did not occur.

But, at least, Linh achieved some successes in

making the party responsive to the altered political playing field, and
capable of undertaking some organizational changes which can pave
the way for further reforms.

Although Do Muoi, who is Linh's

successor, has displayed a different planning and ruling style from
Linh, the main and ultimate goals set by Do Muoi for the party
remain, by and large, the same. Do Muoi prefers to adopt gradualist
and cautious way to renovate the party.

For example, he sought to

build consensus slowly and consolidate support within the central
committee for programs or problem-solving

strategies.''^

Nevertheless,

m
'' m
^^

^^ Stem, Lewis M., 'Party Plenums And Leadership Style in Vietnam'. Asian Survey, vol. 35, No. 10,
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Do Muoi's intention in transforming the VCP into a more efficient and
flexible organization can be discerned from his approaches.
Muoi places primacy on establishing public order and security,
argued that elimination of corruption was an "imperative" for the
ruling party, requiring intensified work in several areas and he fixed
on the importance of developing grassroots party organizations by
clarifying leadership roles and committee functions, and addressing
the problem of malaise at that leveU®

Muoi also stressed that the

party had to adhere to carrying out renovation of the state apparatus.
Muoi himself has high hope for new blood.

"We are particularly

interested in more junior leaders; young, moral, and healthy officials
should be selected" he a n n o u n c e d . T h e Eighth National Congress
held in June 1996 witnessed some further reforms in the party, for
example, the new 170-member Central Committee elected by the
congress representing all the major groups contains younger and
better-educated cadres and the party Secretariat was replaced by the
new five-member Politburo Standing Committee which has been given
power to conduct Politburo business on a day-to-day basis.'^® As a
replacement for the party Secretariat, which acted as a bridge between
the

Central

Committee

and

the

Politburo,

the

new

Standing

Committee is an attempt to streamline party management.
Taking all this into consideration, the VCP is adopting a twopronged approach to achieve and maintain political stability.

By
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using

force

and

coercion,

the

party

can

suppress

the

uncompromising, recalcitrant and threatening political opposition or
rival which goes beyond the authority or legislation of the government
and may lead to political chaos. By reforming the party leadership
(renovating and revitalizing the party apparatuses and political
institutions), the VNCP is adjusted and poised to cope with the
political and socio-economic consequences of Vietnam more efficiently
and flexibly, and thereby, the legitimacy of the government can be
safeguarded or even strengthened. With these two approach working
hand in hand, the VCP has not only ensured a firmer and more
durable position in the political arena of Vietnam, but also a
considerable

political

stability

which

can

entail

a favourable

environment for foreign investments.

3.1.7 The Overseas Chinese of Vietnam

Historically, the overseas Chinese in Vietnam, just like other
overseas Chinese in the four East Asian nations (Taiwan, Hong Kong,
Singapore, and Malaysia) emigrated from China many centuries ago.
The Overseas Chinese or known as Hoa community in Vietnam
currently number 0.7 million or account for about 1.2 per cent of the
total population.'^® This low number or percentage of overseas Chinese
had

resulted

from the

thousands of Chinese.
79

Ch'ng, David C.L.. op cit, p25

political-persecution-induced

exodus of

As elsewhere, Vietnam's overseas Chinese or Hoa community
includes a multiplicity of dialects. The main dialect communities are
the Cantonese (56.5 per cent), the Teochiu (34 per cent), the Hokkien
(6 per cent), the Hainanese (2 per cent), and the Hakka (1.5 per
cent).®o As with ethnic Chinese communities elsewhere in Southeast
Asia, these overseas Chinese who came to Vietnam also carried with
them a

package of Chinese cultural values and beliefs which is

concocted from some key Confucian values. This Confucian-valuesoriented culture is reflected in the Vietnamese overseas Chinese social
and

economic

activities.

As

Barton

observed,

the

business

transaction conducted by the ethnic Chinese businessmen in South
Vietnam were characterized by some Confucian values, such as trust
(sun yung), and obligation.»i In view of all this, obviously, Vietnam's
overseas Chinese backgrounds are strikingly similar to those of the
overseas Chinese in the four East Asian countries.
The incorporating of Confucian values and beliefs into business
practices and coupling with other circumstances have made Vietnam's
overseas Chinese assured of a prominent economic role in the
country. Seen from a historical perspective, the overseas Chinese had
actively engaged in a variety of economic activities, such as commerce,
industry, agriculture and trade.

The overseas Chinese had also

captured a considerable share of most of the economic activities. For,

East Asia Analytical Unit, op c i t p.25
Barton, Clifton A., 'Trust and Credit : Some Observations Regarding, Business Strategies of
Overseas Chinese Traders in South Vietnam', in Lim and Gosling, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, vol.
1, pp.40-63

example, it is estimated that the ethnic Chinese capital controlled the
entire domestic wholesale trade and 50 per cent of the domestic retail
trade of the South before 1975.®2 Furthermore, the role played by the
overseas Chinese in the external trade was even more conspicuous.
In the pre-French colonial period, especially during the Nguyen
dynasty, overseas Chinese businessmen were able to establish an
extensive trading network with their compatriots in China and other
migrant Chinese communities in East Asian nations, such as Taiwan,
Hong Kong, Japan, Thailand, Malaya, and

Singapore.in

addition,

the overseas Chinese also controlled most of the export-import
companies and

trading activities in the 1960s when

U.S. aid was

stepped up in South Vietnam.®^
Although the overseas Chinese active and significant economic
role was harshly restricted by the Communist regime in the late
1970s, the overseas Chinese started to regain their economic power
when the communist government introduced doi moi in 1986.

The

overseas Chinese have been given more space to conduct their
business activities than they had since 1975.

In the 1990s their

influence is again substantial. For example, at the end of 1992, there
were 420 private enterprises registered in Ho Chi Minh City alone, of
which 200 businesses or 45 per cent were ethnic Chinese

^^ Tran. Khanh. op cit p.85
'' ibid, p.57
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^^ East Asia Analytical Unit, op cit, p.85

owned.

Taking all this into consideration, Vietnam's overseas Chinese
are indeed a very valuable asset to other overseas Chinese from other
countries, such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia. This
is not only because Vietnam's overseas Chinese dialect, culture, and
ethnicity have similarities and familiarities with the overseas Chinese
of the four East Asian nations but also because the historically
established de facto business and trading net work could serve as a
common ground to produce mutual trust and bond which can give
rise to opportunities for co-operation in establishing and facilitating
operation and transaction of business and trade. For example. Hong
Kong companies have been bolstered further by Ho Chi Minh City's
nearly half a million Cantonese-speaking ethnic Chinese residents,
who have helped Hong Kong's businessmen cope with Vietnam's
often-cumbersome bureaucracy.
Chinese scholar, Mr. Tan Tian Shin, has pointed out that the
share of common cultural, dialectial, and ethnic backgrounds among
the overseas Chinese can transcend the boundaries of different
nationality

and

promote

more

understanding.

Thus,

closer

relationship and firmer trust, which are the ingredients for business
co-operation, can be built.®'^ Another scholar, Chen Xiangming, also
argues that shared traditional and ethnic ties can lay the ground work
for

crosscutting investment flow among the East Asian overseas

^^ Hibert, Murray and Goldstein, Carl, 'Vietnam Opening : Hong Rong vies to become gateway', Far
Eastern Economic Review, vol. 155,28 May 1992, pp.50-51
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Perpetuation and clan's Relationship'. Zhongguo Huaqiao Lishi Xuehui Chengli Shizhounian Lunwenji,
Eastern Publisher, Beijing, 1993, p. 144

Chinese because they provide the cultural 'glue' for sustaining
organizationally and spatially integrated economic activities in the
region.®® The director of Singapore's Heshe Holdings, Mr. Xie,
commented 'any company intends to expand its operations abroad, it
should begin in a place where there is a common culture'.®^ In the
light of all this, Vietnam's overseas Chinese similar cultural and
ethnic affiliation did play a role in attracting or drawing the overseas
Chinese from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia to invest
in Vietnam.
Furthermore, the diverse, long-standing, and reasonably-welldeveloped

entrepreneurship

and

business

skills

possessed

by

Vietnam's overseas Chinese encouraged entrepreneurs or capitalists of
those four East Asian nations to pour their investments into Vietnam.
This business and entrepreneurial skills have been manifested by
overseas Chinese active, pre-eminent and extensive engagement in
almost all economic activities from the late seventeenth centuiy up to
the present, except in the period of the late 1970s.

Their diverse

entrepreneurship and business skills have not only revealed their long
interaction with the domestic market but also their strong capability
and adaptability in coping with Vietnam's sometime unpredictable and
harsh business environment. Viewed from this standpoint, Vietnam's
overseas Chinese entrepreneurial and business strength can be

Chen, Xiangming, 'Taiwan Investment in China And Southeast Asia : Go West, but Also Go South',
Aisan Survey, vol.36, No.5, May 1996, p.465
^^ Wang, Cangbai and Huang Jing, 'An Analysis on the Ethnic Chinese Investment in Vietnam',
Overseas Chinese History Studies, Spring 1994, p.55

harnessed by the four East Asian nations' overseas Chinese capitalists
or entrepreneurs to facilitate their business penetration.
Direct family and kinship links and historically established
business, social and political connections are also the important
factors in drawing the overseas Chinese to invest in Vietnam.

For

instance, Ve Wong, a Taiwanese food company is tiying to revive its
investment in Vietnam by starting up a U.S $ 37 million monosodium
glutamate factory.®® The company hopes eventually to reclaim the
production facilities it had in Southern Vietnam before 1975.®i Some
of the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs or capitalists pour their
investment into Vietnam through relatives or kinsmen in the country.
Tran Em, an ethnic Chinese living at the Ho Chi Minh City's sixth
distict, owns a factory which deals with plastic and is fully sponsored
by his rich relatives in

T a i w a n . ^ ^

Suffice it to say that Vietnam's overseas Chinese community
which

is

heavily-business-oriented

and has

close

affinity and

connection with outside overseas Chinese can serve as profitable
middlemen or even business partners.

Having these three enticing

advantageous conditions, the overseas Chinese in Vietnam have
indeed become a magnet for those overseas Chinese entrepreneurs or
capitalists.

^ Moore, Jonathan, 'The Old Pals' act: Taiwan aims for stronger trade links with Vietnam', F ^
Eastern Economic Review, 30 August 1990, p.47
''Md
^^ Eisenstodt, Gale, 'Caged Tiger', Forbes, 5 March 1996, p.70

3.2 Existing Obstacles or Problems In Doing Business in Vietnam
In view of all these pull factors, it seems that Vietnam has a
veiy sound investment environment for foreign investment.

In fact

this is not the case. Although Vietnam offers a variety of comparative
advantages (including abundant and unexplpited natural resources,
relatively cheap and highly literate work forcee, strategic geographical
location, potentially large internal consumers' market, and availability
of business-oriented
undesirable

overseas Chinese), it is still fraught with

obstacles which are generated by stifling bureaucracy,

vague regulations and laws, corruption and inadequacy of supporting
facilities.
The

stifling bureaucracy

is reflected in the

cumbersome

administrative procedures and bureaucratic requirements for the
issuance of project licences, the lack of co-operation among different
level of governments, and the constant and shameless harasement by
some obstructionist local officials.
The

overlapping

authority

of

the

central

and

provincial

governments complicates the approval process and causes long
delays.

Despite the government's policy of making the State

Committee for Cooperation and Investment (SCCI) a 'one-stop' service
for investors, most project sponsors find that they need to visit various
levels of government or agencies personally to speed up the approval

process.93 xhe obstructionist local bureaucrats always try to vex the
foreign investors with different allegations which include tax evasion,
operating without a host of permits, and violation of laws.

For

example, local authorities raided a Vietnamese affiliate of Hong Kong based Peregrine Investments Holding Ltd, accusing the local unit of
tax evasion (the company denies wrong

doing).^^

Although the Vietnamese government have promulgated many
investment and business laws, many of these laws are vague or
contradictory. Under the foreign investment law, for instance, profits
can be repatriated abroad, but the foreignrcurrency law say they
cannot, with a few e x c e p t i o n s . ^ ^ ¡^ some provinces local regulations
conflict with national laws and regulations. Authorities are often
unwilling to commit themselves to a course as defined by law,
preferring instead to make decisions on a case-by-case basis.^^
In order to get projects through the bureaucratic thicket,
expensive 'sweeteners' are often required. Foreign firms that can
afford it distribute their largesse widely in the form of scholarships for
officials and their relatives, expenses-paid trips abroad, training
courses, and charitable donations.
Another obstacle lies in the lack of adequate supporting
facilities, such as banking, insurance and consultancy services. The
^^ Nguyen, Tuan Dung, 'Foreign Direct Investment in Vietnam', in Leung Suiwah, Vietnam Assessment
: Creating a Sound Investment Climate, p.83
Chua, Reginad, 'Vietnam : Economic growth remains robust, but the current account deficit is
worrisom'. The Asian Wall Street Journal, 22 October, 1996, p.51
^^ Kohut, John, 'Doi Moi: Now For The Hard Part', Asia INC., vol.5,No.5, May 1996, p.30
^^ Bui Kim Chi, 'Providing legal services in Vietnam : A practitioner's viewpoint', in Leung Suiwah,
Vietnam Assessment: Creating a Sound Investment Climate, p.l 10
^^ Schwarz, Adam, 'Opportunity's Cost', Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 October 1995, p.57

banking system of Vietnam, for example, is underdeveloped, and
although foreign and domestic investors are permitted to borrow on
the domestic capital market, in reality they are forced to arrange all
financing overseas.^® This delays the rate of projects coming into
production and increases transaction costs.
Considering

all

these

obstacles

or

problems,

Vietnam's

investment environment is somewhat risky and unstable.

Many

foreign investors, including Western and Asian, have expressed a
chorus of frustration and dissatisfaction over these stumbling blocks.
Hence, for those foreign investors investing in Vietnam, coping or
getting around these obstacles is undoubtedly a major consideration.
As Lawrence Ding, chairman of Central Trading 8B Development of
Taiwan, commented : "to start a business in Vietnam is not very easy
because one has to deal with the country's cumbersome bureaucratic
procedures and other difficulties.

It is just like muddling through

murky water, you need to know exactly where is the stepping stone.

Nguyuen Tuan Dung, op cit p.85
^ Vatikiotis, Michael, 'Taiwanese Takeover : Island's entrepreneurs are leading the way', Far Eastern
Economic Review, 22 September 1994, p.80

CHAPTER 4
The Push Factors and the Influx of Overseas Chinese Investment
into Vietnam

4.1 The Push Factors
It is too simplistic to argue that the influx of the overseas
Chinese investments from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and
Malaysia into Vietnam is purely prompted by the pull factors. While
pull factors are important any account would be incomplete without
looking at the push factors which have also driven the overseas
Chinese entrepreneurs or capitalists from those four East Asian
countries to invest in Vietnam. The push factors are the positive and
negative political, economic, and social considerations arising from or
existing in those overseas Chinese entrepreneurs' or capitalists' home
countries.

4.1.1 Positive Political Consideration
There can be little doubt that the relations between Vietnam
and those four East Asian nations (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore,
and Malaysia) have improved considerably over the past few years.
Early confrontation has given way to détente, and detente has opened
up opportunities for entente. However, Vietnam in the late 1970s and
early-1980s had little basis for productive contact with the four noncommunist East Asian nations and its approach to these four noncommunist states was influenced by legacies of suspicion from the
Second Indochina War.

Although useful and well-intentioned steps

were adopted by the four non-communist states, especially Singapore
and Malaysia, to develop bilateral relationships with Vietnam in 1976
and 1977, the onset of the severe regional impact of refugee flows from

Vietnam (especially in 1978 and 1979) and the Cambodia conflict
impeded their constructive efforts. ^^^
The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia frightened many noncommunist East Asian countries, including the ASEAN nations in
which Singapore and Malaysia are members.

The invasion revived

those non-communist East Asian countries' latent suspicion of
possible future Vietnamese expansionism.

In this regard, the non-

communist East Asian nations, particularly the ASEAN members
pursued a strategy to reject the legitimacy of Vietnam's presence of
the regime in Phnom Penh and to exert pressure on Vietnam to review
its position and withdraw its forces, i^i ASEAN also mobilized opinion
in the United Nations and pushed U.N. resolutions condemning
Hanoi's belligerent attitude. ^^^ in so doing, a confrontation resulted
and the relations between ASEAN and Vietnam turned sour.
In the changing international and regional environment from
the late 1980s, the reduction in tensions between the former Soviet
Union and China, the decline of Soviet power and the progress
towards a Cambodian settlement, opened the way for detente between
Vietnam and its East Asian neighbours. In this environment, Vietnam
has to re-orient its earlier approach towards the East Asian nations
and, hence, the process of normalization between Vietnam and the
East Asian nations was underway.

Some East Asian commercial

'Shared Destiny : Southeast Asia in the 21st Century', Report of The ASEAN-Vietnam Study
Group, February 1993, pp33-34
Frost, Frank. Vietnam's Foreign Relations : Dynamics of Change, Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, Singapore, 1993, p.60
Duiker, William J., oßdt, 211

relations and bilateral

exchanges with Vietnam had

increased

progressively. For example, Singapore and Taiwan pursued extensive
trade relations with Vietnam when the communist regime initiated the
doi moi.

But it was not until the signing of The Cambodian peace

agreement by Vietnam in 1991, that the pace of ministerial visits and
bilateral co-operation between Vietnam and the four East Asian
nations (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia) were stepped
up markedly.
Apart from the changing international and regional political
environment ( the end of cold war and a shift in the balance of forces
among the major powers) and the reorientation of Vietnam's foreign
policy, there are several other reasons why the relations between the
four East Asian nations and Vietnam progressed from one of
confrontation to cooperation.
Vietnam has the spill-over effect on the four East Asian nations
since they are neighbours of Vietnam.

This implies that problems

affecting Vietnam will inevitably spill over to the next. Consider the
Vietnamese refugees problem,

an outcome of the

war in Vietnam,

which places a burden on the neighbouring East Asian countries. ^^^
While these East Asian nations may suffer if there are problems in
Vietnam, they will also stand to benefit if the latter prosper.

If

Vietnam is able to enjoy a higher standard of living, it will provide not
only a large market but also investment opportunities.
Frost, Frank, op cit, p.60
^^ Lim, Chee Ping, 'ASEAN-lndochina relations : Prospects and scope for enhanced economic cooperation', in Kawagoue and Sekiguchi, East Asian Economics Transformation and Challenges, p.307

Vietnam ranks second to Indonesia in terms of population in
the Southeast-Asian region, and had once competed with East Asian
nations, particularly ASEAN in establishing a regional

order, los

Vietnam has long been considered an important factor in the major
powers' regional policies (This had been revealed in the Vietnam War).
Furthermore, Vietnam is a country with a long history and a proud
tradition of independence and self- assertiveness, if her goals of social
and economic rehabilitation or reforms are largely met, she can
emerge as a more complete regional power. In this regard, Vietnam
did potentially hold an important political standing in regional and
international affairs.

Vietnam with its potential political weights,

could pose some complex political challenges for the East Asian
nations.
The switch of centrally-planned economy to market-oriented
economy has signified the Vietnamese government's commitment to
carry out economic reforms ( wide-ranging policies, institutions and
systematic adjustment) similar to those of the four East Asian nations
to renovate its ailing economy. Undoubtedly, this paves the way for
further economic co-operation between Vietnam and the East Asian
nations.

On their part, the four East Asian can assist Vietnam in

facilitating its economic transformation and integration into regional
and international economy by offering their investment capital,
management
manpower.
105

know-how,

skills

and

technologies,

and

skilled

By doing so , the East Asian nations would not only

ibid, pp.307-308

intensify the pace of economic reforms in Vietnam but also develop a
mechanism for conflict resolution and confidence-building between
both sides,
In view of all these reasons, the four East Asian cannot afford to
neglect Vietnam, which is emerging as a potential arena for
progressive collaboration and expansion and, hence, they have to
engage the country contructively and pragmatically.
Among these four East Asian nations, Malaysia has been
particularly active in fostering ties with Vietnam. Premier Vo Van Kiet
visited Malaysia in Januaiy 1992 and an investment guarantee
agreement to protect Malaysian investments in Vietnam was signed by
Kiet and his counterpart,

M a h a t h i r .

¡^ April 1992, Prime Minister

Mahathir Mohamad led a large delegation to Vietnam (including four
ministers, 20 officials and 107 b u s i n e s s m e n ) . D u r i n g this five-day
visit Mahathir and his counterpart, Vo Van Kiet, signed agreements on
economic, technical, scientific, cultural and telecommunications cooperation. Seven months later, on 11 August, Vietnam's Minister of
Commerce and Tourism, Le Van Triet and Malaysia's Minister of
International Trade and Industry, Rafîdah Aziz signed a trade
agreement to promote stronger trade and economic relations between
the two countries.

According to Rafidah, "the agreement provides

for most-favoured nation treatment to be accorded by both countries
Indochina Digest (electronic edition), 31 January 1992 [On line]. Available Internet : W3C/ A N U
File : The World Wide Web Virtual Library-Vietnam
Frost, Frank, op cit p.62
Indochina Digest (Electronic edition) 28 August 1992 [On line}. Available Internet : W3C/ANU
File : The World Wide Web virtual Library-Vietnam

in matters relating to customs and charges on our imports and
exports," adding that the pact will encourage visits by businessmen,
government
governments,

representatives
enhance

trade,

and
and

trade

delegations

provide

the

of

framework

both
for

diversification of bilateral trade, lo®
Singapore had maintained a ban on investment in Vietnam
during the period of the Cambodia conflict but it was lifted in
November 1991 after the signing of the Paris accords which put an
official

end

to

the

thirteen-year-old

conflict

in

Cambodia, no

Singapore's commercial contacts with Vietnam have since proceeded
rapidly, building on the already flourishing trade

relationship.

Singapore's increasing interest in Vietnam was signified by the visit in
April 1992 of Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew who attended a seminar
organized by the World Bank and the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP) and met the Vietnamese leaders including Premier
Kiet and General Secretary Do Muoi.m

The relationship was

bolstered further by Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng who made the
first visit by a Singaporean foreign minister to Vietnam in
Wong

announced

that

Singapore

would

support

O c t o b e r . ^

Vietnam's

participation in ASEAN consultations, and help provide technical
training for Vietnamese cadres in fields such as infrastructure,
finance, banking, and economic management.

m

Frost, Frank, op cit p.61
ibid
112 ibid

Just after this visit,

the two countries signed an investment guarantee and protection
agreement

which

was

Singaporean investment.

seen

as

a

further

encouragement

for

In the following few years, the ministerial

visits of Singapore to Vietnam were intensified.

For example, in

November 1993 Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew made a five-day trip to
Vietnam and in March

1995 Lee, accompanied by a business

delegation, paid another five-day visit to V i e t n a m .

^^^

Taiwan and Hong Kong have also improved bilateral relations
with Vietnam.

The contacts of these two nations with Vietnam

remained at a low profile in the 1980s, but some high level official and
ministerial visits were organized once the Cambodian peace agreement
was imminent. In September 1991, Taiwan's Vice Economic Minister,
Chiang Pin-Kung, led a 22-member Taiwanese trade delegation which
represented the highest-level Taiwanese official traveling to Vietnam to
meet the Vietnamese

leaders,

The meetings between Taiwan and

Vietnam focus on Taiwanese aid to Vietnam's communications,
agriculture and fisheries industries and setting up an industrial zone
in Vietnam. In 1992 some Taiwanese officials were sent to Hanoi and
Ho Chi Minh City to establish trade offices and sign an investment
guarantee agreement, ii® Hong Kong also tried to strengthen bilateral
co-operation with

Vietnam.^®

in

mid-November 1992, twenty-one

Indochina Digest (Electronic edition), 26 November 1993 and 31 March 1995 [On
Internet, File : W3C/ANU File : The World Wide Web Virtual Library-Vietnam
Indochina Digest (Electronic edition), 27 September 1991 [On line]. Available
W3C/ANU, File : The World Wide Web Virtual Library- Vietnam
Indochina Digest(Electronic edition), 20 November 1992 [On line]. Available
W3C/ANU, File : The World Wide Web Virtual Library-Vietnam
Indochina Digest(Electronic edition), 27 November 1992 [On line]. Available
W3C/ANU, File : The World Wide Web Virtual Library-Vietnam

line]. Available
Internet, File :
Internet, File :
Internet, File :

corporate representives from Hong Kong paid a visit to Vietnam.
Anson Chan, secretary for economic services, led the group to
investigate Vietnam's trade and investment policies. During the visit
the delegation met with Deputy Prime Minister Tran Due Luong, and
representatives

of

the
State

State

Committee

Planning

for

Cooperation

Committee

and

and

Investment,

the

numerous

ministries.

"These contacts have given us a very good idea of the

way in which the Vietnamese government is moving towards a free
market economy,'' Mrs Chan commented.ii®
With all this in view, it is clear that the shift of relationships
between

these

four

East

Asian

nations

and

Vietnam

from

confrontation to dialogue and to mutually beneficial cooperation in
almost all fields has signalled the emerging positive and favourable
political relations. The abandonment of confrontation and the fourEast-Asian-nations increased level of business and official interaction
with Vietnam have paved the way for forging a regional entente, or a
process of sustained, systematic promotion of understanding or
consensus providing

for collaborative

endeavours

and

common

courses of action on the part of regional states. In the light of this, the
confidence of the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs or capitalists to
invest in Vietnam have been greatly

enhanced.

The somewhat

pushing but constructive approaches adopted by those four East

''^Jbid
ibid

Asian nations towards Vietnam have really been the impetus for the
overseas Chinese entrepreneurs to channel their investments there.

4.1.2 Negative Political Consideration in Malaysia
Despite the emerging positive political relationship between
Malaysia and Vietnam as well as the ensuing Malaysian government's
official encouragement to step up commercial interest in Vietnam, the
flow of the overseas Chinese investment into Vietnam has also been
driven or pushed by the existing unfavourable or inauspicious political
circumstances in Malaysia.

After the May 1969 post-election race

riots,

Policy

the

New

Economic

(NEP) was formulated

to be

implemented over a period of twenty years (1971-1990) in order to
reduce and eventually eradicate poverty among all Malaysians
irrespective of race and restructure Malaysian society so that
identification of race with economic function and geographical location
is reduced and eventually eliminated, ii®

More specifically, the NEP

set the target that within a period of twenty years Malays and other
indigenous people will manage and own at least 30 per cent of the
total commercial and industrial activities in all categories and scales
of operation and in terms of employment the NEP provides that the
employment pattern at all levels and in all sectors, particularly the
modern rural and modern urban sectors, must reflect

inter-ethnic

parity. 120

Lin, Tai Yoke, 'Inter-ethnic Restructuring in Malaysia, 1970-80 : The Employment Perspective',
Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science, vol.10. No,2, 1982, p.33
ibid

Considering all the objectives or goals of the NEP, it does seem
clear that the state adopted the NEP as a progressive and sound
remedy to the major socio-economic imbalances inherited from
colonialism and exacerbated by the pattern of national economic
development in the 1960s.

However, most of the strategies and

programmes, such as the Industrial Co-ordination Act and the
Petroleum Development Act, the quasi-public bodies, and government
corporations that were charged with providing special assistance for
Malays or Bumiputeras in obtaining ownership and capital shares in
private sectors and the establishment of regulations and quotas which
were devised discriminately to implement the NEP, have perniciously
undermined overseas Chinese economic status and dynamism in
Malaysia.

As Dr.Lim Lin Lien put it : Insofar as we detect an

unjustifiable loss or sense of deprivation, we' could say that not only
has the Chinese economic position been eroded but that is contrary to
the spirit and intent of the NEP'. 121 The Chinese business community
was upset with the Petroleum Development Act, which put the
country's petroleum industry under the control of the national oil
agency,

Petronas.

The industrial

Coordination Act

ostensibly

promulgated to implement the government's industrialization policies
and to ensure Bumiputera's involvement in the orderly development
and growth of

i n d u s t r i e s . 122

After implementation of this act.

Ling, Liong Sik and et al. The Future of Malaysian Chinese, Malaysian Chinese Association, Kuala
Lumpur, 1988, p.38
Gomez, Edmund Terence & Jomo K.S., Malaysia's Political Economy : Politics. Patronage and
Profits. Cambridge Univesrsity Press, United Kingdom, 1997, p.41

Bumiputera participation

in government-approved

manufacturing

projects grew between 1975 and 1985, with equity participation
always above 40 percent, surpassing half on two occasions (See Table
9). But, the non-Bumiputera's equity participation was always below
40 percent.

Table 9 : Malaysia's Equity Participation of Ethnic Groups in Approved
Manufacturing Project^, 1975-87 (percentages)
Year
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
: 1985
: 1986
1 1987

Bumiputera

Non-Bumiputera

Foreign

41^8""

30.7

27.5

40.3

34.8

24.9

42.2

27.7

30.1

33.3

37.0

46.1

9.7
14.4

40.4

26.7

32.9

44.5

6.5

29.0

56.3
47.4

16.2
26.9

27.5
25.7

42.5

34.8

22.7

54.4

27.8

17.8

37.6

34.5

28.0

29.4

21.5

49.1

39.5

Source : Gomez, Edmund Gomez and Jomo K.S., Malaysia's Political Economy :: Politics, Patronaee
and Profits, Cambridge University Press.U.K., 1997, p.43.

With such discriminatory implementation of the NEP, the overseas
Chinese

business

community

in

Malaysia

were

unrelentlessly

marginalized. After implementation of the Petroleum Development Act
and the Industrial Coordination Act, the Chinese entrepreneurs or
capitalists had been largely excluded from the country's most recent
growth

sectors,

i n d u s t r i e s . 123

the

petroleum

extraction

and

manufacturing

7he foreign investors, however, were given preferential

treatment over local (mainly overseas Chinese) investors.

The

Malaysian government has altered its policies to allow foreign
Jesudason, James V., Ethnicity and the Economy : The State. Chinese Business, and Multinationals
in Malaysia, Oxford Uniyersity Press, Oxford, 1989, pp. 130-131

investors full or majority ownership and control over their Malaysian
incorporated companies.

The government has also announced that

the equity conditions relating to foreign investments made from
October 1986 to the end of 1990 will not be changed in the sense that
foreign investors will not ever be required to sell their shareholdings to
Malaysians.

124

AS

citizens of the country the non-Bumiputera,

particularly the Chinese are not allowed to have 100 percent equity
ownership and they are required to apportion at least 30% equity
ownership to Bumiputera. Furthermore, most overseas Chinese firms
have had to allocate equity at par or below market prices to the
Malays under the NEP.125 with all this in view, the so-called NEP was
indeed a restrictive and prejudiced framework which allowed little
room for the Chinese capital investments to thrive or expand.

Of

course, it is not true to say that the Chinese has not benefited in any
way from the NEP.

A handful of Chinese entrepreneurs and

capitalists, who have fostered close ties with prominent Malay political
patrons, have gained from the NEP.

But, these Chinese represent

only a small portion of the Chinese business community.

The vast

majority of Chinese have not benefited from the NEP.
When the NEP drew to an end in December 1990, the overseas
Chinese

entrepreneurs

or

capitalists

were

longing

for

the

abandonment of the affirmative-action-oriented policy defined solely
by ethnicity, and its replacement by a plural policy which targets

Ling, Liong Sik and et al, op cit. p.49
ibid

small groups with ethnic identifiers. Unfortunately, such hopes of the
Chinese were dashed by Mahathir-sponsored National Development
Policy (NDP) which still reiterates all the NEP's commitments. 126
Although the NDP which encompasses the Sixth Malaysia Plan (6MP)
for 1991-1995 and a ten-year Second Outline Perspective Plan (OPP2)
for 1991-2000 highlight 'balanced development in order to establish a
more united and, just society', its substance was largely familiar
rather than novel. For instance, the 30 per cent equity restructuring
target is still upheld and no specific time frame is set for its
achievement. 127 The NDP claims that past efforts aimed at creating a
Bumiputera (Malay) commercial and industrial community have met
with the least success.^28 Besides, the government's discriminatory
investment policies, such as the 1975 Industrial Coordination Act and
the 1980s heavy industrialization policy are still in effect to
discriminate in favour of foreign investors and against non-Malay
(mainly overseas Chinese) investors.
Taking all this into consideration, it can plausibly be argued
that the National Development Policy (NDP) is nothing more than old
ideas in a new package. The tendency for vested interests to mobilize
around self-benefiting preference policies will very likely be continued
into the indefinite future. The same group of politicians are likely to
have preponderant power in defining future policy which is deemed
Jomo, K.S., U-TURN? : Malaysian Econmic Development Policies After 1990, James Cook
University of North Queensland, Australia, 1994, p.52
ibid, p.58
ibid

non-preferable to the non-Malay, particularly the Chinese.

In

perceiving the unfavourable prospect offered by the NDP, hence, the
overseas Chinese entrepreneurs or capitalists in Malaysia choose to
invest in other foreign countries, such as in Vietnam which have more
lenient investment policies, or at least, the policy is not defined along
ethnic line.

Seen from this perspective, it can be argued that the

inflow of the Malaysian overseas Chinese investments into Vietnam is
pushed by the politically-induced limited opportunities and domestic
constraints in the involvement of Malaysia's economy.

4.1.3 Negative Political Considerations in Hong Kong
The British Crown colony of Hong Kong will be returned to the
sovereignty of the People's Republic of China on 1 July, 1997. The
return will mark the first time that a society which has functioned
under western, albeit colonial, institutions will be handed over to a
massive, developing, socialist country run by the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP).

The adjustments that will be required to absorb

successfully a free-wheeling capitalist economy into the political fabric
of a socialist-oriented market economy will tax the diplomatic and
political skills of both Chinese and British negotiators. The general
guiding formula which has been accepted since the signing of the
Sino-British Joint Declaration on the future of Hong Kong in Beijing in
December 1984 is "One country two systems" whereby China will
guarantee the continuation of the existing system in Hong Kong for at

least fifty years after the date of the

takeover.
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However, the

specifics of just how this will be implemented were and, despite the
passing of the Basic Law or mini-constitution for Hong Kong, are still
vague. This is because the implementation of the Joint Declaration
which involved increasing the democratic basis of the Legislative
Council

amid

close

consultations

with

the

Chinese

side,

the

negotiating of agreements in the Joint Liaison Group (JLG) on issues
relating to the territoiy's future International economic arrangements
- notable among which were several air services arrangements and
Hong Kong's accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade;
the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) and the forum for
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation - and more domestic matters such
as the localization of a wide range of laws has been enormously
influenced

by

the

differences

between

Britain

and

China. ^^^

Therefore, there has always been skepticism in some quarters that the
absorption can be successfully concluded and was reinforced by the
Tiananmen incident of 4 June 1989.
Even when the Chinese side in 1990 finally sketched out their
scheme for the future Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
(HKSAR) in the form of the Basic Law, considerable uncertainties
remained both about the process of transition and about the
vagueness in law of some of the terms used in the Basic Law and
about its own institutional arrangements with the future HKSAR. For

Segal, Gerald, The Fate of Hong Kong, Simon & Schuster Ltd, Great Bratain, 1993, p.46
Yahuda, Michael, Hong Kong : China's Challenge, Routledge, London, 1996, p.66

example, article 23 of the Basic Law that deals with subversion,
specifically requires the HKSAR to enact laws
to prohibit foreign organizations or bodies from
conducting political activities in the Region, and to
prohibit political organizations or bodies of the
Region from establishing ties with foreign political
organizations or bodies, i^i

It is unclear what implications this may have for Taiwanese
organizations operation in Hong Kong, or whether Hong Kong
representatives would be subject to limits on foreign travel (including
Taiwan), or meeting

foreigners.

are provided for the key terms.

Needless to say, no legal definitions
In the view of many within Hong

Kong, the vagueness of the Basic Law will provide a Chinese-dictated
legal basis for the central government to exercise considerable control
over the internal affairs of the HKSAR in addition to those of defence
and foreign affairs.
Besides, the Chinese government has also showed its hardline
stance on legal and constitutional issues. The Chinese authority has
always publicly and repeatedly pledged to replace all three tiers of
representative bodies elected under the proposals of Governor Chris
Patten.

These include the District Boards, the Regional and Urban

Councils and the all-important Legislative

Council,

Among the

three, the Chinese government focuses its attention upon the
Legislative Council which is Hong Kong's highest body. On March 24,

ibid, p. 118
ibid
' ' ' J b i d , p. 125

1996,

the

Beijing-appointed

Preparatory

Committee

passed

a

resolution to create a provisional legislature to replace the colony's
elected Legislative Council. ^^^

The provisional Legislative Council,

which will exclude members of the outspoken and popular Democratic
Party, will be empowered to enact laws, but its principal purpose will
be to devise a new system of elections in favour of the Chinese
government so that a new and pro-Chinese Council could be elected,
preferably within a year.

The director of China's Hong Kong and

Macau Affairs Office, Lu Ping, indicated that all judges will have to be
reappointed after 1997.135 Another ominous sign is Beijing's express
intention to scrap the Bill of Rights, a 23-article law that enables an
individual to sue the government for violation of her civil rights. Then
there is the uncertainty over the Court of Final Appeal, due to be set
up as the ultimate

arbiter

of law in the Hong

Kong

Special

Administration Region from 1 9 9 7 . A l l of this has clearly exhibited
the

Chinese

government's

intention

to

establish

a

cowed

and

compliant legislature which would soon undermine the independence
of the judiciary in Hong Kong.
With all this in view, the sources of potential problems for Hong
Kong are fundamental and are not subject for the most part to control
by Hong Kong government actions. The Chinese approaches to people
in Hong Kong seem to many to show evidence of a desire to establish
controls on democracy rather than to allow for a proper kind of
ibid
Rosario do Louise, 'Justice Under Siege', Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 January 1995, p. 19
ibid

autonomy. Hence, the dynamics of the transition period of Hong Kong
are fraught with danger and uncertainty which have eventually
induced massive migration from Hong Kong and exacerbation of
corruption.
According to official figures, in 1980 some 22,000 people
migrated from Hong Kong to Australia, Canada, United States, and
Englad, with numbers fluctuating by some 5,000 in the subsequent
six years.137 But in 1987 the total was up to 30,000 per year and
rising.

In 1988, it increased to 45,000; then there was a decline to

42,000 in 1989; it then climbed to reach level of over 60,000 from
1990.13®

Unfortunately for Hong Kong, a substantial proportion of

those emigrants is educated, highly skilled and well-trained.

The

emigrant profiles compiled from information on visa applicants show
that, from 1987 to 1991, between 15 and 19 percent of all emigrants
had attained degree level or higher in their education. In 1990, fully
66 percent of emigrants of working age and 34 percent of total
emigrants

could

be

considered

"managers

and

administrators,

professionals and associate professionar workers. ^^^ The comparable
figures for 1991 were 72 percent of working emigrants and 35 percent
of total emigrants.

In this regard. Hong Kong can be said to be

experiencing a brain drain rather than simply the drain of bodies. The

Skeldon, Ronald, 'Hong Kong in an International Migration System,' in Skeldon, Reluctant Exiles?
: Migration from Hong Kong and the New Overseas Chinese, p.30
' ' ' ibid. P.31
ibid, p.32
140
ibid

brain drain is very likely to weaken the manpower and, thereby, Hong
Kong's business vitality could be eroded.
With the impending Chinese takeover of Hong Kong, a large
number of businesses in Hong Kong are already affected by the
corruption of the Chinese mainland political and economic systems.
As the interface between Hong Kong and the mainland grows greater
during the coming years. Hong Kong businessmen will find it
increasingly difficult to resist pressures for corrupt dealings.
examples of these malpractices could be cited.

Many

The Independent

Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) estimated in 1991 that the
cash

and

gifts paid

to mainland firms to facilitate

business

transactions in China added between three and five percent to
business operating costs. ^^^ More worrying is the expectation that the
post-1997

government

will

be

swayed

into

granting

lucrative

construction contracts to Chinese firms for other than strictly
commercial

reasons.^^^

¡^ ig ^Iso feared that the courts may be

inhibited from deciding against politically well-connected Chinese in
civil and criminal cases and against their enterprises in the event of
contract dispute.
Taking all this into account, the notion of 'one country, two
systems' advocated by the Chinese government seems far less like a
pragmatic policy and much more like a recipe for future uncertainty
and conflict. Facing the serious changes in legal and constitutional

Yahuda, Michael, op cit p. 129
ibid

systems, human rights issues, business functions, and human
resources

in Hong

Kong, the local

overseas

Chinese

business

community's confidence on the accountability, and transparency of the
Chinese

government

has really

been

sapped.

A

long-running

confidence survey conducted by Asian Business Magazine in Hong
Kong has revealed that economic confidence of business community
has remained at a relatively low ebb since 1989. Table 10 shows that
Hong Kong's score of Confidence Index has dropped from 73 index
point in 1989 to 59 index point in 1995. Compared to the other four
East Asian nations, Hong Kong has the lowest confidence index.
Table 10 : The Confidence Index of The fíve East Asian Nations

Country
Hong Kong
Taiwan
Singapore
Malaysia
Vietnam

1989
73
71
78
90
-

1990
60
56
70
83
-

1991
57
66
69
81
-

1992
66
67
66
75'
-

1993
62
72
74
77
84

1994
66
71
79
80
80

1995
59
70
67
82
87

- refers to Not Available
* The maximum score of the Confidence Index is 100 and this Confidence Index measures the
following six criteria used in the survey : Local market, export market, turnover, profits,
company prospects and economy.

Source : Compiled from Asian Business, vol.31, No. 11, November 1995, p.38

Hence, the Hong Kong's entrepreneurs or capitalists are forced to seek
outward investment in such a way that they can avoid any deleterious
consequences brought about by the uncertainties.

This was evident

that the outflow of local portfolio capital rose tenfold, from HK$2.4
billion to HK$24 billion in 1989-90.143 Furthermore, the case of Hong
Kong's smaller firms seeking to diversify elsewhere in the booming
East Asian economy pointed out by Gerald Segal has shown that the

143

Segal, Gerald, op cit, p.56

outflow investment from Hong Kong is already underway. In the light
of this, it is not surprising that Vietnam has become the Hong Kong's
Chinese entrepreneurs' destination.

4.1.4 Negative Political Considerations in Taiwan
In recent years the relationship between Taiwan and China has
undergone a sea of change.

From 1947 to 1978 Taiwan was

constantly threatened by direct military invasion from China.

The

shelling of Kinmen and Matsu, the two small offshore islands in the
Taiwan Straits, in 1958 was a stark e x a m p l e . B u t beginning in
1979, when Deng Xiaoping led the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
leadership to embark on its "four modernizations'' program, mainland
China's need to maintain a peaceful image eased its hard-line policy
towards Taiwan. The new goal set by the CCP was not to coerce but to
cajole Taiwan back into the fold with 'peaceful' and conciliatoiy
approaches, such as the 'nine-point' policy promulgated by the late
Marshal Ye Jianying in 1981 and the "one country, two systems"
formula

advanced

by

Deng

in

1984. i^s

According

to

these

approaches, Taiwan had been promised a large degree of autonomy,
to keep its militaiy, its foreign policy, and its capitalist political and
social systems. But Taiwan resisted by adopting its "three nos" stance

Jacobs, J. Bruce and Hong, Lijan, 'China's Relationship with Taiwan', in Harris and Klintworth,
China A s A Great Power : Myths, Realities and Challenges In The Asia-Pacific Region, pp.215-216
Long, Simon. Taiwan : China's Last Frontier, Macmillan Press, London, 1991, pp. 161-162

toward

mainland

China

:

no

contact,

no

compromise,

no

negotiations. ^^
This deadlock was broken in November 1987 when President
Chiang Ching-kuo decided to allow people in Taiwan to visit family
members on the
indirect

trade

mainland.

and

Subsequently, long-standing bans on

investment,

academic,

sports

and

cultural

exchanges, tourist visits and direct mail and telephone links were
lifted in rapid succession.

This opened the floodgates to people-to-

people exchanges between the two sides of the straits, unprecedented
at any period of Chinese history. According to the official sources in
Taipei, from November 1987 to December 1993, Taiwan residents
made more than 5.9 million trips to mainland China, and 78 million
letters and 99 million phone calls had been exchanged across the
Taiwan

Strait.i^s

Indirect trade in this period exceeded US$33.6

billion; and at least 15,000 Taiwan enterprises were operating in
Mainland China at the end of 1993, investing an estimated US$15.7
billion.

Most scholars consider that these official statistics released

by Taiwan

under-estimate

the

true

picture,

for instance,

the

Taiwanese investment on the mainland can run as high as US$30
b i l l i o n . 150

Besides, Taiwan's government established three major

Jia, Qingguo, 'Changing Relations Across The Taiwan Strait', Asian Survey, vol.32, No.3, March
1992, p.279
Hsia, Maria Chang, Taiwan's Main Policy and the Reunification of China, The Claremont Institute,
1991, p.5
Cheng, Joseph Y.S., 'China, Taiwan and Hong Kong in the mid-1990ws'. Current Affairs Bulletin.
vol.72, No.6, April/May 1996, p. 17
'^^jbid
Munro, Ross H., 'Giving Taipei A Place at The Table', Foreign Affairs, vol.73, No.6,
November/December 1994, p.l 15

institutions - the National Unification Council, the Straits Exchanges
Foundation, a n d the Mainland Affairs Council - to handle relations
with mainland China. In 1991, it formulated the National Unification
Program,

which

states

its

agreement

to

establish

direct

correspondence, air and shipping services, and trade and to promote
the exchange of visits by high-ranking officials; and on May 1, 1991,
Taiwan terminated the 42-year-old declaration of the 'period of
suppression of the communist rebellion".isi
In view of all this, it does seem clear that there are signs of
flexibility and even benevolence towards Taiwan by mainland China
and vice versa.

However, beneath the veneer of reciprocity lurks a

tension which can plunge Taiwan into undesirable crisis.

Although

the People's Republic of China (PRC) claims that it seeks a peaceful
settlement of the Taiwan reunification issue, it h a s never ruled out the
use of force. According to Deng Xiaoping, the PRC would employ force
to settle the Taiwan issue u n d e r the following conditions:
If Taipei leaned toward Moscow instead of
Washington; if Taipei decided to develop nuclear
weapons; if Taipei claimed to be an independent
state; if Taipei lost internal control a s a result of
the succession process; or if Taipei continued to
reject reunification talks for a long period of
time. 152

The recent political and diplomatic development of Taiwan
appear to have reactivated the use of the military option by Beijing to
Jia. Oingguo. op cit p.279
Hicjey, Dennis Van Vranken, 'America's Two-Point Policy And The Future of Taiwan', Asian
Survey, vol.28, No.8, August 1988, p.884

resolve the Taiwan reunification issue. Beijing has watched the
accelerated political democratization on the island with some grave
misgiving because the democratization put the island on a collision
course with China. To begin with, Beijing viewed the rapid rise of the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) with strong disapproval and much
concern about the development of Taiwan independence s e n t i m e n t , isa
Ever since its emergence, the DPP has been advocating selfdetermination, a euphemism for Taiwan independence from Beijing's
point o f v i e w . 1 5 4 Furthermore, the democratization has also led to a
rapid 'nativization' of Taiwanese politics and leadership.
Consequently, unlike previous Kuomintang (KMT) party leaders, the
new generation of leaders are much less committed to Taiwan's
reunification with China. Instead, they see their interests in
perpetuating Taiwan's de facto separation from China if not its
outright independence.
China is even more concerned with the Lee Teng-hui
administrations' efforts to enhance Taiwan's diplomatic profile.
President Lee's visits to Nicaragua and Costa Rica in May 1994 were
the first official trips abroad by a Taiwanese president in seventeen
years.
Earlier in Februauy of the same year, Lee visited Indonesia
and the Philippines for a holiday, but he met President Suharto and
President Fidel Ramos and reached a number of agreements on
153

155

Jia, Qingguo, op cit, p.279
ibid
Cheng, Joseph Y.S., op cit p. 17

economic

co-operation,

ise

During the 49th session of the United

Nations General Assembly in October 1994, Taipei managed to
mobilize twenty-four countries to indicate their support for its bid to
participate in the United Nations.

The most unexpected and

disturbing event to the Chinese Government was President Lee's trip
to the United States in June 1995.157
In the light of all these political and diplomatic maneuvers
carried out by the Taiwanese government, the Chinese government
has been convinced that Taipei is attempting to perpetuate the
island's political separation from China.

Beijing has concluded,

therefore, that its previous resort to peaceful overtures to Taipei is not
sufficient to bring about reunification, and that a policy of coercion is
needed.

This perceptible shift has resulted in a series of military

exercises which include joint landing exercises by the army, navy and
air force and missile tests near the coast of Taiwan.

These recent

military pressure tactics are beginning to show that China's greater
inclination to use coercive means if necessary to achieve the goal of
reunification. In this regard, the Taiwan issue may be highly explosive
in the foreseeable future and, hence, Taiwanese investors' confidence
in the business environment in Taiwan or mainland China will be
considerably jolted. This fear was already evident in China's missile
tests near Taiwan in mid-1995 and early 1996 causing immediate

i b i d p. 18
Jia, Qingguo, 'Reflection on the Recent Tension In The Taiwan Strait', The China Journal, Issue 36,
July 1996, p.93

concern among a few Taiwanese investors who have begun to spread
risks by increasing investment in Southeast Asian nations.

For

instance, the Pao Cheng Shoe Co., which earlier set up 17 production
lines for making athletic shoes in China, subsequently established 11
similar production lines in Indonesia, and in 1994, committed US$30
million to build a new factory with eight production lines on 20 acres
outside Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam, is^
Besides, China's potentially unstable domestic policy and tough
position on Taiwan's reunification problem have also strained the
nerves of the Taiwanese government on the already growing and
enormous and growing investment in the mainland. This is because
the leaders in Taipei realized that most of Taiwan's

overseas

investment capital would be sunk into mainland enterprises within a
few years.

This means that the Chinese government would enjoy

overwhelming leverage over Taiwan's business community and thus
considerable influence over the Taiwanese government.

In order to

reduce the potential impact of capricious shift in mainland policy and
at the same time strengthen long-standing trade and quasi-official
relations with
members),

the

Southeast
Taiwanese

Asian

nations

government

(especially
officially

the

ASEAN

initiated

the

"Southward policy" or "Go South policy" in 1994 to encourage
Taiwanese entrepreneurs to pour more into the investment in the
Southeast Asian region, i®®

Chen, Xiangming, op cit p.457
M d , P-453

With all this in view, it is clear that the unsettled and prolonged
political tension caused by the reunification problem facing China and
Taiwan has indeed produced

a latent insecure and

uncertain

environment which is inimical to the growth of business and
investment in the long term. Hence, the Taiwanese entrepreneurs or
capitalists are propelled to invest abroad, particularly in the ASEAN
states which have less political risk.
4.1.5 Negative Economic and Social Considerations in the Four East
Asian Countries (Taiwan, Hong Kong. Singapore and Malaysia)
Apart from the negative political consideration, the emerging or
existing negative economic and social considerations which includes
the rising land and labour costs, shortage of labour,

stricter

environmental-protective laws, scarcity of natural resources and
agricultural products, and small local markets has also been the
substantial force driving the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs of three
of the four East Asian Countries out of their home countries to invest
in other countries which are unrestricted or less restricted by the
above mentioned negative economic considerations.
The rapid industrialization and urbanization experienced by the
four East Asian nations since 1970s and 1980s have intensified the
use of land. As a result, the problem of inadequacy of land in those
four East Asian countries, especially Taiwan, Hong Kong and
Singapore has grown alarmingly. Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore,
although not Malaysia, have very limited land area (See Table 11 ).

Hong Kong and Singapore are simply city states.

Furthermore, the

share of activities of development in total land area of respective
countries from 1975 to 1992 had increased quite substantially (See
Table 11 ). Besides, the figures on population density (person/sq km)
of respective nations from 1975 to 1992 had also intensified (See
Table 12). Hence, it is clear that these East Asian countries have long
felt the pressure on their land resources.

Although Malaysia has a

larger land area than the other three nations, it has begun to feel the
growing

pressure

on

its

land

since

the

industrialization

and

urbanization programmes have been concentrated on Peninsular
Malaysia (West Malaysia).
Table 11: The Four East Asian Nations' Land Area and Land Use
Total Land Area
(lOOOsq.km)

Country

Share of Development Activities* in Total Land Area

(%)

1975
Taiwan
Hong Kong
Singapore
Malaysia

1992

36

12.6

22.6

1

69.3

69.7

0.6

82.0

93.4

329.8

17.3

26.1

•Development Activities refer to urbanization, construction of road, railway, and residential areas
Source : Compiled from Kev Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries, Asian
Development Bank, vol.25, 1994.

Table 12 : Population Density (Persons/sq Km) of the four East Asian
nations.
1992
1985
1975
Country
Taiwan

445

532

574

Hong Kong

4231

5246

5588

Singapore

3645

4000

4548

Malaysia

37

48

56

Asian Development Bank, vol.25, 1994.

In the light of this, the prices and premium on land or properties have
eventually been driven up.

As an example of the change in land

values of Hong Kong, the rent on one 30193-square-metre industrial
site rose from HK$442 (US$56.67) in 1956 to HK$900,000
(US$115,384) in 1990.i6i This reveals that the monthly rental of onesquare-metre land has risen from approximately U.S.$0.0018 in 1950
to approximately U.S.$4 in 1990. The capital value of prime office
space also skyrocketed. For instance, the prices of prime office space
rose by 9 percent in the first quarter of 1992; by 16 percent in the
second quarter of same year.i®^ Singapore also experienced rapid
increases in land and property prices. For example, the monthly
rental of one-square-metre land has soared from approximately
U.S.$2 in 1960s to approximately U.S.$4.25 in 1980s.i63

The

monthly rental of prime office space (per-square-metre) rose from
approximately U.S$31 in 1980 to approximately U.S.$79 in 1997.1^4
In a word, the growing demand for land in these East Asian
nations has led to spiraling growth of land or property prices. Hence,
any commercial, industrial and residential projects established in
these states are very expensive. Inevitably, some overseas Chinese
entrepreneurs' businesses which require large land areas may find
their competitive edge being eroded by rising land costs. To remain
competitive, these business operations are forced to be relocated in
other foreign countries which have cheap land, such as Vietnam —
'Hong Kong Property : Heading Upwards', The Economist 18 July 1992, p.84

iMd

Lee, Tsao Yuan, 'Sub-regional Economic Zones in the Asia-Pacific : An Overview', in Toh and
Low,
Regional Cooperation and Grov^th Triangles in ASEAN, p.38
164
ibid., p.37

the cost of renting space in the country is U.S.$2.50 per square
metre.
Rising labour costs in these four East Asian nations have also
become
overseas

another
Chinese

negative

economic

entrepreneurs.

consideration
Taiwan's,

Hong

bothering

the

Kong's,

and

Singapore's labour costs have been climbing at a considerable rate
since the early 1980s while Malaysia's labour costs have just started
to increase from late-1980s or the early-1990s. For example, between
1987 and 1992, average wages of Taiwanese in manufacturing grew
by 9-15 percent annually and currently the labour costs of Taiwan's
manufacturing sector are the highest in Asia, after

Japan.i^®

jn the

case of Hong Kong between 1983 and 1991, the annual average salary
for manufacturing employees and professionals increased 10 percent
and 65 percent respectively.

A nation-wide survey conducted by

the Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers suggested that wages in
Malaysia rose by 7.3 per cent in 1994.1^8 chart 5 shows the labour
cost of some selected Asia-Pacific nations and Vietnam has the lowest
labour cost among those Asia-Pacific countries.

'Cash Call: Haiphong's grand dreams hinge on foreign investment', Far Eastern Economic Review.
13 February 1997, pp.50-52
Country Economic Brief: Taiwan, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, July 1995,
p.23
Wilkinson, Barry. Labour and Industry in the Asia-Pacific : Lesson from the Newly-Industrialized
Countries, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1994.
Country Economic B r i e f : Malaysia, Department of Foreign Affairs And Trade, Canberra, July
1995, p.35

Chart 5 : Comparative Labour Costs in Asia Pacific (1993)
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Having high growth of wages, all these four East Asian nations have
undoubtedly become expensive places for doing business, especially
setting up the labour-intensive industries. This is because the rising
labour wages can increase the cost of production and, thereby,
products cannot be sold at a lower price in a competitive market. In
such an environment, it is no surprise that the overseas Chinese
investors head out for low-wage-labour countries, such as Vietnam.
Limited supplies of labour in these four East Asian nations have
also been a concern for the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs.

Since

the late-1980s, the labour markets for these four East Asian nations
have become tighter because of persistent labour shortages. In point
of fact, the four East Asian nations have small labour forces and also
slow or negative rates of growth in the labour force (See Table 13).

Table 13 : The Four East Asian Nations' Labour Force
Country
Taiwan
Hong Kong
Singapore
Malaysia

Total (millions) 1993
7.9
3
1
8

Average Annual Growth (%) 1993-2000
n/a
-0.4
0.5
2.5

1995, pp210 &211 and Gale Country & World Rankings Reporter, gale Research Inc, Detroit,
1995,p. 166.

In order to alleviate the problem of labour shortages, these four East
Asian nations turn to recruit large amounts of foreign labour.

In

Taiwan, for example, between 12,000 and 30,000 illegal foreign
workers were estimated in 1989.^^^

Between 1990 and May 1994,

over 73,200 foreign workers were estimated in

Taiwan.i^o

¡n 1985,

150,000 foreign workers, around 12 per cent of the total labour force,
were employed in

Singapore.i^i

Nearly 2 million guest workers were

employed to work in Malaysia in 1 9 9 5 . v i e w e d in the light of the
mass employment of illegal or legal foreign labours, the problem of
labour shortages facing these four East Asian countries is critical.
Furthermore, the average annual growth rate of labour supply in each
countiy has an inclination to decrease in the near future (See Table
14).
Table 14 : The Four East Asian Nations Labour Force's Growth Rate
Country

Average Annual Growth Rate (%) 1965Average Annual Growth Rate (%) 19951995
2025
Taiwan
2.75
1.45
Hong Kong
2.55
-0.17
1.82
Singapore
n/a
3.49
2.01
Malaysia
Source : Compiled from Workers in An Integrating World 1995, Oxford University Press, U.S.A, 1995,
p. 144 and Gale Country & World Rankings Reporter, Gale Research Inc., Detroit, 1995, p. 166

Wilkison, Barry, op cit, p.54
The Republic of China Year Book 1995, Government Information Office, Republic of China, 1995,
p.391
Wilkinson, Barry, op cit, p.54
Asia-Pacific Profile Profiles 1995, Asia Pacific Economics Group, ANU, Canberra, 1995, p. 192

The shortages of labour experienced by these four East Asian
countries have indeed posed a serious problem for labour-intensive
manufacturing activities in the four countries.

Hence, in order to

overcome the constraint of labour shortages on their business survival
or expansion, the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs have to go abroad
to invest in those countries, for example, to Vietnam which has a rich
pool of labour force.
These four East Asian nations have reaped the benefits of their
impressive economic growth and modernization which was brought
about by industrialization and urbanization, with rapid increases in
gross national product (GNP), per capita income, international
economic standing, and other indices.

At the same time, however,

these four East Asian nations have also laid the foundation for serious
environmental problems, which have begun to surface in everincreasing numbers and severity.

In 1987, the Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) reported that of Taiwan's twenty-one major
rivers, 13 per cent of the river waters were polluted with domestic
sewage, industrial effluents and solid

w a s t e s .

in Malaysia, heavy

metals such as lead, zinc, copper and cadmium have recently been
detected in Klang River, which has been classified by the Department
of Environment as one of the most polluted rivers in the

c o u n t r y .

The water pollution is just one of the common and serious

Williams, Jack F., 'Environmentalism in Taiwan', in Simon and Kau, Taiwan : Beyond the
Economic Miracle, pp. 189-190
Seda, Maria, Environmental Management in ASEAN : Perpespective on Critical Regional Issues.
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1993, p.87

environmental problems besetting these four East Asian countries.
The other environmental problems, such as air pollution, noise
pollution, soil degradation, and marine pollution have also exerted
pressures on their environment.
With the emergence of all these environmental problems, there
is no doubt that some undesirable and detrimental effects on the
quality of life and the well-being of society have been generated.
Hence, the governments of these four East Asian countries were
certainly under pressure to tackle these environmental problems, and
particularly in this recent year, these countries have decidedly
stepped

up

their

efforts.

In

Singapore,

for

example,

new

environmental laws are often enacted and old laws, especially those
concerning pollution control, were continuously amended from the
1960s onwards. Table 15 gives details of the newly enacted and
amended

environmental

laws of Singapore.

In Malaysia, the

Environment Quality Act (EQA) which was passed by Parliament in
1974 forms the basis of much of the legislation,

Currently, there

are at least 15 laws under EQA which are being enforced by the
Department of Environment (See Table 16). In addition, several other
pieces of legislation have also been enacted to buttress the EQA and
deal with the environmental issues more specifically (See Table 17).
By stepping up the use of legislation to curb environmental problems,
Taiwan is no exception.

For the past ten years, the Taiwanese

Sani Sham, 'Urban Environmental Issues in Southeast Asia Cities : An Overview', in Brookfield
and Ryron. South-East Asian's Environmental Future : The Search for Sustainabilitv. p.353

government has introduced, enforced and strengthened numerous
environmental laws, such as the Air Pollution Control and the Water
Pollution Control.
AMENDED LAWS

Table 15 : Singapore's Environmental Laws

Environmental Public Health Act 1974 (amended 1987)
Clean Air Act 1971 (amended 1975 and 1980)
Public Utilities (Central Water Catchment Area and Catchment Area Parks)
Reflations 1989 (amended 1992)
Public Utilities ( Water Supply) Regulations 1977 (amended 1992)
Agricultural Pests Act(amended 1986)
Parks and Trees Rules (last amended 1986)
Planning Act 1959 (last amended 1989)
NEW ENACTED LAWS Building Control Act 1989
Prevention of Pollution of the Sea Act .
National Parks Act 1990
National Parks Regulations 1990
Composition of Offences Regulation 1991
Detergents and Equipment Regulations 1991
Noxious Liquid Substances in Bulk Regulations 1991
Reporting of Pollution Incidents Regulations 1991
Radiation Protection Act of 1991
Control of NoisefromConstruction Site Regulations 1991
Source : Compiled from Bankaff, Greg, and Elston, Kylie, Environmental Regulation in Malaysia and
Singapore, University of Western Australia Press, Western Australia, 1994, pp.57, 62, 63,
66,67, 73,77,and 80.

Table 16 : Legislation Enforced by the DOE, Malaysia as at 1 January 1990

Motor Vehicle (Control of Smoke and Gas Emissions)Rule 1977 made under the Road Traffic
Ordinance 1958
EQA 1974 and the Environmental Quality (Amendment) Act 1985
Environmental Quality (Licensing) Regulations 1977
Environmental Quality (Prescribed Premises) (Crude Palm Oil) Order 1977
Environmental Quality (Prescribed Premises) (Crude Palm Oil) Regulations 1977
Environmental Quality (Prescribed Premises) (Raw Natural Rubber) Order 1978
Environmental Quality (Clean Air) Regulations 1978
Environmental Quality (Compounding of Offences) Regulation^ 1978
Environmental Quality (Sewage and Industrial Effluents) Regulations 1979
Environmental Quality (Control of Lead Concentration in Motor Gasoline) Regulations 1985
Environmental Quality (Motor Vehicle Noise) Regulations 1987
Environmental Quality (Prescribed Activities) (EIA) Order 1987
Environmental Quality (Prescribed Premises) (Scheduled Wastes) Regulations 1989
Environmental Quality (Prescribed Premises) (Scheduled Wastes Treatment and Disposal Facilities)
Order 1989
Environmental Quality (Prescribed Premises) (Scheduled Wastes Treatment and Disposal Facilities)
Regulations 1989
"
Source : Compiled from Brookfield, Harold,and Byron, Yvonne (ed).. Southeast Asia's Environmental
Future : The Search for Sustainabilitv, United Nations University Press & Oxford University
Press, Tokyo and Kuala Lumpur, 1993, p.353

Table 17 ; Environment-related Legislation, Malaysia
Protection of Wildlife Act 1972
Streets, Drainage and Building Act 1974
Pesticides Act 1975
Antiquities Act 1976
The National Parks Act 1980
National Forestry Act 1984
Exclusive Economic Zone Act of 1984
Atomic Energy Licensing Act of 1984
Petroleum (Safety Measures) Act of 1984
Environmental Quality (Control of Lead Concentration in Motor Gasoline) Regulations of 1985
Fisheries Act of 1985
Environmental Quality (Control of Emissions from Diesel Engines) Regulations of 1986
Enyironm^^^^

Assessment Order of 1987

Source : Compiled from Brookfield, Harold, and Byron, Yvonne, Byron (ed). Southeast Asia's
Environmental Future : The Search for Sustainabilitv. United Nations University Press &
Oxford University Press, Tokyo & Kuala Lumpur, 1993, p.354 and Bankoff, Greg & Elston,
Kylie, Environmental Regulation in Malaysia and Singapore. University of Western
Australia Press, Western Australia, 1994.

Besides, the public environmental consciousness in these four East
Asian nations has also been growing.

For example, in Taiwan, the

environmental consciousness in the last decade prompted an ever
increasing number of mass demonstrations against firms polluting the
environment and demands for payouts in compensation.
In view of all these circumstances, the room for the operation of
polluting industries in these four East Asian nations appears to be
restricted, hence, the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs who own those
polluting industries, such as paper making, leather processing,
petrochemical making

and electroplating are forced to move or

relocate their industries to somewhere else, like Vietnam, which pays
less attention to environmentalism and has lax enforcement of
environmental laws.
The

Vietnamese

government's

indifferent attitude

towards

environmental protection is evidenced by the fact that it has
Cheng, Humg Yu, 'Taiwan's Economic Relations with Southeast Asia', in Klintworth, Taiwan in
the Asia-PAcific in the 1990s, p. 127

established an ineffective and vague national environmental Protection
law (EPL) which is an umbrella law establishing broad responsibility
and directions for environmental policy, administered by the Ministry
of Science, Technology and Environment. The EPL has provisions for
levying fines against polluters will be determined nor who will enforce
them, and it prohibits the "importation of technology and equipment
not meeting environment standards, but provides no means to
monitor equipment imports.
With this half-hearted EPL in view, it is clear that the lack of
political will and the commitment to active industrial policy as well as
foreign investment promotion have impeded the application and hard
enforcement of the environmental laws.
The

highly

market-oriented

and

resource-intensive

industrialization embarked by these four East Asian countries since
1960s and 1970s has enormously increased the pressure on the
renewable and non-renewable resources.

Pursuing this treacherous

pattern of industrialization,

these four East Asian nations are

exhausting

their renewable

and consuming

and

non-renewable

resources, such as agricultural production, fisheries, and minerals at
a remarkably rapid rate. Table 15 provides some information on the
agricultural and mineral production in individual countries — Taiwan,
Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia. The agricultural and mineral
production of each country has been declining since 1980. For

Sikor, Thomas O. & Rourke Dara O', 'Economic And Environmental Dynamics of Reform in
Vietnam', Asian Survey, vol.xxxvi, No.6, June 1996, p.607

example, Malaysia's production of natural rubber which was one of
the country's main export commodities is in decline. Tin and bauxite
are no exception. Hong Kong and Singapore have already run out of
agricultural and mineral production.

Agricultural and mineral

production in Taiwan are also in fast decline
Besides, the agricultural sector's and mining sector's share in
GDP of each nation has displayed a pronounced decline (See Table
19). For example, Malaysia's agricultural sector had declined from 40
percent in 1960 to 1990; the mining sector had declined form 14
pecent in 1970 to 7 percent in 1990. But, the manufacturing and
services sector grew strongly from the 1970s and has overtaken
agriculture and mining in its share of GDP. Within two decades, from
1970 to 1990, the manufacturing's share of Malaysia's GDP soared
from only 14 percent to 28 percent; the services share of GDP tripled
from 15 percent to almost 45 percent.
In the case of Taiwan, the country's production base has been
the growing share of industry and services at the expense of agriclture
and

mining.

contribution

(See
to

Table

GDP

of

19).
both

The

agriculture's

nations

was

and

eclipsed

mining's
by

the

manufacturing and services sectors which have become the dominant
share of GDP of the two countries.

Nations

Year
1980
i 1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
Year
1980
1989
1990
; 1991
1992
1993
Year
1980
: 1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
Year

MALAYSIA
Production of Natural Rubber ('000 Tonnes) Production of Tin And Bauxite (Tonnes)
Tin
Bauxite
1,530.0
1,415.3
1,291.5
1,257.2
1,173.2
1,074.3

61,404
32,034
28,468
20,710
14,339
10,384

920,356
355,174
398,180
376,418
330,593
68,824

SINGAPORE
Agricultural Production ('000 Metric Tons)
Coconut
Sugarcane

Mineral Production ('000 m.t)

HONG KONG
Agricultural Production ('000 metric Tons)
Ve|![etable
Rice or Paddv

Mineral Production ('000 m.t)
• Feldspar
Kaolin

11
2
1
1
1
0

2
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
^ 0

195
131
112
105
95
91

0
0
0
0
0
0
3
5
4
0
0
0

1
0
0
0
0
0

TAIWAN
Mineral Production ('000 Metric Tons)
Agricultural Production ('000 Metric
Tons)
Natural Gas Crude Petroleum Coal
Rice (brown> Banana Soy Beans

1708 .
211
2574
214
26
2354
1158
135
784
198
11
1865
1129
260
472
201
8
1807
765
157
402
196
8
1819
630
103
335
196
9
1628
587
n/a
327
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a refers to not available
Source : Compiled from Kev Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries 1994, Asian
Development Bank, vol.xxv, 1994 and Statistics on Commodities, Ministry of Primary
Industries, Malaysia, July, 1994.

1980
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

Table 19: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector of The Four East Asian Naions,
1960-1990 (Percentage)
MALAYSIA
Agriculture
Mining
Manufacturing
Services

1960

40
6
9
5

1970

37
14
14
15

1980

23
10
20
30

1990

19
7
27
43

T A I W A N(Table 19 Continued)
Agriculture
Mining
Manufacturing
Servies

26
3
22
n/a

9
1.7
43
46.9

6.7
0.7
43
47.5

3.5
0.3
28
59.1

0.9
0
23.9
22.9

0.3
0
25
32

1.4
0.2
28.8
17.2

0.2
0.1
26.0
30.5

HONG KONG
Agriculture
Mining
Manufacturing
Services

4
0.4
n/a
n/a

2
0.2
30.9
14.9
SINGAPORE

Agriculture
Mining
Manufacturing

3.5
0.8
15
10

2.5
0.4
19.7
14.2

Services
n/a refers to Not Available
Source : Compiled from Kok Swe Kheng, Malaysia to 2003 From Redistribution to Growth. The
Intelligence Unit, United Kingdom, 1994, pp.42 & 43; Country Report : Singapore. The
Intelligence Unit, United Kingdom, 1982 to 1992; Country Report : Hong Kong. The
Intelligence
Unit, United Kingdom, 1986 to 1992; Country Report : Taiwan. The
Intelligence Unit, United Kingdom, 1980 to 1990.

Economist
Economist
Economist
Economist

In the light of these decreasing trends in agricultural and
mineral production and share of GDP, it is clear that these four East
Asian nations are facing serious scarcity of renewable and nonrenewable resources which are so vital for economic development.
Under such circumstances, the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs
of these four East Asian nations have to seek other places, such as
Vietnam which is endowed with abundant un^exploited renewable and
non-renewable resources.

Table 20 shows the overseas Chinese

companies of the four East Asian nations investing in the agricultural,
fishery and aquaculture, and mining sectors in Vietnam.
Table 20 : The Investment of The Overseas Chinese Companies in Agriculture,
Fishing and Aquaculture, and Mining in Vietnam
Companies of The overseas
Project Title
Project Operation
Chinese
Malaysia Rubber Development Corp.

N/A

Planting
rubber

IJM Corporation Berhad (Malaysia)

N/A

Planting and processing cocoa
and rubber.

Mycom Berhad (Malaysia)

N/A

Planting
and
agricvdtural crops.

Amanda Aquaculture Pte.Ltd

A.C.S. Shrim Co.(J.V) Ltd

and

processing

processing

Breeding and trading shrimp

Table 20 (Continued)
Nagarjuna Holdings
Ltd. (Singapore)

Vietnam

Pte.

South Wing Sea Product Pte. Ltd
(Singapore)
High
Horizon
(Singapore)

Invest

Pte.

Ltd

EIFO Co. Ltd.

Vietnam Nagarjuna Intern Co.
Ltd.
Sing Viet J . V Ckjmpany

Nguyen San Ltdd CO.

Trang Bom Marble Exploration
Co.

Plantuig Sugarcane and sugar
processing
Fishing and producing
powder for livestock

fish

Fishing and processing seafood

Marble Mining

Top-Mill Enterprise Corp. (Taiwan)

N/A

Raising livestock & poultry
and pigs and processing meat.

Oceanic Enterprise (Taiwan)

N/A

Catching
and
seafood for export

Formosa Co. Ltd and Jello Hung Co.
(Taiwan)

Formasa Aqua Co. Ltd.

processing

Raising and processing
and ducks

fish

Galore Industrial Taiwan

Puree Farming Industry
(Vietnam) Ltd.

To farm and process shrimps
and lobsters

Taiwan Sugar Corp., King Car Food
Industrial Co.Ltd., Imei Food Co. Ltd.
and Fu-Mei Co.Ltd(Taiwan)

Vietnam-Taiwan Sugar
Company Ltd.

Planting Sugarane and
poducing sugar and honey

United Agriculture Co.Ltd. (Taiwan)

Lam-Tai Co.Ltd.

Planing vegetable, fruit seeds

Halim International (Hong Kong)

N/A

Marble Mining

Golde
Resources
Development
International Ltd. (Hong Kong)

N/A

Gowing and processing high
quality rice for the Hong Kong
market

Chia Hsin Vietnam Co. Ltd. (Hong
Kong)

N/A

Raising
livestock
processing fi-ozen meat

Asia Pacific Agriculture
Development Co.

To
grow
and
veggetables for export

Tanjun International
Kong)

Ltd. ( Hong

and

process

Source : ¿Compiled from Appendixes Tables A, B, C, and D

So far, not all the overseas Chinese companies of the four East Asian
nations have invested in the mining sector.

But, those overseas

Chinese companies have indicated their interest in investing in the
mining sector in Vietnam.

For instance, the Johan Holdings of

Malaysia ( controlled by Tan Kay Hock and his family), Senky Mining
Co. Sdn.Bhd. of Malaysia ( owned by Tan Seng Kee), and Sungei Way
Quarry Industries Sdn.Bhd. of Malaysia have sent a team to Vietnam

to carriy out survey on tin-mining, bauxite-mining, iron-ore mining,
and marble-mining.
Besides, the Straits Steamship Co. of Singapore and the Straits
Trading Co. Ltd. of Singapore have also undertaken a study on the
prospects of the mining sector in

Vietnam.

xhe overseas Chinese

companies of Taiwan and Hong Kong have already established their
respective companies to explore the mining sector in Vietnam.

For

example, the Trang Bom Marble Exploration Co., established by EIFO
Co. Ltd. of Taiwan, is operating to extract marble.(See Table 20)
These investments in Vietnam from the four East Asian nations
are involved in exporting agricultural and aquatic products to their
home countries. Hong Kong's investing companies in Vietnam, for
example, export thousands of tonnes of rice, meat and vegetables to
the Hong Kong market annuallly. Taiwan's investing companies also
export substantial amount of seafood and agricultural products to
Taiwan market. According to the managing director of Galore
Industrial Co. of Taiwan, the joint-venture project Puree Farming
Industry of Vietnam produce 1200 tonnes of prawn yearly and 60 to
70 percent of the prawn are exported to Taiwan.
The domestic markets of these four East Asian countries are too
small for the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs to reap more profits.
This is because the current population of each of these four East
Asian states is comparatively low (See Table 21).
^^^ Nanvang Siang Pau, 4 February 1998, pp. 1-2
Richardson, Graham, Singapore to 2003, The Economist Intelligence Unit, United Kingdom, 1994,
p.32

Table 21 : Population of the Five East Asian Nations
Country
Taiwan
Hong Kong
Singapore
Malaysia
Vietnam

Total (thousands) in
1995

Average Annual Growth
(%)

Projected Total (thousands)
in 2000

21,100

0.9

22,448

6,108

0.73

6,336

2,874

0.84

2,997

20,037

1.85

21,983

74,475

2.03

82,427

Source : Compiled from World Population Prospects 1990. No. 120, Population Studies, United Nations
Publication, N e w York, 1991 and Gale Country & World Rankings Reporter, Gale Research
Inc., Detroit, 1995

Furthermore, the population growth of each of the four East Asian
nations is slow and, the projected population in 2000 of each of the
four East Asian nations does not increase greatly, compared to
Vietnam (See Table 21). In this regard, these four East Asian nations'
markets are very unlikely to become vast and largely latent consumer
markets. Vietnam's growing population is also expected to have an
increasing GDP per capita at Purchasing-Power Parity (PPP) [See Table

22].
Table 22 : Vietnam's Expected Purchasing Power Parity from 2000 to
2025
2025
2020
2010
2015
2005
2000
The GDP Per capita
2716
2409
2154
2320
1424
1790
at PPP* (U.S.$)
*PPP refers to Purchasing Power Parity index which attempts to measure the real purchasing power of
nominal incomes across Vietnam.

Source : Tran, Cao Nguyen, Vietnam's Long -Term Economic Development : Viewpoint and
Solutions', Vietnam Economic Review, vol.32, No.2, 1996, p. 12.

Hence, the country's potential buying power of population should not
be underestimated.

In order to maximize their opportunity for

squeezing more profits, these overseas Chinese entrepreneurs have to
go for other populous countries, such as, Vietnam.
Arguably, the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs of these four East
Asian nations can export their production instead of making offshore

investment to expand their market and capture more consumers.
But, some countries, especially the developing countries like Vietnam
have imposed high tariffs on imported goods, such as foodstuffs,
garments, textiles, electronic and electrical equipment, and wood
products. High tariffs, undoubtedly, add to the cost of products, and
thereby the products become unaffordable for the average consumers
in that country.

In this regard, it is more .economical to invest in

Vietnam, which already has a favourable environment for foreign
investment, to capture the large consumer market than export to
Vietnam.

CHAPTERS
The Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs' Ways of Investing in
Vietnam, Distribution of Investment in terms of Spatial Location
and Sector in Vietnam
5.1

The Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs' Ways of Investing in
Vietnam

The inflow of these overseas Chinese entrepreneurs' investment
into Vietnam from the four East Asian countries is by various
government-owned or private-owned companies which range from
small and medium-sized firms to large conglomerates. However, most
of the government-owned or private-owned large conglomerates which
are mostly based in the overseas Chinese home countries channel
their

investment

companies.

into

Vietnam

via

their, subsidiary

or

parent

For example, the Temasek Holdings Pte. Ltd. which is a

government-linked

corporation,

uses

some

of

its

subsidiary

companies, such as Straits Steamship Land Ltd., Keppel Corp Ltd.,
and Sembawang Engineering Pte Ltd., to invest in Vietnam; the Hwa
Hong Corp Ltd. also made its investment in Vietnam through
subsidiary companies, such as Singapore Piling 85 Civil Engineering
Pte Ltd. and Econ Vietnam Investment Pte Ltd. (See Appendix Table A
for more details).

In the case of Malaysia, the United Engineering

(Malaysia) Berhad uses its subsidiary companies like Vista Spectrum
(M) Sdn., and Northern Eight (M) Sdn. Bhd. to invest; some others
such as MBF Holdings Bhd., Pengkelen Holdings Berhad, and Pilecon
Engineering Berhad invested via their main or parent companies
instead (See Appendix Table B for more details).

For Taiwan's and

Hong Kong's companies refer to Appendix Table C and Appendix Table
D.

However, the ownership and identity of some companies from

these four East Asian nations investing in Vietnam are difficult to
trace or recognize because of the complexities of cross share holding
and unrecorded company details.
On the other hand, the small and medium-sized companies of
these overseas Chinese entrepreneurs cany out their investment
through setting up another company or firm in Vietnam.

A few

examples are Glove Industry (Vietnam) Ltd. set up by Mr. Ng Hai Ping
of Malaysia, Hoa Trang Company Ltd. set up by Mr.Hsieh Sheng Ming
of Taiwan, the Lee Clan Trading Co. of Hong Kong, and Shu Sang Co.
of Hong Kong ( See Appendix Tables A, B, C, and D for more
examples).

Most of these small and medium-sized companies are

involved only in modest projects or investment, such as processing
food, making gloves, trading and others.
Most of the parent or subsidiary companies and the companies
established by small and medium-sized companies from the four East
Asian countries form joint ventures with foreign partners (the Western
or other Asian companies) or local partners ( state-owned and
Vietnamese-Chinese-owned companies) to invest in Vietnam.

Table

23 provides some information on the joint ventures formed between
the overseas Chinese-owned companies and the local companies of
Vietnam or foreign companies of Western and Asian countries, as well
as the type of projects involved.

Table 23 : Joint Venture Investment in Vietnam Between Overseas Chinese and
Vietnam or Foreign Partners

Conipanies of the Overseas
Chinese
Malayan Flour Mills

Vietnamese Partners or
Foreign Partners
VINA Food I Co. (Vietnam)

Joint Venture Name

Project

VIMA FLOUR LTD

Grinding Flour

I Vista Spectrum (M) Sdn.
Bhd. (Malaysia)

Hanoi Industrial
Construction Company
(Vietnam)

Noi Bai Development
Co.

Established to construct
new Noi Bai Export
Processine Zone

| G & T Equities Sdn Bhd
i (Malaysia)

MITSUI & Co. (Thailand)

Vietnam TNT Fibre Co.
Ltd.

Producing fibre of all
kinds

^ Pengkalen Holdings Berhad Industrial Construction Co.
i (Malaysia)
(Vietnam)

Grand Imperial Saigon
Hotel Ltd. Co.

Build and Operate a 5
star hotel

: AMANDA Aquaculture
1 Pte. Ltd. (Singapore)

Cuu Long Aquaculture
Company (Vietnam)

A.C.S Shrimp Co (J.V)
Ltd.

Breeding and Trading
Shrimp

i Goodman Fielder Overseas
I Holding Pte. Ltd.
: (Singapore)

The Australian Wheat Board
(Australia)
+VISSAN(Vietnam)

Vietnam Flour Mills Ltd. Grinding Flour

1 South Wing Sea Product
: Pte.Ltd. (Singapore)

Minh Hai Mechanical
Enterprise (Vietnam)

Sing Viet Joint Venture
Company

Producing fish powder
for livestock

Taiwan Fertilizer Co., Ltd.
1 (Taiwan)

Itochu Corporation
(Japan)+three other
Vietnamese Companies

Vietnam Fertilizer Joint
Venture W.,Ltd

Production of NPK
fertilizers

Johnson System Co., Ltd.
(Taiwan)

Mand M Apparel (Private)
Limited (Sri Lanka)

M.J. IMPEX Co., Ltd.

Garment Making

; Lieu Ya International Co
Ltd. (Taiwan)

Commerce & Construction
Co. (Vietnam)

Dong Tam Ceramic
Brick Producing JV Co.

Production of Ceramic
Bricks

j

Great Dragon International Hanoi's Housing Service Co. Thang Long Building
Co.(Hong Kong)
(Vietnam)
Ltd.

To rent apartments for
office and residential use,
offer business services
transport and tour
services

Source : Compiled from Appendix Tables A, B, C, and D

In addition, the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs also choose the form
of 'enterprise with 100 per cent foreign capital' to invest in Vietnam.
Table 24 shows some of the four East Asian nations' overseas Chinese
companies engagement in this form of investment.

i 08

Table 24 : Investment of Enterprises with 100 % Foreign Capital by the Overseas
Chinese

Eva Footwear Co. Ltd. (Hong
Kong)

DONA Victor Footwear Co. Ltd.

Making Sport Shoes

BODOK Trading Co. Ltd.
(Taiwan)

SHI JAR (Vietnam) Company
Limited

Manufacturing enamel bricks

BOTRON Enterprise Co. Ltd.
(Taiwan)

DONA BORTON Textile Co.
Ltd.

Making first material layer used
for the main body of sport shoes

Chu Hsing Garment Co. Ltd.
(Taiwan)

Chu Hsing Garment Vietnam Co.
Ltd.

Manufacturing garments and
bleaching garment products

WINAWA International co. Ltd.
(Taiwan)

SOCTRANG WINAWA
International Co. Ltd.

Producing female hygenic pads

Tanjun Int'l Investment Ltd (Hong
Kong)

Asia Pacific Agriculture
Development Co.

Grow and process vegetables for
export

Sadec Consortium & Emas
Utilities (Malaysia)

Binh An Water Supply

build water treatment plant

Nagarjuna Holdings Vietnam Pte.
Vietnam Nagarjuna Intern CoLtd. (Singapore)
Ltd.
Source : Compiled from Appendix Tables A, B, C, and D

Grow sugarcane & sugar
processing

Among these four East Asian nations, it appears that the overseas
Chinese companies from Taiwan are dominant in this form of
'enterprise with 100 per cent foreign capital (See Table 25).
Table 25 : Overseas Chinese Investment of Enterprises with 100% Foreign
Capital by Percentage in Vietnam, 1991 to 1995.
Country
Number of Projects'^
Percentage (%)
Taiwan
Hong Kong
10
22.2
Singapore
7
15.6
Malaysia
4
8.9
45
100
*Some of the n u m b e r s of projects may be underestimated due to the difficulty in obtaining
adequate data.

Total

Source : Compile from Appendixes Tables A, B, C, and D

There are two other methods of investment engaged by these
overseas Chinese entrepreneurs from the four East Asian nations.
They are the establishment of a contractual business cooperation with

a Vietnamese entity and the Build-Operate-Transfer Contract (BOT).
But, these two methods are not as common as the former two
methods.

5.2 Spatial Location of Overseas Chinese Investment in Vietnam
Overseas Chinese investment originating from the four East
Asian countries (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia) are not
evenly spread throughout Vietnam. Table 26, which gives a locationby-location breakdown of the four East Asian nations' overseas
Chinese entrepreneurs' number of projects invested from 1991 to
1995, shows that the overseas Chinese investment is concentrated in
the Southern part of Vietnam. The favourite and largest concentration
is in the Ho Chi Minh City.

There are also other significant

concentrations, such as Da Nang, Dong Nai,.Song Be, and Long An.
In the northern part of Vietnam, Hanoi and Hai Phong are the
favourite

and

significant recipients

of these

Overseas

Chinese

investment, but the volume of investment is still less than the south.
By juxtaposing

the

geographical

concentrations

of

these

overseas Chinese investments from the four East Asian nations with
the geographical distribution of the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, a
direct correlation can be observed (See Table 26 and Table 27).

Table 26 : Locational Distribution of the Overseas Chinese Investment in Vietnam (1991-1995^
MALAYSIA
«iNriAPODF

l.Ho Chi Minh City (S)
2. Hanoi
(N)
3.Song Be
(S)
4.Dong Nai
(S)
5.Da Nang
(S)
6.Hau Giang
(S)
7.Hai Phong
(N)
S.Lam Dong
(C)
9.Hai Hung
(N)
lO.Halong Bay
(N)
11 .Quang Ninh
(N)
12. Hue
(C)
TAIWAN

8
5
3
2
2
2
2

l.Ho Chi Minh City
2.Hanoi
3.Vung Tau
4.Thu Due
5.Hau Giang
6.Da Nang
T.Hai Phong
S.Long An
9.Tra Vinh
lO.Minh Hai
1 l.Gia Lai
12.Khanh Hoa

(S)
(N)
(S)
(S)
(S)
(C)
(N)
(S)
(S)
(S)
(C)
(C)
HONG KONG

l.Ho Chi Minh City (S)
14
l.Ho Chi Minh City (S)
2.Dong Nai
12
(S)
2.Hanoi
(N)
3.Da Nang
4
(S)
3.Da Nang
(C)
4.Song Be
4
(S)
4.Hai Phong
(N)
S.Hanoi
(N)
3
5.Hau Giag
(S)
6.Hai Phong
3
(N)
6.Dong Nai"
(S)
7. Khanh Hoa
3
(C)
T.Song Be
(S)
S.Hau Giang
3
S.Long An
(S)
(S)
9.Thu Due
2
9.Lam Dong
(S)
(C)
1 O.Long An
2
(S)
lO.Ha Tay
(N)
11. Vung Tau
2
11 .Quang Ninh
(S)
(N)
12.Thai Binh
1
(N)
12.Kien Giang
(S)
13.Kien Giang
1
n.BenTre
(S)
(S)
14.Lam Dong
1
(S)
14.Gia Lai
(C)
(S) refers to the southern part of Vietnam
(N)refers to the northern part of Vietnam
(C)refers to the central part of Vietnam
* Some of the numbers of project may be underestimated due to the difficulty in obtaining
data

2S
7
5
2
2

17
13
3
2
2

adequate

Source : Compiled from Appendix Table A, B, C, and D.

Most of the geographical locations in the South targeted by these
overseas Chinese for investment have quite substantial number of
ethnic Chinese. Locations like Ho Chi Minh City, Hau Giang, Dong
Nai, Minh Hai, and Song Be can be considered as a having large
ethnic Chinese population numbering between 10,000 and 524,000,
and also constitute 70.7 per cent of the total Chinese population (See
Table 27).

Table 27
Geographical distribution of the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam in the
1989
Territory
Ho Chi Minh City
Hau Giang
Dong Nai
Minh Hai
Song Be
Ha Bac
Cuu Long
Kien Giang
An Giang
Lam Dong
Thuan Hai
Ha Tuyen
Tien Giang
Dong Thap
Khanh Hoa
Phu Yen
Ben Tre
Tay Ninh
Da Nang
Hanoi
Long An
Haiphong
Dac Lac
Lang Son
Quang Ninh
Vung Tau-Con Dao
Bac Thai
Lai Chau
Binh Dinh
Quang Ngai
Hoang Lien Son
Hai Hung
Gao Bang
Gia Lai Kontum
Ha Nam Ninh
Vinh Phu
Son La
Ha Son Binh
Nghe Tinh
Thanh Hoa
Thai Binh
Quang Tri
Quang Binh
Thua Thien Hue
Total

Chinese
Population
(thousands)
524
102
85
40
32
25
21
21
19
10
10
9
8
7
6
0.4
6
6
5
4
3
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0.6
0.3
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.1

% of total
population

% of Chinese
population

13.3
3.8
4.2
2.5
3.4
1.2
1.2
1.7
1.0
1.6
0.8
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.9

54.4
10.6
8.8
4.2
3.3
2.6
2.3
2.3
1.9
1.0
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6

-

-

0.1

0.6
0.6
0.5
0.4

-

-

0.2

-

-

-

-

-

0.2

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.1

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

.

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.3

-

-

962

100

- Not Available
Source : Compiled from Tran, Khanh, The ethnic Chinese And economic Development in
Vietnam, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1993, pp.26-27.

On the other hand, places like Hanoi, Haiphong, Hai Hung, Halong
Bay, Quang Ninh, Ha Tay, and Quang Ninh which are located in the

north have small ethnic Chinese populations, ranging from 300 to
5000 (See Table 27). In view of this distribution, it is clear that the
Southern locations of Vietnam have more ethnic Chinese than the
northern locations. In the light of this, it can be concluded that the
locational concentration of these Overseas Chinese investments in the
south is clearly associated with the high density of the ethnic Chinese
population

clustering

in

the

southern

part

of

Vietnam.

The

phenomenon can be best explained by a few factors which are the
Vietnam's overseas Chinese cultural affiliation, entrepreneurship and
business skills, direct family

links, historically established de

facto business and trade ties with other nations' overseas Chinese.
These factors act as important inducements for these overseas
Chinese entrepreneurs to invest in Vietnam because they can provide
an excellent basis for borderless commercial
mentioned earlier in Chapter 3.1.7).

networking

( As

Of course, the ethnic Chinese

factor is not only reason for the overseas Chinese to focus their
investment on the south. There are other reasons which include the
southern region's more developed human and physical resources.

5.3

Sectoral Distribution of the Overseas Chinese Investment in
Vietnam's Economy
The

outward

investment

of

these

overseas

Chinese

entrepreneurs from the four East Asian nations into other East Asian
Gates, Carolyn L. and Truong, David H.D., Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Change in
Vietnam : Trends. Causes, and Effects, N I A S Report, No.20, 1994, p. 16

countries, particularly the Southeast Asian countries has been
traditionally and typically confined to property, trading, shipping,
hotels, and light industry (such as

textiles, toys, and food).

For

example, the Taiwanese and Hong Kong investment in Malaysia and
Indonesia

is mostly

concentrated

in textiles,

processing, electrical, computers and restaurants.

garments,

timber

The Singaporean

investment in Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand also very much
revolves around manufacturing, property and hotels.

Nevertheless,

the investment of these four East Asian countries' overseas Chinese
entrepreneurs has been channeled into various sectors of Vietnam's
economy. A break down of these overseas Chinese capital investment
in various economic sectors in Vietnam from 1991 to 1995 in Table 28
and Chart 6 shows an interesting phenomenon.

Taiwan
31
4
5
6
9
1
2
4
1
1

Hong Kong
13
11
9
6
2
1
4
5
1
1

Light Industry
Construction
Hotel 4& Tourism
Heavy Industry
Agriculture & Forestry
Infrastructure
Services
Fisheries & Aquaculture
Finance & Banking
Mining
Source : Compiled from Appendix Table A, B, C, and D

Singapore
19
17
4
1
•6
2
3
1
1
0

Malaysia
11
1
7
2
3
5
1
0
1
0

Total
74
33
25
18
15
9
9
7
4
2

Chart 6 : Overseas Chinese Investment in Vietnam, 1991 to 1995
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The list was headed by light industry, construction, hotel and tourism,
heavy industry, agriculture and forestry, infrastructure, services,
fisheries and aquaculture, as well as finance and banking. Although
these overseas Chinese investments remain in the traditional and
typical economic sectors such as light industry, construction, hotel
and tourism, finance and banking, small investment is also flowing
into other sectors. These other sectors are the heavy industry,
agriculture

and

forestry,

infrastructure

services,

fisheries

and

aquaculture which are not normally engaged actively and significantly
by these overseas Chinese entrepreneurs, but have now emerged
markedly (See Table 28).
The venture into other alien economic sectors did bring both a
quantitative and qualitative change to the nature of this overseas
Chinese capital in Vietnam. The heavy industry engaged in by these
overseas Chinese entrepreneurs of the foiir East Asian nations
encompasses

steel production,

cement and vehicles.

Taiwanese

investment in the heavy industry sector from 1991 to 1995 was
targeted on producing cement and motorbike spare parts,

and

assembly of motorcycles (See Appendix Table C ). The leading
Taiwanese companies

involved in these heavy industries are Ching

Fong Group, Lucky Cement Corp., and Universal Cement Corp. These
three companies had invested U.S.$858.3 million in setting u p cement
plants (see Appendix Table C). The investment projects in the heavy
industry sector conducted by the Singaporean companies comprise
building Mercedes cars, small buses, light trucks, and manufacturing
steel. The companies involved are Sembawang Group (subsidiary
company of Temasek Holdings), the Economic Development Board of
Singapore, Sinbus Engineering, Netsteel Ltd Co., and Boon Teck
Marine Steel Works (See Appendix Table A ). The Malaysian OverseasChinese-owned companies like the Nam Fatt Bhd. and Federal Iron
Works of Malaysia have also engaged in the heavy industry sector,
such as steel and iron production (See Appendix Table B). In the case

of Hong Kong, there is only one company, Steel Co. Std, involving in
the heavy industry sector in Vietnam (See Appendix Table D).
The diversification of these overseas Chinese investment into
heavy industry sector in Vietnam may be attributed to three
underlying reasons which are:(I) Vietnam's unexploited and rich mineral reserves (such as iron ore,
coal, and petroleum) provide the significant domestic source of raw
materials for the development of heavy industry.
(ii)

Vietnam has a good domestic market potential for the products

of the heavy industry, such as steel. Acccording to the estimation of
the Ministry of Heavy Industry, Vietnam's steel demand will reach 1.5
million tonnes by the year 2000.
(iii)

Establishment

of

a

long-term

economic

commitment

to

operating in Vietnam since heavy industry can act as the main
industrial

sector

stimulating

ancillary

activities,

especially

in

developing backward linkages, a lower relocation risk compared to
other industries.
Furthermore, these overseas Chinese entrepreneurs of the four
East Asian nations have also found a niche in the infrastructure and
services sectors.

During the five- years period (1991-1995), some

infrastructure has been established and upgraded by these overseas
Chinese entrepreneurs.

Table 28 shows that among the four East

Asian nations, Malaysia appears to be the major investor in the
infrastructure sector.

The infrastructure-related projects embarked

by the Malaysian Chinese-owned companies are a power plant built by
the MBF Holdings Bhd.; two water treatment plants built by IJM Corp.
Bhd.,

Sadec

Consortium

and

Emas

Utilities;

Noi

Bai

Export

Processing Zone built by Vista Spectrum (M) Sdn. Bhd., and Da Nang
Export Processing Zone built by Malaysia's South-South Corporation
(See Appendix Table B). Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan have also
carried out a few infrastructure projects, such as developing and
upgrading seaports, building power plant, and Export Processing
Zone.

In the services sector, the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs of

these four East Asian nations have attempted to provide some
shipping, trading, marketing, management, and accounting services.
With all this in view, overseas Chinese entrepreneurs have
displayed a very different investment pattern from that of the
Japanese, the Americans, and the Europeans in developing countries,
such as Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines.

The investment

made by the United States, Japan and the European countries in the
developing countries is concentrated more on manufacturing industry
and mineral exploration (See Table 29, Table 30, and Table 31).

Table 29 : Japanese Direct Investment in Malaysia by Sector, 1976 and 1986
Sector

1976

1986

Agriculture/fishery

4.5
25.7
57.6
0.8
8.4

2.3
11.5
66.7
3.8
15.6

Mining
Manufacturing
Banking/insurance
Other Services

1991,p.ll4

Table 30 : U.S. Direct investment in Malaysia by Sector, 1976,1987, and 1988
Sector

1976

1987

1988

Petroleum

66.3

63.4

36.1

Manufacturing

18.1

29.6

60.1

Trade

9.3

4.7

2.5

Banking, Finance & Insurance

1.7

0.3

0.6

Services

n/a

0.0

0.0

Other Industries

3.3

2.1

0.6

n/a refers to not available
Source : Mohamed A r i f f , The Malaysian Economy : Pacific Connections. Oxford University Press. Sineaoore.
1991,p.ll6.

Table 31 : Complementarity in United States and Japanese Inyestment in Indonesia,
1980 (Percentage)
Sector

United States

Japan

84

121

Manufacturing

9

31

Food

1

n

Textiles

2

14

Wood and Paper

n

n

Chemicals

2

4

Metal Products

4

11

Electrical Products

0

0

Machinery transport

0

0

Other

1

1

Services

2

1

Mining and Petroleum

n = N e g l i g i b l e (less than 1 per cent)
Source : Hill, Hall, Foreign Investment and Industrialization in Indonesia, O x f o r d University Press,
U . S . A , 1988, p.76

Heavy industry and infrastructure sectors have not been paid any
attention.

The services and other sectors are easily surpassed by

manufacturing (including food, textiles, wood, paper and chemical)
and mining.

Compare this to Japanese or American investment

pattern in those developing countries with the overseas Chinese
entrepreneurs'

investment

in

Vietnam,

investment pattern is more diversified.

the

overseas

Chinese

Sticking with the traditional

and typical sectors yet venturing into other sectors, the overseas
Chinese entrepreneurs are not only diversifying and expanding their
business, but also penetrating into the framework of Vietnam's
economic development and improving the infrastructural capacity
which is imperative for sustaining Vietnam's pell-mell economic

growth.

With this diversified and penetrating investment pattern in

view, the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs have not only demonstrated
some major commercial commitments in Vietnam, but also the great
possibility to take on the key role in shaping the economic structure of
Vietnam and intensifying the pace of Vietnam's economic reforms.

CHAPTER 6
The Prospects of Vietnam's Integration into Regional and the
World's Economy
6.1 The Growing Exports and Trade Activity of Vietnam
The

expansion

of

the

main

economic

sectors,

such

as

agriculture and industry in Vietnam has been quite substantial since
the Vietnamese government initiated economic reforms in 1986. The
economic reforms have caused a surge in agricultural production (See
Table 32).

1988

Table 32 : Vietnamés Agricultural Production Indices
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

1994

116.28

121.06

132.25

122.57

122.79

127.0.1

132.14

Source : Compiled from F.A.O. (Food and Agriculture Organization) Yearbook Production, vol.48,
1994

Agricultural production indices of Vietnam have shown a constant
rate of growth since 1988, from 116.28 to 131.25. Table 33 indicates
that a remarkable increase in production of major crops were achieved
during the years 1986-1991.

Crop
Paddy
Coffee
Rubber
Coconut
Pepper

Table 33 ; Production Of Major Crops (1000 tons) in Vietnam
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
16,003
19

1991

15,103

17,000

18,996

19,225

19,426

21

31

41

60

n.a.

50

52

50

51

58

n.a.

711

791

857

872

895

n.a.

7:1

8.0

n.a.

n.a.

3.6

6.2

Source : Compiled from Nguyen Xuan Oanh and Grub, Phillip Donald, Vietnam : The N e w Investment
Frontier in Southeast Asia, Times Academic Press, Singapore, 1992.

Industry has also experienced high rates of growth in the economy, in
absolute as well as relative terms. During the period 1981-1990, the

industrial sector grew at an average 6.8 per cent per annum.isi From
1991 up to 1995, the growth rate varied from about 9 to more than 11
per

c e n t . 182

Large-scale, centrally-managed, state-owned enterprises

dominated the sector as production of crude oil, coal, fertiliser and
building materials all increased rapidly.

Output of non-state

industries which included food processing, textiles and garments,
leather tanning, shoe making and wood processing and handicrafts,
increased by close to 10 per cent.^^^
In view of all this, the level of production in agricultural and
industrial sectors has really been raised. With this increasing level of
agricultural and industrial production, and the government's opendoor policy, the position and performance of Vietnam's exports have
been considerably changed and boosted. . Table 34 shows the
structure of Vietnam's merchandise exports from 1986 to 1993.
Table 34 : Vietnamés Merchandise Exports from 1986 to 1993
1986
Merchandise exports (U.S.$ million)
376
% agriculture-intensive
77.5
% capital-intensive
2.4
% labour-intensive
11.2
% minerals-intensive
8.1
Source : Compiled from Asia-Pacific Profiles 1995.
1995

1990
1438
55.4
2.9
9.5
31.4
Asia Pacific

1991
1992
1993
2027
2677
2941
51.3
39.2
32.1
1.4
2.1
2.6
12.3
21.9
30.3
34.9
36.2
34.4
Economics Group, ANU, Canberra,

The growth rate in merchandise exports has increased steadily from
U.S.$376 million in 1986 to U.S.$ 3600 million in 1994.
intensive, agriculture-intensive, and labour-intensive

Minerals-

commodities

Nguyen, Ngoc Lan. Investment Pattern, Trade, And Economic Growth in ASEAN And AFTA :
Implication For Vietnam, Department of Economics, University of Wollongong, Australia, 1995, p.l 14
183

m

ibid, p.l 15

have made up 34.4 per cent, 32.1 per cent and 30.3 per cent of the
merchandise exports respectively. The shares of agriculture-intensive
commodities have declined markedly since 1986 while the shares of
the labour-intensive and minerals-intensive commodities have risen.
Nevertheless, Vietnam is still relying on primary products for export
earnings. Arguably, the primary products will only stay as the main
export earner for a certain period of time, and then give way to the
light industry products.

Table 35 shows Vietnam's top ten leading

exports which are dominated by primary products but the light
industry products, such as textiles, garments and shoes are picking
up. In the light of all this, it is clear that Vietnam has the potential to
become an export-oriented economic dynamo.

1994
1993
1992
976.40
861.00
805.00
Crude Oil
555.00
350.00
221.00
Textiles & Garments
480.00
370.00
307.00
Sea Products
405.00
350.00
418.00
Rice
114.70
84.00
62.00
Coal
110.00
24.00
16.00
Shoes
97.50
85.00
91.40
Coffee
70.00
70.00
67.00
Rubber
60.00
31.30
41.40
Cashew Nuts
45.00
46.70
32.00
Peanuts
Source : Harvie, Charles, Economic Reform And Future Prospects of The Vietnam Economy,
University of Woilongong, Australia, 1996, p. 20.

The increase of exports coupled with an outward-looking
strategy adopted by the Vietnamese government have intensified
Vietnam's trade activity. According to the figures from Table 36, by
region. East Asia accounted for 78.7 per cent of Vietnamese trade.

Europe 12.2 per cent, Oceania 1.15 per cent, and North America and
Caribbean 0.92 per cent.

Table 36 : Major Trading Regions with Vietnam in 1991-1993, Percent of Total
Turnover
Regions

Exports

Imports

Exports & Imports

79.74

77.59

78.72

Europe

9.79

14.97

12.23

Oceania

0.96

1.36

1.15

North America & Caribbean

0.68

1.19

0.92

East Asia

South America
0.16
0.01
n/a
n/a refers to not available
Source : Compiled from Ngyuen, Ngoc Lan, Investment Pattern, Trade And Economic Growth in
A S E A N And A F T A : Implications for Vietnam, University of Wollongong, Australia, 1995,
p.130.

Clearly, Vietnam's trade has been increasingly oriented towards East
Asian countries.

Among the Northeast Asian countries, Japan,

Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea are the major trading partners
(See Table 36).

Japan and Hong Kong are the leading countries

because their exports to and imports from Vietnam have grown
tremendously since 1986. Meanwhile Singapore has emerged as the
leading trade partner among the Southeast Asian nations. Singapore
has played the role as the main exporter and importer in trading with
Vietnam since Singapore's exports to and imports from Vietnam have
increased at a breakneck pace (See Table 37). Other Northeast and
Southeast Asian

nations

like Taiwan,

South

Korea,

Malaysia,

Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines have also increased trade
with Vietnam as seen in Table 37.

Northeast Asian Countries' Exports
Japan
Taiwan
Hong Kong
South Korea
Northeast Asian Countries' Imports
Japan
Taiwan
Hong Kong
South Korea
Southeast Asian Countries Exports
Singapore
Malaysia
Indonesia
Thailand
Philippines
Southeast Asian Countries' Imports

1986

1987

37
n/a
97
n/a

130
n/a
103
n/a

1986

1987

135
n/a
40
n/a

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

261
3.5
139
25

340
28.1
147
25.6

520
45
157
60

913
n/a
275
n/a

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

138
n/a
52
n/a

222
n/a
28
n/a

106
1
103
15.6

174
40
197
51.5

189
60
202
65

192
155
281
n/a

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

130
15
4.2
1.6
n/a

120
12.6
5.4
2.6
0.3

140
24.6
5.7
8.3
n/a

70
36.4
19.5
30.4
19.3

194
41.3
38.4
86.7
104

250
34
n/a
n/a
n/a

503
39
125
72
n/a

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

162 •
n/a
123
n/a

42
881
n/a
80
498
636
n/a
Singapore
7.0
n/a
9.5
3.8
6.8
11.9
1.6
Malaysia
32.2
21.1
30.0
25
90
5.4
26.9
Indonesia
34
15.2
22.5
86
1.2
4.7
5.1
Thailand
12
46
13.6
14.6
9.8
2.8
Philippines
1,9
n/a refers to not available
Source : Compiled from Mya, Than & Tan, Joseph L.H.(ed), Vietnam's Dilemmas And Options : The
Challenge of Economic Transition in the 1990s, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
Singapore, 1993, pp.229,230,231; Lim, Chee Peng, "ASEAN-Indochhina relations :
Prospects and scope for enhanced economic co-operation", East Asian Economies
Transformation And Challenges, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Singapore, 1995,
pp312-314.

With all this in view, it is clear that these East Asian countries,
especially, Japan, newly industrialized economies (NIEs), and ASEAN
can play an increasingly important role in Vietnam's trade. However,
the amount of trade conducted between these East Asian Countries
and Vietnam still leaves much room for expansion. Additionally, the
flows of foreign direct investment from those East Asian nations.

especially the Overseas Chinese entrepreneurs' investment from
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia to Vietnam can create
closer trade relations
America.

compared with other countries in Europe or

Hence, the trade between Vietnam and these East Asian

nations is very likely to become more significant and interdependent
for both sides.

6.2 Vietnam's Integration into ASEAN, AFTA, APEC, and WTO
With its high agricultural and industrial productivity and
output, voluminous foreign direct investment, and growing and
expanding trade ties which have contributed to sustained GDP growth
in the range of 6 to 9.5 per cent per annum, Vietnam gained full
membership of ASEAN successfully in July 1995. The implications of
ASEAN membership are widespread, ranging from more access to
international funding and investment to alignment with other member
nations on trade issues.

However, the most important point is

membership reflects that a basis for common approaches and
interests between Vietnam and ASEAN has been created.
Being

a

member

of

ASEAN,

Vietnam

has

shown

its

determination to immerse itself rapidly in ASEAN's co-operation
network. Since joining ASEAN in July 1995, Foreign Minister Nguyen
Manh Cam pledged : 'As a full member of ASEAN, Vietnam [will] fulfill
all obligations and responsibilities of a member country to the targets,
objectives, principles and regulations that have been clearly specified

in the ASEAN basic documents, including its joining in AFTA'.i»^
an interview given to The Nation ( a Bangkok-based newspaper) prior
to the fifth ASEAN Summit held in Bangkok, the Prime Minister stated
that, "under specific conditions, we will do all that is necessaiy to fully
participate in the work of ASEAN, contributing actively to peace,
stability and co-operation in the

region".^^^

JQ

this end, in September

1995, the Vietnam Bank Association (VBA) joined the ASEAN Banks
Association (ABA) and Vietnam joined the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary
Organization (AIPO).i®® In October 1995, the Vietnamese government
set up the National ASEAN Committee headed by Vice-Premier Tran
Due

Luong.i®'^ Almost

simultaneously,

a directive

was

issued

demanding that all ministers or ministerial-level institutions set up
sub-committees to conduct research aimed at promoting relations
with ASEAN. The National Assembly of Vietnam also adopted the first
adjustment on taxation in preparation for joining the ASEAN Free
Trade Area (AFTA) beginning from 1 January 1996.i®®
These are all the examples of Vietnam's commitment to
participating in all activities and associated organizations of ASEAN
although Vietnam may experience short-term difficulties in complying
with ASEAN's requirements on the road to total integration.

'Vietnam's Integration into A S E A N Gathers Pace', The Standard Chartered Indochina Monitor,
vol.4, No. 12, December 1995, p. 10
Hoang, Anh Tuan, ' A S E A N Dispute Management : implications for Vietnam and An Expanded
A S E A N ' . Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol.18, N o . l , June 1996, p.75
'Vietnam'slntegrationinto A S E A N Gathers Pace', op_cit, p. 11 •

m

Hoang, Anh Tuan, op cit, p.75

Taking all this into consideration, it is clear that Vietnam's
membership of ASEAN and commitment to it highlight the country's
desire to become not only a member of a regional community but also
the international one.

Moreover, Vietnam's entiy into ASEAN also

reveals the six-ASEAN countries' determination and ambition to
incorporate Vietnam which still adheres to communist ideology and
has a developing market economy into their more-developed market
economy and 'democratic' political systems.

All in all, Vietnam's

membership of ASEAN will give Vietnam long-term and constructive
economic

advantages

and

boost

its

image

regionally

and

internationally as a reform-minded market economy capable of
satisfying pro-market forces.

In this regard, Vietnam, with its

membership of ASEAN, has built a concrete cornerstone to pave the
way for joining the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) or even the AsiaPacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) and World Trade Organization
(WTO).

However, all this can apparently allow more room for those

overseas Chinese entrepreneurs' business manoeuvres and more
investment linkages to be formed.

Therefore, to deepen Vietnam's

economic engagement and integration with the region or the world,
the East Asian overseas Chinese entrepreneurs' continuing and
increasing investment into Vietnam as well as the expanding regional
or international trade ties are undoubtedly and exceedingly important.

CONCLUSION
Foreign direct investment (FDI), especially from the East Asian
countries overseas Chinese entrepreneurs has obviously become
increasingly

significant

and

influential

in

East

Asia.

This

phenomenon is becoming evident in Vietnam because of the recent
assertion of overseas Chinese entrepreneurs' colossal investment from
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia in the country. These
four East Asian nations' overseas Chinese voluminous investment has
outweighed other sources of foreign investment, such as Japan,
France, Australia, United States, and Switzerland. The surging inflow
of this overseas Chinese investments into- Vietnam can only be
observed markedly from 1991 to 1995 because the unfavourable
business environment from late-1970s to early-1980s which resulted
from the Communist government's centrally-planned economic model
and the political tension existing between the East Asian nations and
Vietnam, had hampered incoming foreign direct investment.
These four East Asian nations' overseas Chinese investment
rush to Vietnam can be attributed to the pull and push factors. The
pull factors which encompass the strategic geographical location,
abundant and untapped natural resources, potentially large domestic
market, cheap and highly literate labour force, relative political and
social stability, the introduction of the market-oriented doi moi
programme, and the availability of business-oriented and Confucianvalue-adherence ethnic Chinese community have conditioned Vietnam

nicely to become a magnet for these overseas Chinese entrepreneurs.
By themselves, the pull factors are not enough to prompt these
overseas Chinese entrepreneurs' investment in Vietnam.

The push

factors which concern the positive and negative political, economic
and social considerations arising or existing in these overseas Chinese
home countries, should be taken into account. The positive political
consideration which has been produced by the rapprochement
between these four East Asian nations and Vietnam, rapid increase in
bilateral visits and commercial interest, and the emergence of
increased interest in regional co-operation has indeed encouraged the
overseas Chinese entrepreneurs to invest in Vietnam.
political

consideration

confronted

by

the

The negative

overseas

Chinese

entrepreneurs in Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Taiwan has also provoked
offshore investment.
Development

Policy

The launch of Mahathir-sponsored National
or

NEP-type

restrictive

and

discriminatory

regulations and imposition, such as the 1975 Industrial Coordination
Act and the 1980s heavy industrialization policy on the Malaysian
overseas Chinese entrepreneurs has undesirably incited local overseas
Chinese making outward investment. The reversion of sovereignty of
Hong Kong on 1 July 1997 to China has inevitably driven the Hong
Kong's local Chinese entrepreneurs to invest abroad because the
reversion of sovereignty has cast doubt on the future well-being of the
legal and constitutional systems, human rights, business functions,
and human resources in Hong Kong. The unresolved and protracted

political tension created by the reunification issue between China and
Taiwan h a s led to the continuance of potential insecurity and risk that
h a s really unnerved the people of Taiwan, especially the business
community. Besides, the negative economic and social considerations
which comprise soaring land and labour costs, shortage of labour
force, stricter environmental-protective laws, scarcity of renewable and
non-renewable

resources,

and

small

domestic

markets

have

inexorably induced these overseas Chinese entrepreneurs to invest in
other countries, such a s Vietnam which h a s

a a rich pool of cheap

labour, a b u n d a n t natural resources, lax environmental laws and a
large domestic market.
The

investing

companies

of

these

overseas

Chinese

entrepreneurs which are government-owned or private-owned employ
different forms of investment, such a s joint venture, enterprise with
100 per cent foreign capital, contractual business co-operation, BuildOperate-Transfer Contract (BOT) to make their investment in Vietnam.
These

overseas

Chinese

entrepreneurs

have

not

only

invested

enormously in Vietnam, b u t also diversified their investment to
various

economic

sectors

of Vietnam,

such

as

light

industiy,

construction, hotel and tourism, agriculture and forestry, heavy
industry, infrastructure, services, financed and banking, and fisheries
and aquaculture. These overseas Chinese entrepreneurs' massive and
diversified investment in Vietnam which are largely located in the
Chinese-densely-populated southern part of Vietnam reveal a very

different pattern from the Japanese, the American, and the European
investment pattern in the developing countries. In the light of this, it
does seem clear that these overseas Chinese entrepreneurs can play
an increasingly important role in changing the economic structure of
Vietnam and intensifying the pace of Vietnam's economic reforms.
Vietnam's accession to ASEAN in July 1995, which was brought about
by Vietnam's growing significance in terms of economy and politics (to
certain extent), and the continuing and mounting foreign direct
investment of the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs in Vietnam can
facilitate the country's process of integration into AFTA, APEC, and
WTO.
All in all, the presence and position of these overseas Chinese
entrepreneurs in Vietnam's economic development are becoming
increasingly indispensable.

The magnitude of their investment in

Vietnam, the reasons generating their investment in Vietnam, and
their horizon of engagement in the economic sectors of Vietnam have
all suggested that these overseas Chinese entrepreneurs' wave of
foreign direct investment is irreversible and profound.

However, the

Western nations' and other East Asian nations', such as the United
States of America, France, Switzerland, Australia, Japan and South
Korea, investment in Vietnam should not be overlooked.

Their

investment is equally important and constructive for Vietnam's
economic development but the investment made by them from 1991 to
1995

seemed

to be

overshadowed

by those

overseas

Chinese

investment from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia. Yet, a
conclusive confirmation on the long-term and far-ranging influence
and impact of these overseas Chinese investment and entrepreneurial
role on Vietnam's economic development cannot be made because
more on-going and future research and data-collecting are needed.
For the time being, it does seem clear that their investment and
entrepreneurial role has carved out a crucial niche in Vietnam's
economy. Hence, these overseas Chinese entrepreneurs' foreign direct
investment is a driving force that should not be overlooked.
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APPENDIX TABLE A : SINGAPOREAN OVERSEAS CHINESE COMPANIES' INVESTMENT IN VIETNAM,
1991-1995
YEAR

NAME OF INVESTING
COMPANY

1991

Sembawang Maritime Ltd.
(Temasek Subsidiary)

Installation of floating
storage and loading
system

The Singapore shipping firm
Orient Lines (NOL)

Shipping services

Natsteel Properties Ltd.
Lim Kah Ngam Ltd.

Planergo Ltd.
- to build Hotel Equatorial

Steamers Telecommunication

To supply a mobile
telephone system

Tredia Investment

Contract to develop the
part of Vung Tau
The project is in the form
of a "build, operate and
transfer (BOT)"

905 million

Vung Tau

United Land and Trading Co.

To develop a 150 hectare
residential area in the
suburban district of Thu
Due

600 million

Thu Due

Sembawang Engineering Pte
Ltd. (Temasek Subsidiary)

To expand Vietnam's oil
refinery

5.6 million

Cat Lai

United Overseas Bank Ltd.
(owned by Wee Cho-yaw)

To open a representative
office

Straits Steamship Land Ltd.
(Temasek Subsidiary)

The project - "Saigon
Center'' to develop a
commercial complex

75 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Dragon Properties

To build Hanoi's tallest
building

41 million

Hanoi

Asia Pacific Breweries Ltd.

To build a brewery to
produce Tiger Beer

49 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Natsteel Ltd Co.

To build a rolling mill

8 million

Thai Nguyen

Property Company DBS Ltd.

To develop 90 service
apartment for foreign
businessman

7.2 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Keppel Corp. Ltd.
(Temasek Subsidiaiy)

To provide general ship
repair, ship building and
steel fabrication services

4.4 million

Ho Chi Minh City

1992

1993

1994

N/A : Not Available

PROJECT*

COST OF
PROJECT
(US$)
9 million

N/A

25 million

N/A

N/A

CITY/PROVINCE

off the coast of
Vung Tau

Ho Chi Minh City

Ho Chi Minh City

Ho Chi Minh City

Ho Chi Minh City

Ill

YEAR

NAME OF INVESTING
COMPANY

PROJECT*

COST OF
PROJECT
{US$)

CITY/PROVINCE

1994

Straits Steamship Land Ltd.

Signed an agreement with
Hanoi's Trade Union
Federation to turn its guest
house on the West Lake into
a complex of services
apartment, villas, restaurant
and a business center

100 million

West Lake of Hanoi

Cycle & Carriage Ltd.

To distribute Ford cars and
commercial vehicles in
Vietnam

N/A

N/A

United Land and Trading
Pte Ltd.

To build an office and
residential complex (4-Star
hotel, detached and semi
detaching housing, an
international school &
trading centers)

733 million

Ah Kanh area of
Ho Chi Minh City

Geomex Surveys Pte Ltd.

Business cooperation on
surveying and salvaging
sunken ship

3.79 million

N/A

Amanda Aquaculture Pte
Ltd.

A.C.S. Shrimco (J.V) Ltd.
- breeding and trading
shrimp

1.3 million

Tra Vinh

Goodman Fielder Overseas
Holding Pte Ltd.

Vietnam Flour Mills Ltd.
- grinding flour

18.6 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Mekong Holdings Pte Ltd.

Mekong-Hacota J.V Co. Ltd.
- constructing a building
complex and offices for rent
A turnkey contract to deliver
a special-purpose offshore .
platform for the Bach Ho oil
field

19.5 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Sembawang Engineering Pte
Ltd.(SEPL)
(Temasek Subsidiary)
Asia Resourse Corp Pte Ltd.

Plan to apply for licences to
build 2 bottling plants

1) Singapore Trade
Development Board
2) PICO Group

To build an exhibition and
convention centre
(TDB Holdings)(100% foreignowned)

N/A : Not Available

67 million

N/A

4.5 million

N/A

Hanoi
Da Nang
Ho Chi Minh City

APPENDIX TABLE A (CONTINUED
YEAR

1994

NAME OF INVESTING
COMPANY

PROJECT*

COST OF
PROJECT
{US$)
12.6 million

CITY/PROVINCE

1. Singapore Tobacco
Pte Ltd.
2. Guthrie GTS Ltd.

To build leisure complex
"Saigon Superbowl" include
32-lane bowling alley,
amusement center,
supermarket, restaurant and
fast-food outlets

1. Singapore Piling & Civil
Engineering Pte Ltd.
2. Econ Vietnam Investment
Pte Ltd
(Hua Hong Subsidiary)

Sinviet
- to cany out project
management in Vietnam
- initiating manage
construction of the Hanoi
Club and the Hanoi Plaza

8.5 million

Hanoi

Singapore Airlines Group
(SIA)

To provide Cargo handling
services at Tan Son Nhut
International Airport

15 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Far East Lavingston
Shipbuilding Ltd. (FELS)

To develop an office building
in the coastal town of Vung
Tau

23 million

Vung Tau

S.China Sea Pearls Co. Pte
Ltd.

Nha Trang Pearl Co. Ltd.
Fishing-100% foreign owned

5.5 million

Khanh Hoa

High Horizon Invest Pte Ltd.

Nguyen San Ltd. Co. (100%)

1.3 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Feal International

Tosac International Hotel
- to build and operate the
Hong Bang Hotel

11.55 million

Hai Phong

Lam Ho Investment

Ocean Place
- to build and operate a
hotel and office building

26 million

Hau Giang

Yuan Chemg Holdings Pte
Ltd.

Saigon Singapore
International JV Corp.
- to construct and operate
a high-rise office building

5.9 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Nippon Paint Co. Pte Ltd.

To produce high quality paint
(100% foreign-owned)

19.9 million

N/A

Sanyo Shompla Pte Ltd.

To produce high standard
plastic(100% foreign-owned)

6.2 million

N/A

1. Sembawang Group
2. The Economic
Development Board of
Singapore

Daimler-Benz Vietnam
Investment Singapore
- to build Mercedes cars,
small buses and light
trucks
- to 90 services apartments
for foreign businessmen

70 million

Ho Chi Minh City
Hanoi

7.2 million

Ho Chi Minh City

DBS Ltd.
N/A : Not Available

Ho Chi Minh City
(near Tan Son
Nhut Airport)

YEAR

1995

NAME OF INVESTING
COMPANY

PROJECT*

COST OF
PROJECT
(US$)

CITY/PROVINCE

Straits Steamship Land Ltd.

To develop an office complex
(18 storey office building)

20 million

RDC Vietnam Pte Ltd.
(Subsidiary of Resources
Development Corp. Ltd.)

1. RSC Vietnam Investment
Pte Ltd.
- to build luxury
apartments and offices
2. RDC Saigon Co. Ltd.
- to produce and sell
ready-mixed concrete
and bore piles

23.3 million

Ho Chi Minh City

3.82 million

Ho Chi Minh City

STL Trading Pte Ltd.

Dat Lai squid Prcs 86 Lacquer
Ex Co.
- squid processing, fine art
lacquer products

0.75 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Palmsville Investment
Pte Ltd.

Royal Garden-Quang Be
Joint Venture
- housing and hotel
construction

50.9 million

Hanoi

Asia Resource Corporation
Pte Ltd.

Bottle Top Production Joint
Venture(100% foreign-owned)
- bottle tops

2 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Komatsu Singapore Pte Ltd.

Saigon Komatsu Buiding
Machines
- construction of equipment

1.9 million

Ho Chi Minh City

CHNG Holdings Pte Ltd.

Fortuna Hanoi Hotel
Joint Venture
- construction of commercial
centre, office and hotel

13.5 million

Hanoi

Centrepoint Properties Ltd.,
Co.

Me Linh Central Ltd., Co.
- construction of office and
commercial centre

35.7 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Citra Sumit Valind
Investment Pte Ltd.

Vietubes Oil Pipe Co. Ltd.
- oil and gas products

8.6 million

Nagarjuna Holdings
Vietnam Pte Ltd

Vietnam Nagarjuna Intern
Co. Ltd.(100% foreign-owned)
- Sugarcane & sugar
processing

22.5 million

Long An

Vietnam Land Pte Ltd.

Centre Park Joint Venture
- construct of a 14 floor
building

12.9 million

Ho Chi Minh City

N/A : Not Available

Hanoi

Vung Tau

APPENDIX TABLE A (CONTINUED)
YEAR

1995

PROJECT*

COST OF
PROJECT
(US$)

CITY/PROVINCE

Transpacific Riverview
Pte Ltd.

Trans-Rose Joint Venture Ltd
- construction of offices hotels

36.5 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Everstrike Investment
Pte Ltd.

My Canh Office & Commercial
Centre
- construction of commercial
building construction

14 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Coopers & Lybrand
Indochina Pte Ltd.

Coopers & Lybrand - AISC Co.
- accountancy, auditing and
consulting

1 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Watson EP Ind

1. Watson Plastic JV

0.59 million

Ho Chi Minh City

2. Viet Thuan Viet Co.

0.59 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Netsteel Ltd. Co.

Natsteel Vina Co. Ltd.
- steel production

21.7 million

N/A

Boon Teck marine Steel
Works

Construction Steel Co. Ltd.
- manufacturing of
construction steel(100%
foreign-owned)

0.7 million

N/A

Xenon Manufacturing Pte
Ltd.

Manufacturing & Printing
Metal Bag Co. Ltd.
- manufacture and print
metal bags

1.7 million

N/A

Antara Koh Development Co.

Urban Housing 8& Development 48 million
Co.
- to build houses and offices

South Wing Sea Product Pte
Ltd.

Sing Viet J.V. Company
- producing fish powder for
livestock

0.9 million

Minh Hai

TCI Trading PTE.

Palm Song Be Golf Co.

15 million

Thuan An
Song Be

NAME OF INVESTING
COMPANY

Hau Giang

N/A : Not Available
* The numbers of projects may be underestimated due to the difficulty in obtaining adequate data
Source : Compiled from Indochina Digest (Electronic edition) [On line] from 1991 issue to 1995
issu^Available Internet : W3C/ANU File : The World Wide Web Virtual Library-Vietnam;
Vietnam Economic News from No. 16 April 1994 to No. 50 December 1995; Vietnam Economic
News from issue of January 1995 to issue of June 1995: Vietnam Economic Times from issue
of June 1994 to issue of January 1996; The Straits Times from 1992-1995.

APPENDIX TABLE B : MALAYSIAN OVERSEAS CHINESE COMPANIES' INVESTMENT IN VIETNAM,
1991-1995
YEAR

1991

1992

1993

1994

NAME OF INVESTING
COMPANY

PROJECT*

COST OF
PROJECT
(US$)

CITY/PROVINCE

The Malaysia Rubber
Development Corp.

Rubber processing plant

1.5 million

N/A

IJM Corporation Berhad

Planting and processing
rubber and cocoa

N/A

N/A

Mycom Berhad (owned by
Kwek family)

Planting & processing
agricultural crops)

N/A

N/A

Public Bank Berhad

VID Public Bank (VPB)

10 million

Hanoi

MBF Holdings Bhd.

To build a power plant

1.2 billion

HCMC

IJM Corp. Bhd.
(IGB Corp.'s Subsidiary)

To build a water treatment
plant

30 million

Hau Giang

Wellden International Ltd
[Subsidiary of Mulpha
International Bhd.]

To build a hotel

6.88 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Land & General Bhd.

Construction of a petroleum
storage terminal

100 million

N/A

Edaran Otomobil Nasional
Bhd.

Vina Star Motors Corp
- to produce minibuses

50 million

Song Be

Malayan Cement Bhd.

Produce ready-mixed
concrete

1 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Vista Spectrum (M) Sdn.
Bhd. with financing
banking from Renong Bhd.

Noi Bai Development Co.
- to construct the new Noi
Bai Export Processing
Zone (Concentrate on
the manufacturing
electronic items and high
technology goods)

20.5 million

near Hanoi's Noi
Bai Airport

Northern Eight (M) Sdn.
Bhd [Subsidiary of United
Engineering (Malaysia)
Bhd]

Noi Bai Golf Resort Corp.
- to build and operate
a golf course

14.7 million

near Hanoi

Faber Hotel Holdings Bhd.

To build a hotel

44 million

Hanoi

N/A : Not Available

APPENDIX TABLE B (CONTINUED)
YEAR

NAME OF INVESTING
COMPANY

PROJECT*

1994 Nevy Kit International Ltd. Vietnam Industrial Wood
JVCo.

COST OF
PROJECT
(US$)

CITY/PROVINCE

0.7 million

Hai Hung

Grand Imperial Saigon Hotel
Ltd. Co.
- to build and operate a
5-star hotel

48.5 million

Saigon

Royal Graft Co. Ltd.
- Wood & Ceramics

0.89 million

HCMC

Da Nang Export Processing
Zone

24 million

Da Nang

Pilecon Engineering
Berhad(owned by Hong
Lee Pee)

Saigon-Pilecon Engineering
Company

4.2 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Malayan Flour MiUs Bhd.

Vima Flour Ltd.
- grinding flour

15 million

Quang Ninh

Sinaran Manufacturing
Sdn. Bhd.

Sinaran Vietnam Co. Ltd.
- producing candles(100%
foreign-owned)

1.5 million

Da Nang

Saga Horizon Son Bhd.

Cooperation Contract
- surveying and salvaging
tin from ship wrecks in
Vietnamese waters

Mr. Ng Hai Ping

Glove Industry (Vietnam) Ltd
- manufacturing industrial
gloves and gaiirients

0.75 million

Hanoi

Viet-Nam Fatt Co.
- to construct a steel works
plant

2.73 million

Dong Nai
- Bien Hoa
Industrial zone

Goh Hoch

To construct a luxury resort

400 million

Halong Bay

Goh Hock Guan

Tourism projects
- construct tourist resorts
- upgrading a hotel
- establishing a tourist
services center

408 million

near Hue

Eng Chong Trading Co.

Dal Lat Import-Export
Industrial Co. Ltd.
- garment & fme-arts for
export

1.7 million

Lam Dong

Pengkelen Holdings
Berhad

1995 Nam Fatt Bhd

N/A : Not Available

N/A

Ho Chi Minh City

APPENDIX TABLE B (CONTINUED)
YEAR

1995

NAME OF INVESTING
COMPANY

PROJECT*

COST OF
PROJECT
(US$)

CITY/PROVINCE

Trenergy Gas Sdn Bhd

Trenergy Gas (Vietnam)
- cigarette lighters(100%
foreign-owned)

1.3 million

Dong Nai

Sadec Consortium & Emas
Utilities

Binh An Water Supply Co.
- water producing &
supply(100% foreign-owned)

30 million

Song Be

Tego Sdn Bhd
[Subsidiary of Kuok Bros.
Sdn. Bhd.]

Vinapack Joint Venture

2.25 million

Hai Phong

Saigon Bluechip Co.

Vimasafco

1.69 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Federal Iron Works of
Malaysia

Nippovina
- production of colour plated
sheet iron

1.2 million

Hau Giang

G & T Equities Sdn. Bhd.

Vietnam TNT Fibre Co. Ltd.
- producing fibre of all kinds
(100% foreign-ownedO

1.8 million

Song Be

N/A : Not Available
* The numbers of project may be underestimated due to the difficulty in obtaining adequate data
Source : Compiled from Indochina Digest (Electronic edition) [On line] from 1991 issue to 1995
issue-Available Internet : W3C/ANU File : The World Wide Web Virtual LibraiyVietnam; Vietnam Economic Nev^^s from No. 16 April 1994 to No.50 December 1995;
Vietnam Economic News from issue of January 1995 to issue of June 1995; Vietnam
Economic Times from issue of June 1994 to issue of January 1996; Nev^ Straits Times
from 1992 to 1995.

APPENDIX TABLE C : TAIWANESE OVERSEAS CHINESE COMPANIES* INVESTMENT IN VIETNAM,
1991-1995
YEAR

NAME OF INVESTING
COMPANY

1991

The Top-Mill Enterprise Corp.

To raise livestock 8&
poultry and pigs and
process meat

The Paradise Development
and Investment Co.

Vung Tau Fairyland

97 million

Vung Tau

Oceanic Enterprise

To catch and process
seafood for export

7.4 million

N/A

1. Formosa Co. Ltd.
2. Jello Hung Co.

Formosa Aqua Co. Ltd.
- to raise and process
fish and ducks

1 million

Ho Chi Minh City

1. Government-owned
Central Trade and
Development Corp.
2. Pan Viet Corp.

To build Vietnam's first
Export Processing Zone

90 million

740-acre zone
outside Ho Chi
Minh City

Ching Fong Investment Co.

Motorcycle assembly plant

95 million

Frank International
Investment Corp.

To build a residential
complex

70 million

Ho Chi Minh City
Hanoi
Thu Due

Seng Chi Condition
Machinery Company

A hotel and restaurant

3 million

Hau Giang

Ching Fong Investment Co.

To build a cement plant

288.3 million

Hai Phong

Ching Fong Bank
[an affiliate of Cathay
Investment and Trust Co. Ltd]

To open branch office

15 million

Hanoi

Taiwan's state-run Chinese
Petroleum Corp.

To build oil refinery

1.2 billion

N/A

Ching Fong Investment Co.

To build the group's third
motorcycle plant

Ngugen Phan Ltd. Co.

1. Binh Duong Frankfurt
Taxi
2. Viet Hung General
Agriculture Dev Co.

0.6 million

N/A

3.85 million

N/A

Ton Yi Industrial Corp.

lant to produce tin plate

5 million

1. Ching Fong Group
2. Chinese Petroleum Corp.

To build a liquefied
petroleum gas (LPG) plant

11 million

1992

1993

1994

- Not Available

PROJECT*

COST OF
PROJECT
(US$)
2 million

N/A

CITY/PROVINCE

Suburban district
of
Thu Due

Hai Tay

Ho Chi Minh City
Hai Phong

APPENDIX TABLE C (CONTINUED)
YEAR

1994

Lucky Cement Corp.

To set up a cement factory

COST OF
PROJECT
(US$)
190 million

Universal Cement Corp.

To build 2 cement factories

380 million

N/A

Central Trading and
Development Group

To foiHi a new town
(Saigon South)

more than
600 million

near Ho Chi Minh
City

Pan-Aqua Development
Co. Ltd

Nha Trang Shrimp Farm Co.
(100% foreign-owned)

0.7 million

Khanh Hoa

Vinh Linh Commercial
Co. Ltd

Reproduction Aquaculture
(100% foreign-owned)

1 million

Thai Binh

Galore Industrial Taiwan

Puree Farming Industry
(Vietnam) Ltd(100% foreignowned)
- to farm and process
shrimps and lobsters

7 million

Binh Thuan

1. Ching Fa Fishing
Equipment
2. Ching Sheng Fishing Net

Ching Fa Fishing Equip and
Net Co. Ltd(100% foreign- .
owned)

13.4 million

Dong Nai

Chun Cheng Trading Co. Ltd

Shrimp Farm An Phu JV

0.3 million

Da Nang

Orient Star International

Orie Himex JV Co.
- to build and operate hotels

19.5 million

Tan Sieu Knift Holding Co.

To produce industrial knives
(100% foreign-owned owned)

0.5 million

Hau Giang

Mr Juan Cheng I

Royal International Hotel Co.
- building a 5-star hotel and
entertainment project

39 million

Quang Ning

BODOK Trading Co. Ltd

BODOK Vietnam Co. Ltd
- manufacturing wearing
gloves

2.1 million

Hau Giang

Taiwan Ryder Co. Ltd

Da Nang International
Tourist Complex
- construction of Resort

32 million

Da Nang

1. Taiwan Sugar
Corporation
2. King Car Food
Industrial Co. Ltd
3. Imei Food Co. Ltd
4. Fu-Mei Co. Ltd

Vietnam-Taiwan sugar
Company Ltd
- producing sugar, honey •

66 million

Thanh Hoa

NAME OF INVESTING
COMPANY

N/A : Not Available

PROJECT*

CITY/PROVINCE

Ho Chi Minh City

N/A

APPENDIX TABLE C (CONTINUED)
YEAR

NAME OF INVESTING
COMPANY

PROJECT*

1994

SHI JAR Enterprise Co. Ltd.

SHI JAR (Vietnam) Co. Ltd.
- manufacturing enamel
bricks (100% foreign-owned)

1. Hitson, International Inc.
2. Gen Hong Food Industrial
Co. Ltd.

Phu Tai Tea - Agri Company
- planting and processing tea

2 million

Botron Enterprise Co. Ltd.

Dona Botron Textile Co. Ltd..
- first material layer used
for the main body of sport
shoes(100% foreign-owned)

3.69 million

Dong Nai

Chu Hsing Garment Co. Ltd.

Chu Hsing Garment Vietnam
Co. Ltd. (100% foreign-owned)
- manufacturing garments
and bleaching garment
products

2.33 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Winawa International Co.
Ltd.

Soctrang Winawa (100%
foreign-owned) International
Co. Ltd.
- producing female hygienic
pads

0.78 million

Soc Trang

1. Edisoned Industrial Corp.
2. TA YING Plastic
Industrial Co. Ltd.

The First Chemical Plastic
JV Co. Ltd.
- producing plastic pipe

1.5 million

Long An

1. Tien Fu Industrial
Co. Ltd.
2. Formosa Plastic Arts
Co. Ltd.

Thien Phu Co. Ltd.
- making art products of
Plaster, plastic, glass
and producing handle
implements

0.8 million

Song Be

Lincoware International Inc.

Lincoware International
(Vietnam) Inc(100% foreignowned).
- producing kitchen
implements

8.2 million

Song Be

United Agriculture Co. Ltd.

Lam-Tai Co. Ltd. (100%
foreign-owned)
- planting vegetable, fruit
seeds
Textile complex

0.5 million

Lam Dong

247 million

near Ho Chi Minh
City

Hualon Group

N / A : Not Available

COST OF
PROJECT
(US$)
12.82 million

C1TY/PR0VINCE

Song Be

Yen Bai

APPENDIX TABLE C (CONTINUED
YEAR

NAME OF INVESTING
COMPANY

1994

l.Mitorient enterprise Pte
Ltd.
2. Pan Viet Corporation

First Logistics Development'
JV Co.
- construction of container
port in Nha Be district

Grace County
manufacturing Co. Ltd.

Grace County manufacturing
Co. Ltd. (100%))
- producing multi-functional
connections for machines.
equipment

3 million

Lien Ya International Co.
Ltd.

Dong Tam Ceramic Tile JV
Co. Ltd.
- producing ceramic tiles

7.58 million

Long An

Lien Chin Industrial Joint
Stock Co. Ltd.

Viet Chin Industrial Co. Ltd.
- producing office chairs and
motorcycle seats(100%)

1.9 million

Dong Nai

Control Techniques
Worldwide B.V Co.

Hong Chi Co. Ltd. (100%)
- producing motorbike
brakes

0.7 million

Dong Nai

3.23 million

Dong Nai

1.94 million

Dong Nai

2.27 million

Dong Nai

1.02 million

Dong Nai

Ztong Yee Industrial Joint
Stock Co. Ltd.

SEE WELL Industrial Joint
Stock Co, Ltd.

Fong Hsiang Industrial Co.
Ltd

Kai Fa Industrial Joint Stock
Co. Ltd

PROJECT*

COST OF
PROJECT
(US$)
25 million

CITY/PROVINCE

Ho Chi Minh City

Hai Phong

Ztong Yee-Vietnam Industries Co. Ltd.(100%)
- producing vehicle batteries
SEE WELL Investment Co.
Ltd. (100% foreign-owned)
- producing electrical wire,
head lights and plastic
products for vehicles
Vietnam Precision Industrial
Co. Ltd.(100% foreign-owned)
- producing motorbike
spare parts
Kai Fa-Vietnam Industrial
Co. Ltd. (100% foreign-owned)
- producing shock absorbers
39 million

Mei Lai Co.

Ha Long Bay

International Royal Ltd Co.
(To build a 5-star hotel at
Bai Chay beach)
Mr. a n d Mrs :
C h u a n g Ching Shiu
J u a n g J a n Pei
C h u a n g Shen Chi
C h u a n g Sheng Gue
C h u a n g Shu Fen

N / A : Not Available

0.49 million
K Source-Vietnam Co. Ltd
- producing motorbike
mirrors(100% foreignowned)

Dong Nai

APPENDIX TABLE C (CONTINUED)
PROJECT*

YEAR

NAME OF INVESTING
COMPANY

1994

Broad Bright Enterprises
Joint Stock Co. Ltd

Broad Bright Industrial Co.
Ltd. ( 100% foreign-owned)
- producing motorbike
exhaust systems and
spare parts

Chiù Yi Joint Stock Co. Ltd

1995

COST OF
PROJECT
(US$)
4.1 million

CITY/PROVINCE

Chiù Yi-Vietnam
Co.Ltd. (100% foreign-owned)
- producing speedometers,
switches, electric wire
and locks for motorbikes

2.44 million

Ha Tay

Hiep Phuoc Power Co.

To build a 675 MW thermal
power plant to supply the Tan
Thuan Export Processing
Zone and the new urban area
in southern Saigon

205 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Central Trading
(Taiwan's Nationalist Party)

To build a 300 hectare
industrial zone

380 million

Ho Chi Minh

Double Johnson
International Co. Ltd

Double Johnson International
Co. Ltd. (100% foreign-owned)
- clothing

2.8 million

Hiep Thanh

CMS International Co. Ltd

Da Nang CSM
Company(100%)
- produce textiles for export

1 million

Jin-Wen Group

Vietnam Jin-Wen
enterprise JV
-to develop a 21-story hotel,
38 stoiy office tower and
a shopping center in a park

524.6 million

EIFO Co. Ltd

Trang Bom Marble
Exploration Co.

0.58 million

Dong Nai

Phyllis Trading Co. Ltd

Long Thanh JV

0.57 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Van Ban Co.

Hong Phat Decoration
Material JV, Ltd

0.87 million

Hanoi

South Pacific Invest

Vinapacific JV

0.44 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Moo Tsung Enterprise

Viet Thuan Viet Co.

0.58 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Full Dextinity Ind. Co.
Chingli

Ly Phu Dong JV

1.5 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Ho Asia Enterprise Co. Ltd

Tay Do Steel Co (TSC)
- to laminate steel products
investment capital

12.1 million

N/A : Not Available

Dong Nai

Da Nang

Ho Chi Minh City

N/A

APPENDIX TABLE C (CONTINUED)
YEAR

1995

NAME OF INVESTING
COMPANY

PROJECT*

COST OF
PROJECT
(US$)

CITY/PRO VINCE

Lieu Ya International
Co. Ltd

Dong Tam Ceramic Brick
Producing JV Co.
- production of ceramic
bricks

7.6 million

N/A

King Show International
Co. Ltd

Cooperation Contract
- producing insecticides,
cleaning substances
and flavor oil

6 million

N/A

Huacheng Toko electronics
Co. Ltd

Viet Shiang Electronics
Co. Ltd
- manufacturing
transformers

5 million

Dong Nai

1. Hoa Trang Company Ltd
2. Mr. Hsieh Sheng Ming

Hoa Trang Food Processing
Co. Ltd
- processing foodstuff

3 million

Song Be

Comforward Enterprise Co.
Ltd

Comforward Enterprise
Vietnam Co. Ltd
- producing carpets from
coconut fibre

1.427 million

Johnson System Co. Ltd

M.J Impex Co. Ltd
- Garment manufacturing

1.5 million

Taiwan Fertilizer Co. Ltd

Vietnam Fertilizer Joint
Venture Co. Ltd
- producing of NPK fertilizers

34.86 million

Vung Tau

Central Trading

60,000 hectares of land for
reforestation

27 million

Kien Giang

Ho Chi Minh City

Da Nang

N/A : Not Available
* The numbers of project may be underestimated due to the difficulty in obtaining adequate data
Source : Compiled from Indochina Digest (Electronic edition)[On line] from 1991 issue to 1995
issue—Available Internet : W3C/ANU File : The World Wide Web Virtual Library-Vietnam;
Vietnam Economic News from No. 16 April to No.50 December 1995; Vietnam Economic News
from issue of January 1995 to issue of June 1995; Vietnam Economic Times from issue of
June 1994 to issue of January 1996.

APPENDIX TABLE D : HONG KONG OVERSEAS CHINESE COMPAMNIES' INVESTMENT IN VIETNAM,
1991-1995
YEAR

1991

1992

NAME OF INVESTING
COMPANY

1994

COST OF
PROJECT
(US$)
3 million

CITY/PROVINCE

Hong Kong company joint
venture with Japan, Taiwan
and Hau Giang province

Meko-Hau Giang
- to produce leather,
clothing and lacquerware

New World Development
Co. Ltd

Construction of a 4-star
hotel

60 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Olympic Champion

To expand and manage
Hanoi's Noi Bai airport

160 million

Hanoi

A Taxi Company

2.2 million

Hau Giang

Bio-Organics International
Ltd.

Vegetables and fruit
farming for export (100%
foreign-owned)

4.2 million

N/A

Pacific Land Ltd

First Pacific Straits Land
Ltd
- to build an office and
hotel complex (60,000
sq feet office space in
2 buildings and 300room hotel)

75 million

Ho Chi Minh City

ABC Communications Ltd

Paging services

0.4 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Power V Company Ltd

To build a 675 MW Hiep
Phuoc power plant to
supply the Tan Thuan
Export Processing Zone

82 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Hong Kong Land Holdings Ltd

To build an office complex
(the fully air-conditioned
seven-story Central
Building)

7 million

Hanoi

Inchcape Insurance Holdings

To set up joint venture
- Inchbrok

0.125 million

Ho Chi Minh City
Hanoi

Subsidiary of Golden
Resources Development
International Ltd

For production plant to
process high-quality rice
for the Hong Kong market

10 million

Long An

New World Development Co
Ltd

1. New World Hotel Saigon

62.5 million

Ho Chi Minh City

25 million

Ho Chi Minh City

4.15 million

N/A

Investment Ltd
Tocobest Investment Ltd

1993

PROJECT*

Halim International

N/A : Not Available

2. 25 storey office tower
next to the New World
Hotel Saigon
Marble Mining (100%
freign-owned)

Hau Giang

APPENDIX TABLE D (CONTINUED)
YEAR

1994

NAME OF INVESTING
COMPANY

PROJECT*

COST OF
PROJECT
(US$)
0.6 million

CITY/PROVINCE

ACER Asia Pacific Ltd

ACER Consultants
(Vietnam) Ltd
- to provide services in
design, consultancy and
technical management
for construction project

Great Dragon International

Thang Long Building Ltd
- to rent apartment for office
and residential use,
- offer business services,
transport and tour services

2.7 million

Hanoi

Treasure Resources

Mandarin Hanoi Hotel
- to renovate and expand an
exiting building to become
a 3-star hotel

2.74 million

Hanoi

Price Waterhouse

Price Waterhouse
(Vietnam) Ltd
- Independent auditing and
financial consultancy

0.6 million

N/A

Intani Asser Ltd & Nan Kinh
International Economic &
Technical corp.

Capital Hotel
- to build and operate
a new hotel

13 million

N/A

Tung Shing Development
Inc.

Hanoi Tung Shing Square
- to build and operate
a trade centre

13.4 million

Hanoi

Hamon Properties (Vietnam)
Ltd

Nguyen Du Park Building
Co. Ltd
- on constructing two 18
story residential buildings

19.95 million

Ho Chi Minh City

AVIO Indochina Properties
Co. Ltd

Housing Development
Company in Quang Ba
- on building living quarters

3.22 million

Hanoi

Eva Footwear Co. Ltd

Dona Victor Footwear
Co. Ltd.(100% foreignownedO
- making sport shoes

7.9 million

Dong Nai

NASSAU International
Company Corp.

Bimin JV Co. Ltd
- producing garments and
embroidered products

0.72 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Vanny Chian Technology

- To build and house
monkeys to be used for
scientific purposes.

2 million

Dong Nai

N / A : Not Available

N/A

YEAR

1994

1995

NAME OF INVESTING
COMPANY

PROJECT*

COST OF
PROJECT
(US$)

CITY/PROVINCE

Wesfarmers Kleenheat Gas
(ASIA) Co. Ltd

Klean-Petro Gas Co. Ltd
- producing and trading
liquefied petroleum gas

12.5 million

Hanoi

Luks Industrial Co. Ltd

Luks-An Khanh
- to build and operate
an office and apartment
building

20 million

N/A

Chia Hsin Vietnam Co Ltd

To raise livestock and
process frozen meat (100%
foreign-owned)

38 million

Song Be

Joint Venture Company
between Hong Kong and
Vietnam

Danang Shipbreaking
and steel Co Ltd

4.7 million

Da Nang

Central States Trans Ltd

Aquaculture Farm Chien
Thang-Central.(100% foreignowned)

1.2 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Crown Trade Development

Saigon Airport Hotel
- to build and operate a hotel

24 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Tanjun International
Investment Ltd

Asia Pacific Agriculture
Development Co. (100%
foreign-owned)
- to grow and process
vegetables for export

2 million

N/A

PENTAD Constrution Co.
Ltd

PENTAD-LAVICO
Construction JV Co.
- Construction bidding
overseas

5.5 million

N/A

Kim Hai Tourism &
Investment Co.
- to build Kim Hai Hotel &
houses for rent

16 million

N/A

Golden Dragon Beer JV Co.
- producing beer

26 million

N/A

14.3 million

N/A

East Hall International Ltd

San Miguel

1. Procter and Gamble Far
East Inc.
2. Far East Co.

N/A : Not Available

Procter & Gamble Co.
- producing Cosmetics

APPENDIX TABLE D (CONTINUED
YEAR

1995

NAME OF INVESTING
COMPANY

PROJECT*

COST OF
PROJECT
(US$)

CITY/PROVINCE

Schmidt Vietnam
[Subsidiary of Schmidt
Group of Hong Kong]

Announced the launching of
the first phase of the Hanoi'
International Technology
Center

93 million

suburban district
of Hanoi

Th City Horse Trading Ltd

To construct an urban
development project

1.1 billion

Ho Chi Minh City

Cable and Wireless Pic.

To open representative office

Hong Kong Land
[Subsidiary of Jardine
Metheson Holdings]

To develop office building

1. Lee Hing Development
Ltd
2. New World Development
Co. Ltd

N/A

Hanoi

30 million

Hanoi
[near the French
colonial opera
house]

To construct a 21 -story
388 room hotel

43.5 million

Ho Chi Minh City

Swire Pacific Ltd

Construct of aluminum
can plant

41 million

HaTay

Paregrine Investment
Holdings

Peregrine Capital of Vietnam
- to engage in direct
investments and
financial advisory services

N/A

Ho Chi Minh City
Hanoi

Mainbrace Holding Limited

1, Cuu Long Shipping Joint
Venture
- ferry service (hovercraft)

3.5 million

Ho Chi Minh City

2. Mekong Maritime Co. Ltd
- passenger
Transportation
by sea-route

3.5 million

Ho Chi Minh City

21.4 million

Da Nang

2 million

N/A

RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co.

Da Nang-RJ Reynolds
Tobacco Co.
- cigarettes

Trueway International Ltd

Viet Hai International Ltd
- hotel renovation

N/A : Not Available

APPENDIX TABLE D (CONTINUED)
YEAR
1995

NAME OF INVESTING
COMPANY

PROJECT*

COST OF
PROJECT
(US$)

CITY/PROVINCE

Gammon ConstructionVietnam, Ltd

CCI-Gammon Construction
Co.
- Construction

2.7 million

Hanoi

Dabema's Asia Ltd

Gia Lai Wood Processing
- business cooperative

2 million

Gia Lai

Pactrade Company

Da Lat Fresh Food and
Mushroom Processing

0.5 million

Lam Dong

Gentle Glad Ltd

Gentle Glad Da Nang-fishing
( 100%foreign-owned)

1 million

Da Nang

Lee Clan Trading Co.

Quang Ninh Agriculture JV
(100% foreign-owned)

million

Quang Ninh

Shu Sang Co.

Kien Sang Aquaculture Co.
(100% foreign-owned)

0.9 million

Kien Giang

Truong Sa Sea-products

Farming & sea -product
export (100% foreign-owned)

0.5 million

Hai Phong

San Miguel Glass (Vietnam)
Ltd

San Miguel Hai Phong Glass
Co. Ltd
- producing various glass
bottles

27.3 million

Hai Phong

Goldtech Engineering Co.
Ltd

Goldtech Tuyen Phong
International Office Complex
JV Co. Ltd
- construction of a building
and operating office services

7 million

Ho Chi Minh City

American Vehicles
International Ltd

Ben Tre Activated Carbon
JVCo.
- producing coals from
coconut shell

1.5 million

Ben Tre

N/A : Not Available
* The numbers of project may be underestimated due to the difficulty in obtaining adequate data
Source : Compiled from Indochina Digest (Electronic edition)[On line] from 1991 issue to 1995
issu^Available Internet : W3C/ANU File : The World Wide Web Virtual Library-Vietnam;
Vietnam Economic News from No. 16 April 1994 to No.50 December 1995: Vietnam Economic
News from issue of January 1995 to issue of June 1995; Vietnam Economic Times from issue
of J u n e 1994 to issue of January 1996.
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